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
# **Soviet Union**

***KOMMUNIST***

No 13, September 1988

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## KOMMUNIST

No 13, September 1988

### Democratization of Inner Party Life

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[Article by Georgiy Petrovich Razumovskiy, candidate Politburo member and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee]

[Text] One of the characteristic features of the current situation in our society, the political outlines of which took shape after April 1985 and the 27th Party Congress and were particularly graphically defined after last January, is the great public—nationwide, one might say—resonance acquired by questions of party construction: they have become important and interesting for everyone.

This interest made itself felt in a particularly impressive manner during the preparations for the 19th Party Conference, when the party became the focal point of attention of communists and nonparty people within the framework of the general discussion which preceded the conference, and specifically in the discussion of the Central Committee theses. Our public was stirred by the unprecedented intensity and scale of the work done at the conference itself, as a result of which the party reached a higher intellectual and political level of understanding of the restructuring process, including topical questions of party construction. The active interest in the nature of party development and problems of party life is not only failing to abate but is, conversely, intensifying. The party must, after all, lead and energetically conduct the work to implement the conference decisions, to which we are directed by the July Central Committee Plenum.

## I

It is legitimate to ask what is the sociopolitical context of this increased interest in the party and in the style and methods of party organizations' work. The approach to many of the most important problems concerning the country's life and activity under contemporary conditions depends on the answer to this question. It follows that the extent to which the style and methods of communists' work corresponds to the spirit of the times also depends on this.

The point of the matter is that the Soviet people are becoming increasingly profoundly aware of the tremendous work which the party took on by starting the April changes on its own initiative. It is with the party that the people link the prospects for the country's social progress and their hopes for the future; they want to see a truly dynamic political force in each primary party organization, in each party committee, and in every party member. These hopes and aspirations which the people have

addressed to the party are, as it were, a reflection of the growing demands which the new stage in the revolutionary restructuring of society is placing on the political vanguard. The sense and orientation of these demands is primarily that the deep democratization of inner party life on the basis of Leninist principles has now become the most important condition for the intensification of the restructuring process, and one of the guarantees that it will be irreversible.

The party conference resolution "On the Democratization of Soviet Society and the Reform of the Political System" stresses that "The main feature of the present historical moment is to ensure that the activity of the CPSU corresponds in full not only in content but also in methods to Lenin's idea of the party's leading role in society." In practice this is expressed as shifting the entire political work of communists and the whole of inner party life to a democratic track, and as the transformation of the party into a true model of a socialist self-governing organization which exerts an active and formative influence on all processes in society. In short, the socioeconomic, sociopolitical, intellectual, and moral context of the restructuring process has lent acute political urgency to questions of party activity, and made them the subject of very broad public discussion.

Does it follow from this that it was only the 19th Party Conference that crystallized and affirmed the understanding that the restructuring process places major democratic transformations in the party's own life on the agenda? Of course not. As we know, the April CPSU Central Committee Plenum spoke out decisively in favor of democratizing the CPSU and completely reviving the Leninist standards of party life. The new edition of the Party Program adopted by the 27th Congress defines the deepening of inner party democracy as a guarantee of successful activity and a most important area of its development.

Among the guarantees of success for the restructuring process, the January 1987 Central Committee Plenum named the healthy development of the party itself, its capacity for critical analysis of its own activity, and its ability to renew the forms and methods of its work and to establish socialist democratism. Justifying the idea of convoking the conference and revealing the political intent behind it, the June 1987 Central Committee Plenum placed particular emphasis on the need to adopt a demanding new view of the work and life of every party organization in light of the tasks of deepening the restructuring process, as well as giving serious impetus to the democratization of inner party life.

In M.S. Gorbachev's speeches in connection with the 70th anniversary of the October Revolution, in the course of his meetings and journeys around the country, and at the February 1988 Central Committee Plenum, he has consistently developed the thesis that democratization must increasingly permeate the party from top to bottom, that party committees and organizations cannot

be allowed to lag behind the prevailing attitudes in society, and that any concessions to conservative and extremist epidemics are impermissible. The well-known PRAVDA editorial of 5 April 1988 reaffirmed the strategic nature of the democratization policy and the party's unbending resolve to put an end to authoritarian methods, to the practice of unthinking execution of orders and of suppressing initiative, to bureaucracy, and to freedom from control.

The 19th Conference arrived at its understanding of the urgency of democratic changes in the party on the basis of its in-depth study of the consequences of the personality cult and the stagnation period, which had a deforming influence on the party's life and on its style and method of work. One might say that the party engendered this understanding and, if you like, suffered through it. The need for deep democratic changes in the party itself was dictated by the realities of the contemporary political situation, by the tasks of revolutionary renewal of socialism, and by the successes and difficulties of the restructuring process.

In this context it is apposite to recall a fact mentioned by M.S. Gorbachev in his concluding speech at the conference. It is well-known that the principal aspects and areas of democratization were discussed in great depth and width by the January Central Committee Plenum. Its ideas and aims were not, however, supported by organizational mechanisms (including internal party ones) for their implementation. What happened was that these ideas were left "hanging in the air," at a standstill, and things did not progress as the Central Committee had reckoned and as the party and society had expected. A number of fundamental conclusions were drawn from this serious political lesson at the 19th Conference.

The first and perhaps most important of these was that the issues of party construction, including that of inner party life, were not presented as technical organizational issues, but primarily as political problems, which is what they in fact are in their Leninist sense. A key conference directive states that it is impossible for the CPSU to play a vanguard role in restructuring and renewing society without in-depth democratization of the party's internal life.

This dialectical interdependence calls for in-depth interpretation for all communists and party organizations. In order to exercise its political leadership of society consistent with contemporary conditions, the party must develop its democratic potential and reveal it in full. Under the new conditions, the party's leading role will be entirely defined by its real authority, which it will have to reassert through each specific action in the restructuring process, the deepening of democratization and glasnost, and the improvement of people's lives. Urgent democratic innovations in internal party practice must, of course, be determined by the interests of the cause and the interests of renewing socialism, rather than by fashion or some personal whim.

It is important to bear in mind the following politically significant point: the communists' attitudes to democracy within the party itself. For most people this is the yardstick which they use to determine for themselves whether the policy of democratization has been adopted seriously and on a long-term basis. One cannot avoid seeing how painfully the public reacts to cases of criticism being suppressed and critics being persecuted, of violations of the principles of democratic and collective leadership, and of relapses of the commanding and pressuring style. This is a profound and grave problem. The party has consciously drawn the cleansing fire of criticism, and adopted a bolshevik, self-critical, exacting, and open approach to everything that slows our development, without concealing or hushing up anything. This could not fail to be reflected in the public's consciousness.

It is natural and legitimate for the people to ask and seek answers to the same questions which the party asked itself at the conference. Why was the CPSU, created as a genuinely democratic organization, unable to hinder the processes of deformation of socialism which were associated with Stalin's personality cult? Why was it that later, after it had exposed and condemned the deviations from Leninist principles, it confined itself to superficial changes, as a result of which serious stagnation became possible in the country? The answer is above all to be found in the fact that certain deformations occurred within the party itself, in its activity, and in its contacts with working people, leading to the loss of many democratic bolshevik traditions which had been laid down through the efforts of Lenin and his colleagues over many years.

Hence the heightened public sensitivity to the problem of "party and democracy." Hence also the pressing need for democratic changes in internal party life and the reason for the acute political formulation of questions of internal party life at the 19th Conference.

On a broad general political level it is a question of solving problems of extraordinary importance for the success of the restructuring process as a whole: the complete and real restoration of the Leninist meaning of inner party democracy as an indispensable condition for the party's political health and capacity for self-development; the elimination of deformations in the party's organizational structure, rooted in the past; the establishment and maintenance of a fresh democratic climate in communal party life, and the constant enrichment of this climate with progressive democratic experience; mastery of the entire arsenal of democratic working methods and of a political style of work.

We turn to the Leninist heritage in our interpretation of these tasks. In our time it is especially important to grasp its full depth and wealth, to use it creatively with regard for real life in approaching the very complex unexplored problems raised by the restructuring process. The simple, mechanical transposition of some forms or work



methods which proved themselves at the turn of the century, in the 1920s and to our day is an unproductive path. One may recall the historic resolution on party construction of the 10th Party Congress, held under Lenin's leadership: "The party of revolutionary Marxism radically rejects the quest for an absolutely correct form, applicable to all stages in the revolutionary process, for the party organization and for its work methods. On the contrary, the form of organization and working methods is entirely determined by the specific features of the given historical situation, and by the tasks derived directly from this situation." Today the CPSU has to carry out its vanguard role in conditions which differ strikingly not only from those which existed at the beginning of the century, but also from those of the 1920s, 1950s, and 1970s. It follows that dogmatism is simply ruinous in this case.

Conversely, the dialectical methodology which guided Lenin in resolving issues of party construction is proving unusually effective in our time, applied to the specific historical situation and today's tasks. That is why the horizons of the discussion on reconstructing the political system have been widened to such an extent by the introduction of ideas and reflections found in Lenin's final works. They have made it possible to introduce much greater clarity into the entire range of problems engendered by contemporary social development, and to view them in their interconnection with problems of democratizing the party. The same can be said about the works of Marx and Engels on party problems. In our practical activity we shall clearly have to return repeatedly to the Marxist-Leninist roots of the ideology of renewal and restructuring.

The party conference stated uncompromisingly that the CPSU will never permit a repetition of anything similar to that which took place during the periods of personality cult and stagnation. The party forum expressed its will in specific measures to eliminate the hypertrophied role of the party apparatus and unjustified secrecy in the work of party committees. The conference decisions on limiting tenure periods for leading positions in the party and on developing the collective principle in party leadership are in the same vein.

The resolutions of the 19th Party Conference and the provisions of the CPSU Statutes provide everything that is necessary at the present stage for establishing a democratic atmosphere in the party as a whole and in each of its cells. It is also necessary, however, for every party member to personally adhere to democratic standards, to be ready and able to observe them, and if necessary to defend them. Each party member must arrive at them by himself and develop them within himself. In order to achieve this, decisive changes are needed in party organizations where communists have become reconciled, have even established a *modus vivendi*, with deference to rank and with the division of party members into bosses and subordinates, and have become accustomed to fitting in and relying on orders from above. Let us

recall Lenin's attitude to a comrade who said that he had "taken the liberty" of sharply criticizing the action of people's commissars. Vladimir Ilich stated that "there can be no talk of whether one may or may not take the liberty of sharp criticism; such criticism is the duty of a revolutionary, and the people's commissars do not consider themselves infallible." (*Poln. Sobr. Soch.* [Complete Collected Works], vol 35, p 87)

Today we all need such sharp "democratic hearing" and irreconcilability to any encroachments on the bolshevik norms of party life. The conference demanded that effective measures be taken in order that "all units in the CPSU may function in an atmosphere of camaraderie, of free discussion of all topical issues of policy and practical activity, of criticism and self-criticism, of collectivism and conscious discipline, and of personal responsibility." The July Central Committee Plenum stressed that the conference's policy aimed at democratizing inner party relations should be put into practice without any additional instructions.

The conceptual approach taken by the 19th CPSU Conference to questions of party construction was reflected in its interpretation of the principle of democratic centralism. It was a question of having the statutory norms work more efficiently for perestroika, and for the political emphasis to be placed on those areas which primarily determine the combination of democracy and centralism in the party's life and work, a combination which is optimal under present conditions.

The party conference proceeded from the view that the paramount task is to fully restore the Leninist meaning of the principle of democratic centralism, which provides for freedom of discussion at the stage when issues are being debated, and unity of action after the majority has reached a decision. This is a very important political emphasis. What is it dictated by? One can give a short answer: life, social practice. The essence of the problem is that for decades the political system which developed in the country operated for the fulfillment of arbitrary instructions and orders from above, rather than for the stimulation of the processes of self-regulation and self-management in society. This could not but affect the party.

This kind of practice significantly warped the principle of democratic centralism; furthermore, this principle was frequently replaced by bureaucratic centralism. The proclamation of democracy in words was accompanied by authoritarianism and strict regimentation in practice. The result was the alienation of many communists from the real political process, social apathy and indifference, and a way of life where party members simply issued or executed orders. All this manifested itself in politics as subjectivism and voluntarism, sluggishness and single-option approaches, and a lack of effective feedback.

That is why the Central Committee theses and the conference documents particularly emphasized our need for a permanent mechanism for comparing views and for criticism and self-criticism in party and society. The undoubted achievements of the policy of glasnost, democratization and openness in party life will have to be consolidated and augmented. This is a vitally important issue in view of the one-party system which historically developed and established itself in our country. Constant constructive political dialogue, an atmosphere conducive to discussion, and extensive information on domestic and foreign policy issues are expected to become inseparable features of all party activities. That is the current political substance of the idea of "freedom of discussion at the stage when issues are being debated" in the 19th Party Conference's interpretation of the principle of democratic centralism.

Another aspect of the principle of democratic centralism which the conference stressed is just as important from a political point of view: unity of action after decisions have been made by the majority. This requirement is derived from the very essence of inner party democracy and, to a large extent, is a prerequisite for its real effectiveness. It means that while enjoying freedom of discussion and criticism, every communist is expected to rigorously fulfill everything that is adopted as a common decision, as a result of collective debate, and to persistently strive to implement it.

As V.I. Lenin stressed, "after a decision has been made by the competent organs, all of us party members act as one," (op. cit., vol 14, p 128). As the ruling party, the CPSU is aware of its political responsibility for the fate of the country and socialism. Under these conditions, conscious unity of action by party members becomes the paramount issue in the implementation of party policy. Every communist must become a fighter for unity of word and deed, of decision and execution: that is the conference's order to all party members.

The productive interplay of both aspects of the principle of democratic centralism was most graphically manifested in the nature of the work done by the 19th Conference itself, as a plenipotentiary party authority and a rostrum for the collective discussion and development of fundamental issues of party policy. It was noted that for many decades the party has not seen such a frank, unregulated discussion about the most important and urgent points, such breadth of discussion and freedom of criticism, or such a clear expression of socialist pluralism. Nonetheless, despite the polemic—sometimes a very acute one—between supporters of different points of view on various issues, the conference was, more than any other party forum, dominated by the aspiration for true rather than ostentatious consolidation of the party, for the unification of all party forces on the perestroika platform, and for constructive participation by all communists in practical work.

Problems of party construction were discussed in an extremely democratic manner at the conference. Speeches on these issues were made by 45 delegates, who made about 100 proposals. What is very important is that a considerable share of the proposals have been reflected in the conference resolutions; virtually all of them were taken into account when the CPSU Central Committee was drafting the Organizational Plan for the Implementation of the Aims and Decisions of the 19th All-Union CPSU Conference and the Measures to Implement the Proposals and Comments of Delegates at the 19th All-Union CPSU Conference.

This does not mean that all comments were accepted "straight off;" the conference regarded a number of proposals unacceptable, and some of them were voted on separately. For one reason or another, the conference was critical not only of delegates' proposals, but also of some initiatives by the CPSU Central Committee. Thus, the idea of sociopolitical certification of communists was not ultimately supported, while the proposal to limit tenure periods in elected CPSU positions was amended. There is nothing unnatural about this, for it is the normal democratic course of events.

## II

Accountability reports and elections in party organizations are an important stage in the practical implementation of the 19th Party Conference's directives aimed at consistent democratization of party life. It is during campaigns of this kind that further steps can and must be taken to convert party activities to a democratic basis; to renew intra-party relations; to improve the electoral process and the collective work of elective agencies; and to reorient the party aktiv toward new methods of ideological, political and organizational work among the masses, as well as of its cadre policy; to increase the combativeness of primary party organizations; and to enrich their life with political substance.

In accordance with the CPSU Statute and the decisions of the 19th All-Union Party Conference, by the end of the year about 1.7 million accountability report and election meetings will have been held in primary party organizations (starting with party groups and workshop organizations), and in rayon, city, okrug, oblast, and kray party organizations. In accordance with the proposals of local party authorities, meetings will be held in September-October in primary party organizations, rayon, city, okrug conferences will be held in October-November, and kray conferences in November-December of this year.

The conference deemed it necessary to conduct this campaign by using everything new that has lately been practiced in inner party democracy. Because of their democratic essence, the forthcoming accountability reports and elections are expected to give a powerful impetus to the positive processes taking place in the life

of party organizations and in society as a whole. However, they will only achieve this on condition that the attributes of democracy not remain mere attributes, but start operating at full power in every party organization. That is why it is so necessary for the revolutionary and democratic atmosphere of the conference to permeate the entire work of party meetings and conferences.

There is something else which must undoubtedly be borne in mind. The democratization of CPSU internal life, under the banner of which the accountability reports and elections are taking place, is today one of the most reliable and effective ways of increasing the combativeness of the party as a whole and of each of its organizations separately, and of concentrating the party members' efforts on urgent and vital problems. The party organization is duty bound to take a clear, constructive, and mobilizing stand on each of these problems without exception—whether the problem is that of overcoming difficulties in the assimilation of new forms of economic management or of breaking with anti-restructuring, conservative, or nationalist phenomena; whether it is support for those fighting for human rights or the submission of a recommendation on the structure of higher party authorities.

This campaign will be an exacting test and a responsible examination which party organizations will have to take in front of society. The main question in the party discussion is what must be done to give the restructuring process greater dynamism and effectiveness and to put an end to vacillation. In order to obtain the answer to this question, the party organizations must take a look at themselves—an objective and self-critical look. Here, it is necessary to note and assess the worth of each party member's contribution to each cause: to social affairs and the establishment of a healthy moral climate in the collective, and to the specific results obtained in the course of perestroika. It is for the sake of this that we take care to ensure that the debate held in party groups is specific and principled, and appropriate for the party, and that it is continued and enriched at shop and primary party organization meetings and at conferences. It is necessary to rouse and activate the party's links from top to bottom, and to attain a situation in which the vanguard role of the party increases in the day-to-day struggle for restructuring and renewal.

The Central Committee plenum concretized the directives of the 19th Party Conference in its resolution on accountability reports and elections in party organizations. The organizational side of the matter is set out in the new Instruction on the Election of Leading Party Authorities, which is to be applied in the current accountability report and election campaign. The plenum's participants acquainted themselves with this instruction and approved it. This document, which has been published in PARTIYNAYA ZHIZN and distributed to the local organizations, would seem to provide a good base for the comprehensive development of inner party democracy.

High ideological, political, and organizational standards can only be guaranteed for the accountability report and election campaign if preparations are made for it in a businesslike manner. It is above all necessary to acquire a profound understanding of the new demands made on this campaign and to consider how to satisfy them in full in order to democratize the course of the accountability report and election campaign, to activate the party masses as much as possible, to increase the role and responsibility of party organizations and committees for intensifying the restructuring process, and to apply political leadership methods in their work.

What is of foremost importance here? The stipulation that in elections for all leading party organs there must be wide-scale discussion of candidacies, a secret ballot, and the possibility of including more candidates on the ticket than there are mandates is of fundamental importance. This principle is the basis for a number of other requirements guaranteeing the democratization of the electoral process in the party.

It is very important that party life should assimilate the proposals which the conference supported on extending to 5 years the term of office for elective positions, from party raykoms upward; on holding party conferences 2 or 3 years after elections and electing delegates to republic and all-Union party conferences according to the same procedure as delegates are elected to the congresses of republic communist parties and the CPSU; and on endowing all such conferences with the right of partial renewal—up to 20 percent—of the composition of party agencies. It is intended that these norms will become part of the CPSU Statutes. Primary party organizations now have the right to re-elect the staff of their buro or committee if its work is found to be unsatisfactory, or to partially replace it in by-elections at meetings and conferences. The buros of party raykoms, gorkoms, okrug committees, kraykoms, and Union republic party central committees can be replaced at plenums of the corresponding party committees when these are discussing the buros' accountability reports on work done in the period between the accountability reports and the elections.

As well as electing delegates to its conference or congress, the party organization now has the right to submit proposals on candidacies to the staff of higher-ranking party agencies, making decisions by open vote. The conference or congress delegates have the last word in this matter. The provision on limiting tenure of the same elective position in party agencies to two successive 5-year terms adopted at the 19th Party Conference is becoming standard. It has been considered expedient to begin counting these terms starting with the present accountability report and election campaign. Furthermore, communists have the right to resolve the issue of each leader on an individual basis (regardless of how long he has held his job), based on his performance and on his ability to make improvements.



The fact that the meeting, conference, or congress determines the size of the elective party authority does not restrict its participants' right to include any number of candidacies on the secret ballot. Candidacies for the new staff of a party agency can be determined on a preliminary basis both by a meeting of delegation representatives or by a commission specially convened by the party meeting, conference, or congress, which presents a list of all the candidacies that have been submitted, with its own suggestions. The following details are also typical: The secret ballot (list) lists the candidacies in alphabetical order, stating the position and place of work of each candidate, and the ballot boxes are set out in such a way that communists pass through a booth to reach them. All in all, the election process is acquiring a new aspect and is being enriched in form and content.

It is common knowledge that when functionaries of higher-ranking agencies or graduates from party academic institutions are elected party committee secretaries, and when cadres are being redeployed laterally, in some cases co-opting may be required. In this connection, precise rules are being applied to regulate the practice of co-opting. Individual communists may exceptionally be co-opted to the staff of a party raykom, gorkom, okruzhkom, obkom, kraykom, or Union republican central committee on the recommendation, or with the agreement, of a higher party authority. Communists for whom the majority of party committee members have voted with a secret ballot are considered to have been co-opted.

Special mention should also be made of the following democratic innovation: a primary party committee which has a member of a higher elective party agency on its register has the right to petition at any time for his recall if he has compromised himself or lost the organization's confidence.

A most important political task of the accountability report and election campaign is to promote the active implementation of contemporary cadre policy, and to make a positive contribution to strengthening leading party agencies with truly active and enterprising people, capable of advancing the restructuring process in deeds rather than words. This requirement must be at the center of attention of party organizations and party committees: the obsolete approach to the cadre problem, which makes use of the apparatus and secret procedures, is as unacceptable here as any reliance on letting things take their own course.

Accountability reports and elections must be used to consolidate positive trends in cadre work and to resolve urgent issues. A great deal has been accomplished since April 1985 to reinforce various sectors of party activity with better trained and more enterprising functionaries, with active supporters of perestroika. In the past 3 years almost two-thirds of the secretaries of party obkoms,

kraykoms, and republic central committees, and around 70 percent of CPSU raykom and gorkom secretaries, have been replaced. This is undoubtedly a legitimate and natural process.

The Central Committee plenum recommended that the accountability report and election campaign be used to replenish party committees with fresh new forces. The party's standpoint is clear and definite: anyone who supports its ideas in heart and mind, who honestly overcomes everything in his way of thinking and working that does not match the spirit of the times, who supports what is new, and who works conscientiously, has a future and has the moral right to remain a leader. Otherwise, he should relinquish his position.

Beginning with the primary levels, party leaderships are to be formed in the process of electing party committees, so that these agencies may successfully implement future as well as today's tasks. After all, the accountability report and election meetings and conferences must decide which individuals the communists are to entrust with the leadership of party organizations at the present very important stage in the life of the party and society, and determine whether these are real leaders who enjoy unconditional respect and who are political fighters capable of influencing and leading the masses, practically advancing the cause of revolutionary renewal, and ensuring a new standard of party work. The establishment of elective party authorities is a task for all party members. The combativeness of the entire party and the accuracy and depth of party organizations' assessments of the state of affairs will depend to a tremendous extent on the responsibility and principle with which communists approach the resolution of these issues in the primary units and the delegation of worthy people to higher positions. This guarantees the creation everywhere of an atmosphere of strict requirements, dissatisfaction with what has already been achieved, and intolerance of shortcomings.

The organic combination of total glasnost, electiveness, and party control from below forms the democratic mechanism for resolving cadre issues which, to use Lenin's words, ensures that "every official ultimately finds himself 'in his own niche,' takes on the work that most suits his strengths and abilities, experiences for himself the full consequences of his errors, and proves to everyone that he is able to recognize and avoid his errors." (op. cit., vol 6, p 139) The entire body of elected party officials is to undergo precisely this kind of demanding verification. The party's body of cadres will be determined not according to some "list of staff members," but by the communists' free and completely unrestricted expression of their will, and by the effective work of the democratic institutions of our political system as it renews itself.

### III

The conference defined one of the key areas for the development of inner party democracy as the full restoration of the principle of collective discussion and decision-making, the increased effectiveness of elective party bodies, and a certain amount of reorganization of the existing relationship between the elective bodies and their apparatus. Party committee plenums are playing an increasing role in resolving all issues of party life; it is becoming the rule that party committee bureaus submit accountability reports at their plenums and inform communists about the work they have done; the participation of party committee members in the committee's day-to-day work is expanding. This also fully applies to the party's Central Committee, where a special commission headed by CPSU Central Committee General Secretary M.S. Gorbachev has been formed from Central Committee members, to coordinate and control all of its activity in implementing the directives and decisions of the 19th Party Conference.

The urgent need for political leadership by the party; the demarcation of the functions of party, soviet, and economic management bodies; the improvement of their cooperation with social organizations legitimately puts the question of changing the structure and composition of the party apparatus on a practical plane. In the documents of the 10th Congress of the RKP(b), Lenin noted that the apparatus is necessary for policy, rather than vice versa, and he explained that "maximum flexibility is now necessary, and for this, for flexible maneuvering, the greatest possible firmness of apparatus is needed." (op. cit., vol 43, p 373) Unfortunately the combination of effectiveness and flexibility with the firmness and consistency of the apparatus, and the subordination of the apparatus to policy, have far from always been or are now ensured in practice.

Many subdivisions of the republic, kray, and oblast party bodies, and indeed those of the CPSU Central Committee, are narrowly oriented toward their particular sector. This structure divides the forces of the apparatus; it prevents it from concentrating on the study and formulation of recommendations for the major tasks of socioeconomic development, education, and party organizational work; it engenders technocracy and the duplication of or substitution for state and economic agencies, and preserves departmentalism and parochialism. All of this gives rise to fair reproaches from communists and nonparty people, and makes the reorganization of the party apparatus as a whole an urgent matter.

That is why the conference set the task of making a radical change in the structure of the apparatus, an improvement in its quality, and its strict subordination and accountability to the party's elective collegial bodies. The conference recommended that the necessary practical work be completed by the end of this year. The essence of reorganizing of the party apparatus is to

eliminate its present division into units spread throughout the administrative sectors, to reduce its numbers, and to restructure the profile of party bodies in accordance with the party's functions in contemporary conditions. This aim, which was formulated in the conference documents, reflects the view which the majority of party committees and communists expressed in the course of the discussion.

The starting point for the concept of reorganizing the apparatus, a concept which corresponds to the Leninist understanding of its role and functions, has been identified as the fact that as an inseparable component of the party's organizational structure, it is called upon to act as an active and dynamic force of restructuring. The apparatus must be an instrument by means of which the elective party bodies exercise their political, organizational and educational functions, and conduct their work of implementing and verifying the fulfillment of adopted decisions and to assist lower-level organizations in their work.

It is self-evident that while rejecting the division of the apparatus into units spread throughout administrative sectors, the party does not consider it possible to completely withdraw from its competent observation of the course of economic progress and the state of affairs in priority sectors of the national economy and the social sphere. As the Central Committee plenum noted, every party committee and its apparatus must have the ability to consistently implement the party's line of revolutionary renewal of society, and to act creatively through methods of ideological-educational and organizational work, without excessive supervision of lower party echelons and without fettering them.

It is of course, no simple matter to form a qualitatively new party committee apparatus. A definite system has yet to be worked out. However, practice is already suggesting new approaches in this work which need to be legally consolidated. To be specific, the Central Committee plenum stated that the recommendation of a primary party organization is an obligatory condition for the nomination of personnel to the party apparatus. The party organization which recommends a communist for party work has the right to raise the issue of relieving him of his duties if he fails to justify the trust shown in him.

As far as the redundancy of some personnel resulting from the party apparatus reorganization, maximal care must be taken of them and their social security must be ensured. It has been recognized as necessary to use these communists to strengthen important sectors of state, economic, and social activity. Particular attention will have to be paid to reinforcing the apparatus of soviets of people's deputies and agencies of people's control, with due account for their new role in the political system.

The Central Committee plenum instructed the Politburo to study and approve the new structure of the CPSU Central Committee's apparatus and also to determine



the main echelons of the apparatus of local party bodies, while giving the central committees of Union republic communist parties and party kraykoms and obkoms the right to independently resolve the structural and staffing issues of all party committees and party institutions, within the limits of the approved wage fund. Party committees have themselves been insisting on this for a long time, citing the diversity of conditions and the need for specific consideration of the same.

At the new stage in the restructuring process, an immense political burden rests on the shoulders of primary party organizations. The main bridgehead in the struggle for restructuring does, after all, lie precisely in their area of functioning, among the masses, in the workplace, and in the labor collective. It is for this reason that the conference devoted such great attention to activating the primary party organizations and democratizing their life and work. It is necessary to ensure the independence of each organization and its right to organize its own work in accordance with specific conditions.

To a very large extent it is the activity of primary party organizations that determines the broadening of the mass base of the restructuring and renewal processes, and it is around them that nonparty working people rally or do not, which unfortunately also happens.

The July Central Committee Plenum stressed once again that at the present time the initiative and enterprise of communists, the active stand of every party member in establishing new approaches and fighting shortcomings, bureaucracy, indiscipline, and irresponsibility and of course communists' ideological conviction and their ability and readiness to present arguments in defense of their views and the party's standpoint in the course of informal and formal discussions assume decisive significance.

Success is assured when communists and primary party organizations embody the party's constant presence in the life of society, and when they carry out their vanguard role.

Returning once more to the subject of the unity of communists' actions, a subject which has already been dealt with, it should be emphasized that the question of whether restructuring is to be or not to be depends to a tremendous extent on the ability and persistence which communists display in executing the decisions which have been made and in exercising effective control, both from below and from above, over their implementation. These decisions include not only those of the party congress or Central Committee plenums, which are obligatory for all communists, but also their own decisions which lend political policy its specific form. That is why it is necessary to make the issue of party discipline, guaranteeing it by the means stipulated in the CPSU Statutes and the strict accountability of every communist for the discharge of his obligations—party, civic, official, and human—a principle.

One might say that the most important factor contributing to the CPSU's absorption of everything that is best, most aware, and honest in our society is the high level of fighting capacity of communists and primary party echelons.

The aspiration of party organizations to improve the quality of their ranks through a more demanding approach, which has led to some reduction in the admission of new members, is justifying itself on the whole. The CPSU now numbers 19,546,600 members. Over a period of 6 months 281,000 candidate party members were accepted, which is 58,000 less than during the same period last year. Paramount importance is increasingly being assumed by the in-depth study of real requirements for new party forces, and most importantly by the establishment of a de facto consistency between the influx of party members and the contemporary requirements of the process of revolutionary renewal of society. Unfortunately, an increase in the party's influence over the decisive areas of restructuring is still a long way from being achieved everywhere, given the fact that the purely mechanical approach is ruled out.

Analysis provides evidence that the destructive influence of the quota system condemned by the party is still fairly widespread. Incidentally, a great deal was said about this during the discussions of the Central Committee theses. Thus, in Khabarovsk Kray and Astrakhan, Belgorod, Voroshilovgrad, Kaluga, Kirov, and Tula Oblasts the party members resolutely demanded an end to petty regulation of admission to the CPSU. It was noted virtually everywhere that the CPSU Central Committee's directive on democratizing admission to the party and increasing the role played in this work by primary organizations and labor collectives is being implemented sluggishly.

In Kirovograd Oblast the majority of primary party organizations base admission to the CPSU on the instructions of party gorkoms and raykoms, which regulate this process by limiting the issuing of application forms. This kind of approach to the replenishment of the party has not yet been abandoned by many party raykoms and gorkoms in Chimkent and Kalinin Oblasts, or by Moscow's Oktyabrskiy and Sokolniki Raykoms.

The continuing practice of pursuing favorable percentages of new party members reduces the role and responsibility of primary party organizations and makes it necessary to select candidates for admittance on a purely formal basis, without regard for the real need for fresh forces or the applicants' level of preparedness. It is no coincidence that it is extremely rare for an application for admission to the party to be turned down by a primary party organization. The number of such refusals is insignificant at raykom and gorkom level as well. This year there have been no cases of raykoms and gorkoms turning down an application for CPSU candidate membership in Vladimir, Vologda, Volyn, Transcarpathian,

Kurgan, Issyk-Kul, and Turgay Oblasts, in the Gorno-Badakhshan and Gorno-Altay Autonomous Oblasts, and in the Abkhaz and Adzhar ASSRs.

There is another point. The discussions on the Central Committee theses, which were held in many party organizations in Moscow, Leningrad, the Ukraine and Georgia, and in Gorkiy, Kirov, and other oblasts, stressed the need to tighten up the struggle of party committees and organizations against those who suppress criticism. The opinion was expressed that since suppression of criticism is a criminal offense, the harsh measure of exclusion from the CPSU ought to be applied against communists found guilty of it. There are grounds for such proposal. The fact is that eight people have been expelled from the CPSU for their suppression of criticism this year (it was 10 last year). How favorable is the situation in Azerbaijan, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kirghizia, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldavia, Tajikistan, Turkmenia and Uzbekistan, where there was not a single person guilty of suppressing criticism who might have deserved punishment by the party? Criticism and self-criticism are the natural condition for a party like ours, and no party committee or member has the right to forget this. This is all the more true because we well know what consequences result from forgetting or disregarding this most important principle of party activity.

The 19th All-Union CPSU Conference demanded that the positive processes taking place in party organization be decisively intensified: the political vanguard of the Soviet people must work on itself with Leninist purposefulness, and must develop its democratic potential. Our society and the restructuring process await this. The decisions adopted by the conference, as well as those which the Central Committee made with regard to the conference results, are aimed at this; they are an inseparable component as well as a powerful accelerating factor in the process of the country's renovation.

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#### **Notes of a Publicist: 'Worship the Law With a Free Soul'**

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[Article by Yuriy Vasilyevich Feofanov, IZVESTIYA columnist]

[Text] The works of our great poets are amazing. Elegance and lightness of form are some of their invariable features. Sometimes a poetic aphorism is broad enough to shed light on a profound social problem, whether economic, political or philosophical.

Hence the half line quoted in this title.... Actually, the law which the poet calls upon us to worship with a free soul is always one which limits freedom, for it is a

combination of prohibitions and permissions, frameworks which limit arbitrariness, and penalties which follow violations. It is harsh and inflexible. It does not allow those who would "like very much" to do something, and puts a limit to unrestrained enthusiasm by setting limits "from here to there."

At the same time, the law is also the most important guarantor of human freedom in society. We are free, Montesquieu said, for we live under the power of the law. The most severe punishment inflicted on our forefathers was to be banished from the community, i.e., precisely the punishment of having absolute freedom. To declare a person "outside the law"... only death could be worse.

Such is the twin nature of the law. Its great social value is found precisely in the fact that it does not exacerbate contradictions between man and society and between the citizen and the authorities, but blends them within statehood, combining, successfully or not so successfully, the interests of both sides. That is why the free soul is called upon to worship, it would appear, its "chains." However, the people would worship only a law which meets their expectations and when laws are not merely engraved on stone or printed on a piece of paper and if those who hold the power and those who obey them respect the law equally, if it becomes for both a Kantian inner imperative. Awareness of the law by society and by all of its members as being the most reliable, long-term instrument for building the state, not subjected to the whims of circumstances, and a regulator of social relations, gives society civic stability which is the equivalent of the ecological balance.

Perestroika in the economy, the political system and the way of thinking itself, it seems to me, is substantially different from what we must accomplish in the area of justice and human legal awareness. In the former we look for new ways and means; in the latter we try to return to a greater extant to the sources, to that which was destroyed during the period of the cult of personality, and then, from those ruins, pilfered by "order" during the period of Brezhnev's powerlessness of the law. Terror grossly violated the law. Stagnation forged, falsified and emasculated it. Both were equally ruinous to legal awareness in society. As M.S. Gorbachev said, "the legal nihilism against which V.I. Lenin so mercilessly struggled turned to be quite widespread...." It became so entrenched that administrative commands increasingly replaced the law. An order became stronger than a law.

However, when the laws of the state lose their ability to regulate the most important social processes and become helpless in the face of bureaucracy, radical, extremely radical state reforms become inevitable. Such reforms were earmarked at the 19th Party Conference. But how will they be carried out? Will the changes yield the expected results?

Energetic decisions were adopted at the conference. However, one must also be patient in order to avoid hasty and anticipatory steps. In his letter to Vera Zasulich, Engels expressed a thought which may seem paradoxical: "people who boasted of making a revolution always realized the next day that they did not know what they were doing and that the revolution which had been made was totally unlike the one they wanted to make" (K. Marx and F. Engels "*Soch.*" [Works], vol 36, p 263). Could this statement be more ironical than it is analytical? Could this have been the case in many coups d'etat? This, however, is not the essence of the matter. The essence is an advice addressed to us as well: consider everything, try to look at tomorrow's results of today's reforms.

By no means could all of our reforms, not to mention some legislative acts, be equated to revolutions. Adopted without any scientific forecasting, at best they failed to yield the expected results. For example, we increasingly hear in society objections not to the struggle against drunkenness as such but against the way this struggle is being waged. Ignoring individual cases, we are bound to reach the conclusion that virtually all the loses in this area are the result of the fact that many people threw themselves into "overobserving the law." They hastened to report who had closed down more hop-processing facilities, who had the widest "sobriety areas," and how many grape vines had been uprooted. As is usually the case, the easiest thing now is to blame "local excesses" and "the voice of the people," those same people who, at well-organized rural rallies, voted in favor of universal sobriety and immediately began to organize the production of moonshine. Yes, it is difficult to acknowledge the indisputable fact that by no means an unquestionably noble deed was always kept within the boundaries of the law. It was done through arbitrary methods and administrative zeal, which denied the law as a necessary instrument for carrying out any reform or mounting the type of campaigns we love so much.

A stir approved by superiors and the organization of "initiatives" not simply distort but ruin the legal awareness and civic feelings of the people. "If the bosses have said to approve, well, let us vote first and then see how to bypass the prohibition," is the harsh legacy of a type of thought inherited from our recent history.

Let us go a few years back, to the times which followed L.I. Brezhnev's death. At that time great hope was set on the appeal to bring order in production and in daily life, to put an end to negligence and irresponsibility, and to strike at those who live beyond their means, at parasites of all kinds. All of this, unquestionably, was necessary. The question was how, through what methods? Obviously, the methods had to be fast, decisive and loud, as we had become accustomed.

Let me describe the way this struggle was waged, in particular, against parasites in Dneprodzerzhinsk. After the November 1982 CPSU Central Committee Plenum,

the local soviet of deputies published in the newspaper DZERZHINETS an appeal to mount the proper campaign. Then, on the suggestion of veterans, an address was officially established: "Official City Mail, Box No 13." It was suggested that all individuals practicing a parasitical way of life be reported to that address. Then the box for such denunciations began to include reports, such as the following: "You are doing the right thing: to defeat an evil such as parasitism is possible only if we act jointly. Such people will not respond to gentleness or warmth. Following is the address of one of those gay blades."

What had actually happened was the initiation of a campaign of informing, which was immoral and illegal. However, people were proud of it and wrote about it, and when I, at a seminar for journalists, mentioned this, an amazed correspondent of a local newspaper came to me: "But it was approved by the party gorkom, and supported by the people!" Ah, how willing we are to join any kind of explosive campaign "in the struggle!"

Awareness of the law is a specific, a historically and socially founded concept of what must be done that is legal and just. Such components could agree with the thoughts of a person or else may also disagree. As a result, however, they form a totality of legal views, ideas and convictions which express an attitude toward the law and toward its application; ideas of what is legal and what is not and what is, let us say, legal but unfair. The feelings which people experience in connection with various events related to the effect of a law are instilled in the feeling of legal awareness.

The folk wisdom "if you are not caught you have not stolen" actually expresses with extreme brevity and quite accurately a basic principle of the law: the presumption of innocence. I would say that it is a kind of profound feeling, based on an innate feeling of justice and a precise understanding of a fundamental principle.

I remember that we converted this saying to "you were not caught but you are a thief." We did this with thoughtless light-handedness in order sometimes to justify actions which were clearly illegal. Unfortunately, this "principle" is retained in the practice of the law enforcement authorities: how otherwise to explain the illegal demand, for example, for builders to present documents and canceled checks for materials, equipment, and so on, they have purchased? This is the foundation for this "accusatory slant" which is so energetically criticized today: "you were not caught but you are a thief." Where does this slant come from?

Given the nature of my work, I get responses to judicial essays I write, from readers belonging to different age-groups or different social status and levels of education. If the "character" of the essay has committed some kind of serious crime, just about one-half of the authors of

such letters are unanimous and peremptory: "death by firing squad," "public hanging," or "grind into dust." But on the basis of what law? And on the basis of what type of morality?

Obviously, on the basis of that same morality which is so extensively cultivated in the consideration of "personal cases," for instance. Everyone—those who sit in judgment and those who are judged, know perfectly well the "rules of the game." God help you if you start by justifying yourself, even if you do not believe to be guilty or would like to explain your action! The main prerequisite for leniency or even forgiveness of sins is to repent. You may consider your case lost if you claim any kind of "right."... How not to remember here what Lenin said? Following the protest of a group of MVTU professors on the subject of the appointment of a new board in charge of the Main Vocational Training Administration (the professors believed that the board should be elected and not appointed), Lenin asked D.I. Kurskiy, the people's commissar of justice, to issue a resolution "based on legality and then in terms of the essence" of this matter ("Poln. Sobr. Soch." [Complete Collected Works], vol 52, p 141). Note that the essence of the matter comes second; first is whether it is legal!

Having become the standard, the presumption of culpability in trying "personal cases," promotes hypocrisy and suppresses dignity. This originates from the raykom offices. The answer is indifference and hidden opposition to the law. The people feel quite accurately unfairness and disparity between words about the law and essentially illegal actions.

Let us consider the problem of petty theft in industry, trade, and so on. Let us try to answer the question: Why is it that the majority of unquestionably honest people, who would not take even a pin from the desk of their neighbor without his permission, do not blame the person who has stolen a nail if it is public? Why is it so? How many appeals, reports and outstanding articles have been published, stating that public property should be cared for, and that "pilferers" are dragging the state down! The laws concerning punishment for such a crime are known. Yet the mind refuses to accept a seemingly simple matter. No, the people know perfectly well that it is not good to steal. But just try to instill in a person why he should not take that which has no owner, which has been dumped into a pile, which has been rotting or gathering dust for years!

Negligence is a nutritive ground for distortions in legal awareness. The struggle against it has become an important element of perestroika. Self-support and self-financing, the introduction of the brigade contracting method and many others, which are aspects of our economic life, can correct this distortion. "...We can manage," V.I. Lenin said, "only when we properly express that which the people are aware of" (op. cit., vol 45, p 112). But how to manage the economy, how to promote a feeling of thrifty attitude toward the people's

good if, as a result of the indifference of the management or, frequently, of the collective itself, in front of its very eyes valuable items worth millions are destroyed? The period of stagnation corroded the social and legal consciousness of the captains and privates of industry. Legal awareness is shaped less by legal propaganda, despite all of its usefulness and necessity, than by life itself. It is shaped... or else distorted.

If despite all distortions and losses, we nonetheless have developed a sufficiently powerful industry and made a cultural revolution, in the area of legal building we have moved backward. Is this too categorical a statement? Let us analyze it, without lulling ourselves with the fact that we so daringly today expose Stalinist illegalities. Naturally, we are exposing them as being striking. What if we consider facts which were not all that striking? Those which pertain to economic life? We come across such facts to this day.

In laying the foundations of the new society, our party and V.I. Lenin never ignored the need to base the entire life of the state, including the economy, on the law. In November 1918, the question of strengthening legality in the state was especially discussed at the 6th Extraordinary All-Russian Congress of Soviets. The congress issued the following decree: "To appeal to all citizens of the republic, to all authorities and all officials of the Soviet system to ensure the strictest possible observance of the laws of the RSFSR...."

In 1928, when the socialist industry was in the stage of its establishment, the VKP(b) Central Committee Plenum resolution stipulated the following: "...Revolutionary legality is triggered by economic necessity." This is not our usual formula that the captains of industry must mandatorily obey the law but somehow a reversed requirement: successful economic management requires legality. This is unusual. How meaningful it becomes, precisely in this context!

The violation of such principles began in the years that followed. The bureaucratic administrative-command system distorted the legal awareness of economic managers, the active people and the heads of enterprises and entire sectors. Having eliminated from the awareness of society the idea of the law, the system replaced it in the minds of the captains of industry initially with "the usefulness of the project" and, subsequently, exclusively with the requirement of submitting a good report. The plant director, kolkhoz chairman or brigade leader found themselves in a difficult situation. The sensible objective, which was to do the work thoughtfully, expediently and with maximal benefit to society, the enterprise and the collective, was pushed back. The ancillary objective, to be thought of favorably by one's ministry or any other superior, took over, becoming the main thing. The law was kept as window dressing. Its inviolability was mentioned only in reports, whereas in practice it was routinely violated, after which many economic managers had to pay for this. They were even sent to jail. This,



however, did not stop their successors. We remember the arguments on the subject of the "13th chairman." The saddest thing is that the moment we begin to discuss legal awareness, all of our sympathies are on the side of the "lawbreakers."

In this case, the quotation marks are no accident. In the eyes of the audience the character in the play who, incidentally, has his real prototype, is not a lawbreaker in the least. In the public awareness, what is good for the people and useful for the cause cannot be related to violating the law. This seems to defy common sense. Nonetheless, we try to convince the people, through the entire power of our propaganda, that the law is sacred and so is the "letter of the law," and that outside of it there is no "spirit of the law" whatsoever. This is heard in public lectures, read in newspaper articles or taught in university law courses. Yet on the stage or on the movie screen, we see that something good is accomplished only by violating the law! I have had the opportunity to meet and talk with noted kolkhoz members, such as Gorkiy's Vagin and the Belorussian Starovoytov. They "went among the people" and improved the farms, acting "on an exceptional basis." But an exception to what?

The great, powerful and patient Russian language has combined in the formula "as an exception" two principles which seem opposite to each other in terms of their social nature and meaning. What happens in practical terms? Plans are being corrected as an exception, apartments are being allocated out of turn, scarce goods are procured and houses are being accepted unfinished. The magic formulas "as an exception," and "you cannot squeeze life within a frame," cover an entire range of sins. The essentially accurate philosophical premise that "every rule has its exceptions," has become, in our daily affairs, a justification for nepotism and crime and led to corruption and bribery.

Let the readers not misunderstand me: I do not equate in the least such sins committed "as an exception," with socially useful activities such as those which economic managers mentioned to me. The tragedy is that frequently something useful could be accomplished only by violating a law. It was frequently not a law but one of the numerous departmental instructions which occasionally were more powerful than any law. Let us point out that the administrative system showed little concern for the quality of the laws. Gaps in the laws, lack of clarity and vagueness somehow encouraged correcting the laws with instructions. This led to the claim that life was more complex than any law. However, by giving a "green light" to socially useful actions on the part of chairmen such as Vagin, Starovoytov and others, we widely opened the barrier to an army of violators of the law, who were harming society. That was the trouble. Nonetheless, I believe that it is better to observe a bad law and try to change it than to take upon oneself to ignore it "conspiratorially," according to one's conscience.... It

was no accident that the resolution of the 19th Party Conference "On the Legal Reform" described the radical review, the codification of legislation, as its intrinsic part.

The law is not a dead, a formal series of rules, stipulations and obligations. Law and order ensure the live link among the parts of the single social organism. Traumas, wounds and abrasions are the exceptions. Something develops quickly or takes longer than it should and something turns into a tragedy. Accidents, fires, explosions, catastrophes, and so on, and so forth, are events which are much more frequently not the consequence of a malicious element but the result of the violation of safety rules, slackness and "enthusiasm," mixed within the notorious "perhaps this will do."

Let us imagine a set of situations. The public health physician bans the commissioning of an enterprise for violations of environmental protection rules. Or else a labor safety inspector will instruct that a given operation be halted, or else again a bookkeeper will object to figure padding in accounts. Many similar examples could be cited. Would someone not make an effort to talk the physician, the inspector or bookkeeper to lift his prohibition? The trump cards used in such cases will include "state necessity," "the people's good" or else "putting spikes in the wheels," which, allegedly, are put by said officials into the departmental wheel. Let us ignore for the time being the firmness of those with little power in terms of observing the law. What about the powerful, those who try to persuade the inspector, the physician or the bookkeeper? Are these Chekhov's evildoers who do not know what they are doing! For it is they who preach the authority and inviolability of the law.... The thought becomes firmly embedded in the mind that the law is mandatory in principle, as an idea, but not in terms of daily practice.

Democracy is being said to be the legal feature of an organized people. If it is not based on legality, it leads to chaos at work, anarchy in society and arbitrariness toward individual citizens; without legality democracy cannot exist; one must learn how to live under the conditions of democracy. These quite accurate statements are today very popular. But reread reports and speeches at party congresses held during the period of stagnation: the same accurate words were mentioned. What is most dangerous is that these were not only words. Thunderous statements that "the plan is the law," while plans collapse totally, have still not been replaced by slogans such as "the state order is the law," but we are coming closer to this. Although the idea of the state order is that it is an exception to the "laws" of cost accounting, self-financing and self-support. It is no accident that at the party conference this practice was subjected to withering criticism. However, departmental and ministerial thinking is still being shaped by the "usefulness of the matter" (frequently, furthermore, misunderstood) rather than based on the principles of the law.



Lenin wrote (in reference to the NEP period) that the workers hold the power, for which reason "they have the full legal possibility of "taking" everything, i.e., not surrendering a single kopek which does not have a socialist purpose. However, Lenin went on to say, the petty ownership element undermines this juridical possibility, which must be taken into consideration (see op. cit., vol 43, p 209).

In other words, one must not act arbitrarily the moment one seizes the juridical power. This Leninist view purely rejects the bare order as a method for solving pressing economic problems. Nonetheless, it must assert that same "state legal awareness," which must become not a slogan but a practice. It still has not....

Understanding the priority of legality over expediency as a benefit rather than a hindrance is the most important element in socialist legal awareness. I think that one of the basic tasks of perestroika is changing on this level the thinking of all members of the production process, as they say, from the worker to the minister.

There is a large number of underwater rocks in this case. One has the right to formulate one's own standards, based on the conflicts of life. Such standards, if adopted in secrecy, without proper processing and hastily, the moment they have been created invariably begin to obstruct the development of society. Conversely, a well considered law, adopted on the basis of long-term forecasts for its action, becoming an obstacle to administrative arbitrariness, can help to structure useful relations within the society. Let us consider the Law on the Cooperative (without the abrogated Ukase on Taxes). It supports the new movement. A law which is poorly conceived is harmful. It nurtures an arbitrary method of economic management which means that violations of the "formal" requirements of the law are possible and even inevitable; consequently, expediency is given priority. It is difficult, very difficult to surmount this viewpoint. However, if it is not surmounted all that is left is to surrender and retreat back into stagnation.

The task now is to organize universal legal training. This was mentioned from the highest rostrum. Unquestionably, we shall begin to implement this instruction although not from scratch: such universal training does exist and a resolution exists on the dissemination of legal knowledge and promoting respect for Soviet laws. The verification of their execution confirms that things are progressing. You may be quoted huge figures of the number of people involved, the impressive number of lectures on legal knowledge read at universities and the growing circulation of the journal CHELOVEK I ZAKON and other popular legal publications. Therefore, as far as accountability data, we are doing all right. The point is... the avalanche of lectures is growing but what about the legal awareness of the audiences?

I imagine the following picture. In the splendid Political Education House, which is on Trubnaya Square in Moscow, a doctor of juridical sciences is trying to convince the audience that the court is the most important institution of the state and that justice is the cornerstone of social well-being. After that, the audience pays a visit, shall we say, to the Sverdlovskiy Rayon people's court in the capital, which is a five minute walk, at Samotek. To begin with, it is difficult to find the courtroom in the labyrinth of yards between warehouses and offices; secondly, it is difficult to find space in the decrepit entryway; third, the visit cannot be started for lack of something with which everyone begins: with a coat rack, for no such facility is available.

Our court buildings are a shame and a disgrace, and this is the standard. I do not know a single one of them which would meet the status of a Court. And this is in Moscow, in the capital, where many of them are in condemned buildings! I do not even wish to mention the situation "abroad," and people who have been there have seen palaces of justice. We have no such thing. Even the USSR Supreme Court is no palace. There are approximately 5,000 courts in our country. I realize that many palaces cannot be built all at once. However, eventually we must start!

Do I mean by this that with such a neglect of Themis' premises efforts to make people believe in her greatness and divine wisdom are hopeless? No, no and once again no. In the final account, we may be poor but we could be proud. To achieve this, we must above all speak of what is: Of the sanctity of the law but also of the imperfection of many laws; of the prestige of the court but also the damage which was inflicted on it by the cult of Stalin's personality and the legal nihilism which was established under Brezhnev. Of legal proceedings as the most reliable democratic way of resolving conflicts but also of the distortion of justice through superior instructions. All of this is necessary so that the people may truly believe in the idea of perestroika and accept as their own the democratization of social and state life (with justice as their constituent part) and not as a gift from the "leadership." It is only under those circumstances that one could speak of upgrading the standard of legal awareness of the people and of every individual. We must convince the people that the party and the state are systematically guided by the Constitution in all of their actions and on all levels. Verdicts of "not guilty" have to appear as well as announcements that money had been paid in compensation for false arrest for the people to believe that there is justice....

We must convince the people (not only through lectures, naturally) that there is a law. If the law assumes its proper place in the social consciousness the palaces will appear as well. For some reason I believe that if, for example, only the court and no one else begins to consider disputes between a citizen or a cooperative, on the one hand, and the Ministry of Finance, the Gosplan

or the government itself, on the other, a program for building palaces of justice would show up. In a state of law the court alone should be the arbiter between the citizen and the authorities.

One of the tasks of perestroika is to assert the equality of all—of citizens and the state—in the eyes of the law. Legal responsibility for one's decisions and actions, whether the person is a worker or a minister, is the only thing which can reliably eliminate arbitrary decisions and deal a major strike at bureaucratism. Even the most frightening steps taken "despite the law" would hardly lead to success. This has been tested repeatedly and has never yielded results. Arbitrariness and the law are two essentially different types of social organization. We tried and, to this day, still frequently try to combine them!

Let us recall what confusion was created in society by proclaiming from on high the legal axiom that that which is not forbidden is allowed. After the euphoria from this bold and open proclamation vanished, people on all levels became dismayed. "Is this possible?" This question, which is stupid in the light of this axiom, keeps being repeated by the "lower strata." "What will they do without permissions and instructions," was what the "upper strata" thought with equal dismay. Yet legal awareness means not only knowledge of the codes, of what "is forbidden" and not only obedience to the law, but, if one may say so, confidence in the law. Confidence in one's rights, ability to fight for them and, naturally, the existence of real means to defend such rights in front of independent umpires.

The old legislators used to say that what turns gray from old age is sacred. However, what turns gray may also be ossified and deadened itself and deadening everything around it. Fighting against traditions and promoting reform is always a difficult and painful process. Today we are at the peak of this struggle.

As to the establishment of a state based on law, a great deal in this area must be settled anew. The main thing perhaps should be to define the position of the party as the leading force of society, as the nucleus of its political system. The role of the party and the decisions of its central and local authorities and its apparatus must adopt a sensible attitude toward the power of the state and the law.

The 19th Party Conference earmarked ways of solving one of the most important problems of statehood: the problem of democratic rule under socialist conditions and a one-party system. Understandably, many problems will arise in the building of such a power. The main thing is that the power of the party apparatus, which so far has not been subordinated to state control, is being set as a result of the reform of the political system on a legal basis: all decisions must be made through the soviet, through the authority within which the state principle is democratically combined with the will of the

people through his legal representatives. This eliminates the gap in the people's legal awareness that "the law is the law and the raykom is the raykom," which triggered disbelief in the power of the law.

To prohibit raykoms from interfering in judicial affairs is simple. All that is required is to do this decisively. No special theoretical requirements must be met in this case. The role and place of the leading force of society in a state of law must be defined above all by theory. The builder of a legal state must be able to obey the laws in order to earn the prerogative of leading. It is this type of legal awareness that we should have, albeit if only as our objective.

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### From the 'Cult of Secrecy' to an Information Culture

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[Text]

#### I. Secrecy in the State's Information Policy

All over the world there is a growing understanding that information is a most important result of social production, a constantly increasing resource for mankind, and the most valuable and popular commodity in international trade. Information, and the propaganda which relies on it, have become a powerful means of accomplishing the most complicated tasks, including those which repeatedly led to armed conflict in the past. The trend of information playing an increased role in society's life provides grounds for concluding that in the present conditions of historical competition, the winner will be the socioeconomic system which has a higher quality of information, assimilates it more rapidly, and uses more of it more effectively to achieve common human objectives.

The restructuring process in Soviet society has brought about accelerated development of the information processes. Social relations connected with information are increasingly expressing the interests of the broad popular masses, the state, the party, social organizations, collectives, and individual citizens. It is well known that any problem assumes a political nature if its solution is directly or indirectly connected with the masses' interests and with the functioning and development of the institutions of authority. This makes it quite legitimate to pose the question of the Soviet state's development and pursuit of a purposeful information policy.

The attitude which regards information as the subject as well as the means of political government is aimed at revealing Soviet society's vital need for knowledge and at determining the potential of state organs and social institutions to satisfy these needs as fully as possible, in accordance with the goals of socialist renewal and development. What is involved therefore is the development and structuring of an organizational and legal mechanism for administering the information processes in the country according to a unified system. This mechanism must ensure that the factors which hinder the development of glasnost and the accessibility of information to society are eliminated; it must intensify progressive transformations in public awareness, create favorable conditions for democratization, and actively contribute to putting the new political thinking into practice in international affairs.

Politics and the state are corresponding concepts. The participation of the state in solving various problems presupposes the direct or indirect, actual or assumed use of authority and legal and administrative support for certain agents of social relations in order to obtain the desired political, ideological, economic, and social effects. In other words, we have the right to regard state means of influencing the information processes in society a most important political condition and legal form for developing glasnost and improving the efficiency of the use of the country's information potential. Routine secrecy measures are the first among these measures. Thus, in order to pose and resolve the question of the goals, substance, forms, and methods of an information policy, it is necessary to turn to the system for protecting secrecy as the strongest area of state and legal mediation of social relations in this sphere.

### Glasnost in Questions of Secrecy

The system for the protection of secrets developed under the complex historical conditions, as is known. It was born in the period of the "exacerbation of class struggle" which was tragic for the Soviet people. It crystallized during the Great Patriotic War, and it was consolidated in the "cold war" period. After the cosmetic work done at the turn of the 1960s to purge the most odious and archaic forms whereby the institution of state and military secrecy was not used for its original purpose but, a number of cases, to cover up illegal acts, the system for protecting secrecy increasingly fell behind the needs of social progress, although it was improved in its own way. It still contains elements of sluggishness and irrationality. A certain alienation of the institution of secrecy from society led to a situation whereby the principles of its organization and operation; its political, military, and economic goals; its legal foundations and organizational forms; and the proportions between the cost of and results of routine secrecy were not only exempt from serious and objective critical analysis, but were not even discussed in public.

A discussion of this "nonevent" calls for an initial definition of the situation with regard to the role and place which routine secrecy operations play in ensuring the country's security and protecting its intellectual wealth. A fundamental issue is that of the unconditional recognition of the necessity and usefulness of this social institution in accomplishing numerous tasks under conditions of coexistence by different social systems, economic competition, and scientific-technological rivalry between countries, and the possession of very powerful military resources. For the time being, the condition of the system of international relations and economic ties, as well as the realities of Soviet society's political, legal, and information standards "condemn" our society to using routine secrecy restrictions, and make them inevitable. The world public, too, has relatively uniform views on the right of governments to have state secrets. At the same time, it seems to us that there is a need for a comprehensive, in-depth study and wide-scale discussion of the justification for choosing and implementing specific political and legal forms of secrecy; of the extent to which the system for safeguarding state and military secrets is appropriate to the social relations which it reflects; of the exactitude with which these forms of secrecy are laid down in law; and of the social effectiveness of the regime's measures.

The time has come to draw public attention to this traditionally delicate sphere of state activity, because it is becoming irrational to say the least, to further avoid glasnost in posing and solving the problems of secrecy under the presently evolving conditions. To be specific, these conditions include circumstances which are obvious even to a nonspecialist, such as the lack of full-scale legislation on secrecy matters; the alienation from democratic institutions of the mechanism for defining and maintaining state secrets; and the unjustified restrictions placed on Soviet citizens' access to information related to secrecy and regime's stops. At the same time, there has been no constructive official reaction to the increasing public need for such information. This is leading to an exacerbation of the problem and is adversely affecting the system for protecting secrets itself, as well as the political attitudes of broad population strata.

Under these conditions, the problem of the information which Soviet people have about the state's routine secrecy operations is becoming considerably more acute. The extent to which society is informed about the system for protecting secrets is connected with the necessity and adequacy of democratic control over the definition and satisfaction of vitally important state interests, with the effectiveness of guarantees of glasnost, and with the efficient utilization of the country's information resources.

### Sources and Traditions of the 'Cult of Secrecy'

The general public's ignorance concerning the organizational and legal foundations, general and specific goals, and legal and technical administrative means of protecting secrets gives rise to myths and distorted ideas about

this sphere of state activity. Excessive centralization in solving all of the country's problems produces the phenomenon of a "cult of secrecy" as an indispensable condition for the functioning and development of the hierarchical administrative structures which govern society. The obsession with secrecy which pervades the mass consciousness and political thought has swallowed up the consequences of those unhappy historical periods in which the atmosphere was thick with suspicion, deformations of socialism's theory and practice, and rising tension in international relations.

Today this has to be paid for by the painful reactions of public consciousness and political thinking to the processes which have begun: the destruction of stereotypes of the inherent value of rigid procedural restrictions; the loss of illusions about the perfection of the established system for defining and safeguarding state, military, and official secrets; and the revelation of disparities between the real and nominal importance of secrets. Social practice is revealing an increasing number of dead ends and conflicts between routine measures and the new political, economic, military, and social realities. The difficulties here are not only related to the visible administrative barriers, but are also connected with the emotional and psychological reactions to traumatic information and with fear of unusual new situations. Even progressive political and legal thought is facing obstacles of a subjective nature.

The situation regarding the choice of a concept for legally safeguarding the policy of glasnost is indicative in this respect. Published material on the progress of work on the draft law on glasnost and on the basic provisions of this law recognizes that the most democratic method of solving the problem would be to regulate the state's routine secrecy procedures. The authors of this material provide what is in our view an accurate assessment of the real state of sociopolitical development and legal knowledge in society, but are skeptical about the readiness of society and, most importantly, of the organs of state administration, to adopt a law on state secrets. From this one may conclude that there is a preference for setting rules for the process of glasnost rather than the process of secrecy. In other words, the preference is for teaching democracy to society by legal methods which are not the most democratic.

It turns out that a society which has made a historic choice in favor of democracy, and which has made it its goal to reveal the creative potential of socialism by precisely this method, is capable of acting as the agent of social progress, but is not capable of applying one of the widespread forms of democratic control over the state's activity to define secrets and organize their protection. By indefinitely postponing work on draft laws which would provide the most effective and democratic guarantees for glasnost, we remain in the grip of the established stereotypes of the primacy of authority over law. Our legal experts continue to shy away from the juridical

problems which the state administrative bodies have traditionally solved at their own discretion, without society's will being clearly expressed in law.

Matters are not confined to clashes between legal rules. A reverse process which is unfavorable for the formation and stabilization of new social relations can also be noted: Routine secrecy regulations which are departmentally restricted and are not laid down by law contribute to the reproduction of conservative political views and to negative reactions from those who profess the "cult of secrecy."

#### 'The General Spirit of Bureaucracy Is Secrecy....'

As an attribute of power, the institution of secrecy is a kind of indicator of society's political development and of the extent to which its social institutions are democratic. The organization and operation of the existing system for preserving secrets reflects low legal standards, dogmatic traditions in government, and disorientation in determining political, economic, and social priorities. This makes itself felt in legal and organizational imperfections in routine secrecy operations. The yardsticks of secrecy are not, however, the passive result of a naturally developing sociopolitical process. They are closely linked to the position and interests of particular social agents in society. K. Marx gave a convincing answer to the question: "To whose advantage is this?" "The general spirit of bureaucracy is secrecy and mystery. This mystery is preserved by the bureaucracy's hierarchical organization in its own environment, and by its closed corporate nature with regard to the outside world. For this reason, an open spirit in the state, as well as statesmanlike thinking, seems to the bureaucracy to be a betrayal of its secrecy." (K. Marx and F. Engels ("Soch." [Works], vol 1, p 272)

The condition of the secrecy system thus reflects the nature of mutual relations between society and state and the democratism of state power. In this context, public ignorance about the principles, criteria, structure, and functions of the secrecy system, and secrecy about the legal regulation of procedures which define and preserve state secrets assume a significance which goes far beyond the bounds of routine measures as such.

The indecisiveness which state institutions display in matters of secrecy issues does not seem to be connected with inadequate qualifications on the part of the responsible officials, or with the low significance and relevance of the problem under perestroika conditions. The reason lies in the mechanism of power relationships. Until political practice overcomes the tendency for society to be subordinated to the state, electoral bodies to the apparatus, and labor collectives to the administration, the bureaucratic segment of the party, state, and economic apparatus will continue to have an interest in uncontrolled routine secrecy measures. Under these conditions, the secrecy system is not only not being used for



its immediate purpose but is a means of alienating power from society and promoting the constant reproduction of this alienation in politics and economics, and the social sphere.

The objective evaluations that social scientists are now making about the condition of the political system attest to the fact that far from all forms of the state organization of Soviet society's life are in accordance with contemporary demands and goals. This has indeed given rise to the need for radical political reform. Nor is the sphere of state secrecy free of the deformations which have appeared. However, the "cult of secrecy" and the "lack of legal constraints" in routine state secrecy activity, as well as the lack of any democratic safeguards in this area, are frequently praised as virtues of the present information system and as an advantage of authoritarian rule which is inaccessible to "bourgeois liberalism." It may be that this kind of idea would continue to prevail in society were it not for the restructuring process which is under way in the country. The bureaucratization of social life and unjustified secrecy are thus two sides of the same process of society's alienation from the political, material, and spiritual means of reaching the goal of self-government.

The continuation of the "cult of secrecy" in political practice and public awareness is a method of maintaining faith in the infallibility of bureaucratic thinking, and provides opportunities for unchecked and irresponsible exercise of power benefiting departmental or narrow group interests. Confirmation of this is provided by numerous examples of military secrets being divulged to foreign partners in arms reduction talks in a more efficient and compromise-oriented manner than is the case when enterprise administrations and officials from institutions talk to the press on domestic political issues. Quite paradoxical things happen: Inspections of important military installations by foreign specialists have not only become a reality, but are one of the main areas for confidence-building between countries and for international and national security, while it is by no means always possible for Soviet journalists to visit national economic or sociocultural institutions designed to resolve issues which concern the population in connection with consumer goods production, housing, and everyday services.

This undoubtedly runs counter to the party's course of developing glasnost as a condition for the revolutionary renewal of society. There is, however, another side to the problem. The secret functioning of the power apparatus gives rise to the danger that it will turn into an independent and self-sufficient force. Foreign researchers studying a similar phenomenon in the West have concluded that as the bureaucracy consolidates its position, it becomes increasingly autonomous with respect to the system's central political leadership. By playing on public ignorance and using departmental barriers to dole out information in its implementation of activity by the authorities, and by claiming a monopoly of knowledge under these conditions the apparatus thus acquires a decisive role in drafting political decisions and presenting them in a convenient legal form.

Apart from its direct threats to the normal development of the political process, unjustified and unchecked secrecy causes substantial damage to the self-awareness and dignity of Soviet people, and weakens their ties to their state. **The confidence and support of the people can only be acquired in response to confidence which is placed in them.** However, what kind of confidence can there be when secret data of a military-political and military-economic nature are divulged during negotiations and then widely publicized by the Western mass information media, yet are far from always made available to our public; when Soviet scientists are obliged to consult foreign sources for information about various areas of our country's life? It turns out that certain "state interests" are being defended against Soviet citizens rather than an external threat.

Secrecy complicates the coordination of efforts by government agencies and "insures" bureaucrats against specific demands made by the public. The implementation of organized protection of state secrets is confused with its function. The right to state secrecy is the de facto creation of executive power bodies rather than the result of the Soviet people's wishes which guide the state's activity in protecting secrets in accordance with the clearly expressed interests of the citizens themselves.

## II. Ways of Overcoming Conservatism in Routine Secrecy Activity

All this leads to the conclusion that the forces of inertia in the present secrecy system and the social forces interested in preserving them, are objectively contributing to the transformation of a social institution of vital importance to the Soviet state and society into part of the mechanism which is slowing the restructuring process. The state is powerful not least by virtue of glasnost and open information. Excessive secrecy is a condition and sign of dangerous deformations in the state, as well as of deviation from the goals and methods and socialist development.

At his May meeting with leaders of the mass information media, M.S. Gorbachev stressed that the main obstructing force in the restructuring process is conservatism, which must be defeated in the course of restructuring. Since authoritarian, bureaucratic distortions of the organizational and legal mechanism of routine secrecy activity form one of the facets of conservatism, they can be eradicated by means of a strategic triad composed of the new thinking, democratization, and radical economic and political reform.

### Extending the Principle of Equality to National Secrecy Systems

Proceeding from the functional purpose of the secrecy system, it would seem logical to start breaking down stereotypes with a review of this system's foreign policy



aspects and of the value of routine restrictions for the sake of ensuring that the Soviet Union may enjoy a favorable international position. Under contemporary conditions, considerable importance is attached to whether the world community finds our political practice on matters of defining and defending the country's vitally important interests attractive. It should be especially noted that the sovereign right to secrecy and superpower status in no way releases the USSR from the need to learn to look at itself from the sidelines, to see its own weaknesses and merits, and to strive to eliminate the former.

The Soviet Union has taken a most important step on the road to bringing national secrecy systems into line with the principles of the new political thinking. A letter written by USSR Foreign Minister E.A. Shevardnadze to the UN secretary general on the issue of confidence-building and expanding openness and glasnost in the military sphere stresses that it is the right of the international community to know the true state of affairs, and that inadequate information of this kind can be used by the opponents of disarmament to create disinformation and myths aimed at whipping up the arms race.

Secrecy is not the only possible form of behavior under the conditions of coexistence between different social systems. It is not a "miracle" which ensures military-strategic advantages in the age of nuclear missiles. It is already clear that, like it or not, the unwieldy secrecy system, which is not justified by the realities of international relations, is a condition for and result of sectarianism, which alienates the broad popular masses from the struggle for peace and socialism. The military-political, military-technological, and other similar advantages which seem to be gained through secrecy measures are accompanied by very real negative political effects. This leads to a weakening in the potential of world public opinion and a reduction in the activeness of the broad masses and progressive social movements.

Disoriented by departmental judgments and departmental disjointedness, efforts to define and protect secrets have frequently made it more difficult to accomplish foreign policy tasks. This can be seen from a single example: the state of Soviet foreign policy science. For a long time our diplomats, experts, and international affairs journalists did not accept the data published in Western publications about the correlation of arms and armed forces existing between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, but were in fact forced to rely on them due to the clear lack of Soviet data and calculations. As a result, bourgeois political science effectively monopolized the elaboration of military-political problems on a regular basis.

Routine secrecy activity in our country has recently become the focal point for sharp questions addressed to us by Western politicians and representatives of the foreign public. It is obvious that this must not produce a knee-jerk political reaction from the Soviet side. Yet one

can hardly respond to every edition of the Pentagon publication "Soviet Military Power" with rebuttals which have greater literary attraction than factual conviction. The tradition of secrecy undoubtedly gives rise to doubts on the part of the competent agencies about the advantages and losses that come from publishing such data. There can be no doubt, however, that the world public will obtain answers even without our involvement, but hardly such as to favor us.

The conversion of secrecy measures into a subject for political negotiation and legal regulation gives rise to the need to seek legal means of determining the commensurability of national secrecy systems both in specific areas and as a whole. Bearing in mind the experience in implementing confidence-building measures in international relations, the specific steps to ensure mutual verification of the fulfillment of international agreements in the military area and the trends in the development of the Soviet-American dialogue, it would seem expedient to make an international legal principle out of the formula of **identical secrecy** in the military-political, military-economic, and military-technological spheres of state activity.

The principle of identical secrecy is derived from the principle of equality and identical security; it makes this principle more concrete by taking account of the balance of interests of members of the world community and provides an opportunity for expanding the areas where governmental and popular diplomacies can be combined. An objective criterion for justifying routine secrecy measures with foreign policy considerations appears in this connection. It is obvious that if a country has greater openness than the level of routine restrictions in other countries, this will give it **moral** advantages and will help to compensate for possible risks in tactical plans for supporting the progressive international public. Implementation of the principle of identical secrecy could give additional impetus to the process of confidence-building in international relations and help to eliminate asymmetries in the routine secrecy restrictions which have developed in different countries. It is our conviction that the need for an international legal mechanism which establishes a balance of interests in the area of state secrecy will become all the more apparent as confidence-building policy begins to acquire specific shape.

#### **Establishing Responsibility for Unjustified Routine Restrictions**

International legal restrictions on the development and functioning of national secrecy systems are of great domestic political significance for they diminish opportunities for arbitrarily setting and maintaining routine restrictions which conceal departmental interests behind vague references to higher state interests. We should

overcome prejudice and oversimplification in our assessments of foreign experience, as well as the a priori negation of many rational elements of political, legal, organizational, and practical activity in this area.

The study of foreign experience is a topic of professional research, which lies outside the scope of this article. Attention should merely be drawn to the key points which facilitate a more precise definition of the starting points for restructuring the internal governmental mechanisms of routine secrecy. These include the problem of publicity and responsibility for applying secrecy measures. It should be emphasized that it is primarily our own experience which has led to this problem being raised and to the need to solve it. Foreign practice helps to enrich this experience and to amend the search for optimal solutions by expanding the area of knowledge about secrecy as a widespread phenomenon of social life.

Material from the March 1986 issue of the American journal *SIGNAL* can be cited as an example of foreign experience in publicity and political accountability in posing and resolving these problems. It reports that after the Senate Intelligence Committee of the U.S. Congress had studied the documents of the Information Security Oversight Office, it came to the conclusion that the existing system "creates more problems than it solves" and that the country "lacks a unified national policy on issues of protecting the secrecy of information." The committee proposed that "an all-embracing strategic program for security be developed," its aim being "to comprehensively encourage and coordinate the protection of information and activity of top strategic importance." An editorial in the January 1988 issue of the British journal *ARMED FORCES* provides grounds for the need to review the existing Official Secrets Act, and if possible to replace it with something simpler and less cumbersome this legal act having effectively become compromised by the government and local administrative authorities, which place on the secrets list information which has no bearing on national security, but which could show that someone has made a mistake.

Experience at home and abroad confirms the fundamental importance of establishing the political and legal responsibility of executive state administrative bodies for the correct definition and legal application means of preserving state and other secrets.

A lack of accountability on the part of state organs and institutions, which exceed the bounds of what is necessary in using the institution of state secrecy, and which apply penalties incommensurate with the extent of actual damage or consequences when current routine restrictions are violated, deforms the secrecy system and leads it along a path of extensive development where asymmetries develop between the formally defined secrecy measures and the real requirements of economics and scientific-technological progress. Situations are

often created in which routine secrecy restrictions complicate rather than facilitate reaching economic and scientific-technological objectives.

From a political and legal point of view, a situation has arisen in which secrecy operates as a higher social institution than other public institutions. Real priorities essentially reflect the presumption of secrecy in which the burden of proving that it is not expedient to restrict the spread of information falls to those who want to publish some new data or to ease the stranglehold of secrecy. The opposite—a **presumption of non-secrecy**—should be the case. The entire system of rights and obligations in matters of establishing and maintaining secrecy procedures operates in the same single-minded manner: At present, one can superfluously classify things as secret, but one cannot infringe even patently unjustified restrictions. The law does not provide for any responsibility for excessive secrecy, or even the use of secrecy to selfish ends.

This is no accidental deviation of an administrative command system; it is a natural consequence of its development. Laws merely reflect the de facto relationships which have set the apparatus above society and ensured the legal conditions necessary for upper-level administrators to act unchecked and with a completely free hand, while the lower levels have capacities and have been held strictly accountable in security matters. For this reason, increased political and legal accountability for state organs and officials who engage in unjustified secrecy must become a most important area in information policy.

#### Activating Economic Safeguards Against Unjustified Secrecy

Political and legal levers can and must deliver strong signals to the secrecy system by way of the general restructuring processes: democratization, consistent implementation of the principle of the division of power, and increased control over the routine procedures of state authorities. Optimism about bringing secrecy measures into line with today's demands should, however, be based more on the processes developing on a material basis than on the readiness of lawyers to do the necessary drafting of laws, or the readiness of state leaders to show political willpower in supporting urgent reforms. This reflects a law described by the founders of Marxism: "Wherever the development of industry and trade has created new forms of relationships...the law has been forced to sanction them...." (K. Marx and F. Engels, op. cit., vol 3, p 64)

It is precisely the fact that phenomena in the superstructure are ultimately the product of processes at the base that explains why many of the norms and principles of routine secrecy activity which contradict the new economic legislation remain outside the area of legal and political attention. The tangible changes at which the new legislation is aimed have not yet taken place at base

level. It turns out that it is not enough for legislation to recognize the potential of a scientific product to be realized in a commodity-monetary form. Information must be truly possessed and used by the participants in production relations. It must be at their disposal, and must be subject to economic accountability. Only then will material incentives begin to operate in the social awareness and practical behavior of participants in economic operations. In turn, they will activate the legal incentives which already exist. At the same time, one can already see the increasing interest of lawyers and economists in the problem of intellectual property in the context of economic reform, and of the development of new forms of international cooperation. In this context, increasing significance is being assumed by problems of secrecy which result from the increased economic independence of state enterprises, the growth of the cooperative movement, the development of joint enterprises, and limiting unjustified interference by state bodies in economic activities. The urgent requirements for growth in productive forces will ultimately lead to their being sanctioned by legal rules. However, in the conditions of revolutionary renewal of Soviet society, it is unacceptable to rely only on the natural result of developments in base-level relationships. Political and legal passiveness in solving the problems involved in liberating productive forces from the production relations which constrain them could act as a brake and bring about unforeseeable negative consequences both at the base level and in the superstructure.

The actual determining and protecting of secrecy is a very expensive undertaking. In the United States, for example, firms spent \$10.7 billion in 1982 and \$12.5 billion in 1983 protecting their scientific and technological information. All in all, up to 20 percent of total expenditure on scientific research and experimental design work in the United States is spent on measures of this kind.

The secrecy system thus needs to have the "keepers" of secrets economically assessed and oriented toward economic interests. The social connection between the "clients of secrecy" and the enterprises which ensure secrecy is now created largely from above, by means of administrative pressure, and essentially expresses strictly the interests of the power apparatus. One can, of course, coerce people through methods which lie outside economics, and instructions about protecting secrets. Labor collectives cannot, however, be motivated to be economical or to display enterprise and initiative in this way. A proprietary and statesmanlike attitude toward measures to determine and preserve secrets can only be fostered on the basis of positive incentives, on the basis of labor collectives' internal requirements for the protection of information, and on the basis of their real economic interest. The current situation can be described as one in which a secrecy system which has become unstable (because of a lack of "economic brakes") is coming up against the reality of economic

accountability, the development of commodity-monetary relations, and the rise in enterprises' independence. All this dictates the need to base the restructuring of relations with regard to secrecy issues on the requirements of economic expediency.

In our view, laying the economic foundations of a system for defining and preserving secrets must start by bringing existing practices into line with the realities of unity and heterogeneity of all developing forms of socialist ownership. This means that pluralism of economic structures must be embodied in a diversity of models of secrecy consistent with the specific ways in which those engaged in economic activities hold, use, and handle information. The growth in the independence of state enterprises and the rise in cooperation make it expedient to classify secrets into **state** and **industrial** (those of enterprises). This is in accordance with the general trend in development of the relations of socialist ownership, a trend in which the consolidation of national economic unity calls for the strictest observance of enterprises' economic independence, while the need to intensify the role of the common economic center is leading to its restricted influence. The transition from directive management to the utilization of forms involving contracts and state orders gives rise to the urgent need to master these forms as means of regulating relations on secrecy issues.

Therefore, the economic expediency of procedural measures in no way reduces the state's role in developing a strategy for developing a strategy for the use and development of secrecy as an institution, and does not annul its monopoly over state secrets. However, the political will of the state bodies which control secrecy procedures at enterprises must be implemented in a **materially** accountable form. Society has a right to know the correlation between the cost of routine secrecy activity and its results, and the state has a duty to assess this correlation, to direct the secrecy system toward achieving economically valid objectives, and to promote the formation of new economic relations.

#### **Optimizing the Conditions of Scientific-Technological Progress**

The economic expediency of procedural measures must be determined not only by the criteria of the country's major policies and military security, or by comparing expenditures and gains, but also by evaluating the **quality** of economic development. As we know, this development expresses itself as the acceleration of scientific and technological progress.

There is a widespread conviction among scientists all over the world that the traditional coercive methods of preserving information are incapable of protecting the main wealth of any country—its ability to invent new things. At the same time, state institutions frequently protect their knowledge so jealously that they forget about the knowledge itself, and all that is left is the protection.

Procedural restrictions that affect scientific creativity usually cause a painful reaction in scientists. This can be seen from the example of the U.S. scientific community: "While the technologically illiterate, hardheaded politicians in the Reagan administration consider that high walls and thick blinds are the answer, the people who understand the essence of scientific and technological progress know that the best way to be among the leaders is to run faster than one's rivals," and that "however attractive restrictive barriers may seem to security services, they actually undermine fruitful scientific cooperation." The U.S. National Academy of Sciences has assessed the measures proposed by the White House to intensify secrecy procedures as being capable of "completely stifling the exchange of ideas, which is vitally important for the scientific and technological progress." The conclusion is that in the age of scientific and technological progress "it is much better to be in a position where you are robbed than be forced to steal from others." (INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, 6 July 1982)

Leading Soviet scientists have recently been criticizing unjustified routine restrictions more frequently and sharply. Academician R. Sagdeyev regards ill-considered routine restrictions as one of the reasons for the loss of momentum in the development of Soviet science. The scientific bureaucracy also has an interest in unchecked use of secrecy procedures, and this unites it with the state and economic bureaucracy, as well as with those who seek to bring everyone down to the same untalented level. In the opinion of Academician Yu. Gleba of the Ukrainian SSR Academy of Sciences, classification as secret is often the best way of concealing low-quality work from one's colleagues' appraisal. Academicians D. Gvishiani, V. Mikhalevich, and V. Semnikhin, and Professor A. Rakitov note that in the years of stagnation dozens of departments, enterprises, and organizations stubbornly engaged in the "concealment" of information. Pursuing narrow departmental objectives and hiding behind the supposed secrecy of their information, they thus established a monopoly over it.

The logic of rivalry in the struggle for scientific leadership and the prevention of unpaid use of science-intensive products by unscrupulous competitors demand that the exchange of information be regulated and that legal, organizational, and technical foundations be laid for the protection of inventors' rights. No careful Western form today sets about financing an expensive new development without guarantees of the right of intellectual ownership. However, secrecy does not replace the need for free circulation of ideas; unless these ideas conflict and mutually influence one another, the development of science will simply stop.

The problem of combining national security interests with those of ensuring freedom of scientific creativity is objectively contradictory. It is extremely difficult to assess the degree of risk to national security either as a result of unhindered dissemination of information or of

routine restrictions. This is related to many circumstances—from the dynamics of state priorities to considerations of scientists' personal prestige. The most important point today is, however, that a specific concept for a country's security has not yet been defined. Taking this into account, the opinion of many foreign scientists is beginning to favor the following approach to resolving the contradictory development of the structure and function of state power: "The risk ensuring from prohibition of free dissemination of knowledge would be much greater for the development of science and ultimately for national security. Scientists firmly believe in the superiority of 'security through achievement' over 'security through concealment.'" (AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY, 8 February 1982)

However, the proposed general approach does not in itself provide optimal solutions in specific situations. The problem of combining routine secrecy operations with foreign and domestic policy, economics, production organization, and scientific and technological progress is exceptionally complicated. It is precisely for this reason that the secrecy system cannot be based on the principle of isolation from other social institutions and social values. In order to remove the objective contradictions of routine secrecy activity, they must first be revealed (which is impossible without glasnost), and then explained, and alternative solutions to the problem must be provided (which is impossible without the participation of science). For this reason, the formulation of promising ways of restructuring the secrecy system calls for reliable scientific support and consistent implementation of the principle that the political and other decisions made in this area of social relations should be scientific.

The definition and provision of security for state secrets is an important aspect of protecting the vitally important interests of the socialist fatherland. The main direction of such protection today is, however, the actual process of revolutionary renewal of society, not its ossified social structures or deformed political institutions. For this reason the reliability of the secrecy system should be measured by the extent to which it is involved in the democratic process and corresponds to the needs of economic and political reform. It is precisely this concept of the protective function of routine secrecy operations, as the protection of the restructuring process and socialist society from arbitrariness and abuse of power when foreign and domestic problems are being solved, which must become the basis for political thinking as it moves from the "cult of secrecy" to an information culture.

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### Strategy of Accumulation

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[Article by Yakov Grigoryevich Liberman, doctor of economic sciences, professor at the Moscow State Correspondence Pedagogical Institute]

[Text] "For a period of 15 years, between 1971 and 1985, the share of the national income used for consumption averaged no more than slightly over 73 percent. In the last 2 years it has increased somewhat. Today, however, the central economic authorities and many leading economists and counselors, in discussing the concept of our country's long-term socioeconomic development, are suggesting that the percentage of the consumption fund be reduced once again. Some of them would like for this indicator to be reduced to 70 percent. Yet each percentage unit is the equivalent of about 6 billion rubles, which would be withdrawn from the social "basket," from public consumption funds" (conference delegate S.A. Shalayev, chairman of the AUCCTU).

The radical restructuring of the economic management system presumes a sharp change in the social consciousness and the elimination of obsolete stereotypes in economic thinking. Many such stereotypes have accumulated in the strategy of accumulation as well, which holds a leading position in economic policy.

### I

The ability to mobilize the material, financial and manpower resources, needed in order to ensure a high pace of socioeconomic development is the most important advantage of the socialist economic management system. This advantage, however, is not absolute. It exists only within the limits defined by objective economic criteria. Beyond their range any excessive diverting of social resources for purposes of accumulation could result in significant economic and social losses.

The establishment of the administrative-command system was marked by a sharp increase in accumulation rates.<sup>1</sup> In Russia, on the eve of World War I, it amounted to some 8.5 percent of the national income. This indicator was only slightly higher on the eve of the 1st 5-Year Plan. At the very beginning of the 2nd 5-Year Plan, however, the accumulation rate exceeded 30 percent. Even that figure, however, was underestimated, for wholesale prices of investment resources were, at that time, reduced.

Industrialization demanded a certain increase in the rates of accumulation. However, the rates reached an absurdly high level which was inconsistent with the country's possibilities. The consequences were not late in arriving. The increased pace of economic growth was accompanied by irrecoverable losses of a significant share of resources, and a reduced living standard for

large population groups (the peasantry above all). The most important reproduction ratios were disturbed. A steady trend toward overaccumulation developed in the national economy.

The extensive expansion of accumulations occurred initially under the conditions of a unique abundance of other extensive factors: inexpensive manpower (Stalin described the country's manpower as "incalculable") and natural reserves (allegedly "inexhaustible"). The preservation of an excessive accumulation rate led to the fast exhaustion of the extensive opportunities for economic growth.

Unfortunately, many theoreticians and practical workers are still convinced that increasing the accumulation rates or maintaining them on a high level is a necessary and an adequate prerequisite for high rates of economic growth. An entire set of stereotypes pertaining to the theory of accumulations has developed. Here are some of them: the pace of economic growth is in a linear (directly proportional) dependence on the accumulation rate; accumulation is the only way of achieving a high rate of economic growth; the higher the accumulations are today the higher will consumption be tomorrow. These postulates are the foundations for the concept of the initial one-time "burst," which presumes reaching some kind of "high" production standard in a drastic leap, which would enable us to solve all pressing problems immediately.

Faith in the salutary "burst" has clouded the eyes of many generations of planning workers. It imbues all long-term forecasts for Soviet economic growth. At the initial stages of each period of the forecast the plans called for maximally increasing the rate of accumulations or preserving it on a high level; at the end of the period an advent of a sudden "prosperity" was expected as well as a stabilization and even a reduction in accumulation norms while retaining the high rates. This was not achieved in any one of the forecast periods. The next forecast would begin with a new "burst" but with no "explosion" in the growth rates of the national income.

The "initial burst" was converted a long time ago from a one-time occurrence to something permanent, and from a short-time to a constant, an almost eternal event. However, even this fact did not weaken support of stereotypes adopted once and for all. Furthermore, the constant increase in the accumulation rates was raised to the level of a socialist law.

The concept of the need to divide the growth of the national income into accumulation and consumption in equal amounts was theoretically substantiated. A 50-percent accumulation growth rate was proclaimed optimal. In the course of time, however, the accumulation rate as a whole would reach one-half of the national income. Despite the entire stupidity of such an "optimal solution,"



with enviable stubbornness planning practice tried to follow it for decades. However, it could not be achieved even through the direct apportionment methods.

Although in some years (no less than on 10 occasions between 1951 and 1986) the growth rate reached 50 percent or higher, its average was no more than 26 percent, which is not only half of the stipulated "optimal" level but even below the average rate of accumulation for that period (26.6 percent). The maximal upsurge in the growth rate of accumulation was followed by its decline. The economy was unable to withstand the overloading. Not only the further increase in the accumulation rate but also maintaining it on an excessively high level was too heavy to withstand.

The sharp "bursts" in the dynamics of the accumulation rate did not result in more or less adequate "bursts" in the rates of economic growth. Whereas in the 1920s less than 1 percent of the national income could be accumulated annually in order to obtain a 1-percent growth, 4.5 percent were already needed between 1951 and 1986, including 5.7 percent during the 9th, 10th and 11th 5-year periods, and as much as 15 to 20 percent of the national income in 1985-1986.

The increase in accumulations leads to increased output. As a rule, however, it also leads to an increase in its capital intensiveness. In order to compensate for increased capital intensiveness a new and even higher increase in accumulation is needed, which once again stimulates increased capital intensiveness, and so on. It is precisely this that is ignored in the concepts concerning the linear correlation between the rates of economic growth and accumulation.

Capital returns are rarely steady. Inevitably, relying on a single factor (rate of accumulation) results in a negative impact of the factor not taken into consideration (capital returns). The actual dependence of the growth rates on accumulation rates (in an interval of several medium-length periods) is graphically presented not as a straight line but as a rising convex curve.

The tip of the convex curve, its highest point, is consistent with the maximally attainable rate (i.e., not a multiple but a single value), characterizing the "threshold" of accumulations, which separates the curve into two uneven parts: ascending (left) and descending (right) branches. Along the left branch capital returns grow although, it is true, at a diminishing rate, whereas on the right they decline at a faster rate. Up to the "threshold" (inclusive) the accumulation plays a positive role; above the "threshold" it becomes a negative factor of economic growth. Not only below but even above the "threshold" point, the growth rate declines (compared with the maximally possible value).

Above the "threshold" of accumulations, the economic growth rates systematically go through the same values as below the "threshold," but only in the reverse order:

not "upwards," but "downwards." For that reason, the same growth rate (other than the maximal) can be achieved with different absolute volumes of accumulation; not only excessively high (above the "threshold") but also with much lower volumes. The difference between such volumes is what indicates the absolute value of overaccumulations: the size of the surplus of net investments.

The simple truth that "the higher the rate, the higher the pace" is valid for as long as the accumulation is lower than or equal to the "threshold" value; if it is higher, the opposite rule prevails: "the higher the rate the lower the pace."

This is related to the fact that at each given moment the set of efficient options of capital investments is limited. It depends on the existing level of the equipment and production technology, capital construction capacities, and so on. The fast growth of net investments allows us to increase accumulations at the expense of increasingly capital intensive (i.e., less efficient) options. As a result, capital returns drop. An increasing surplus of accumulations develops, which is absorbed by increased capital intensiveness and yields no results whatsoever.

The chronic scarcity of available goods compared to the artificially inflated investment demand reflects the sickness of monetary circulation. The overaccumulation itself, however, is a powerful inflationary factor. An excessive rate of accumulation restrains the growth of individual consumption, increases the gap between money and commodities on the consumer market and lowers the efficiency of incentives to increase output and make it more efficient (wages grow more slowly and, furthermore, this such is not secured with commodities). The connection between labor and the material well-being of the working people is disturbed.

Surplus investments become frozen in unfinished construction and in "long-term construction," the excessive accumulation of equipment and materials (as a reinsurance reserve against difficulties in material and technical procurements based on allocations), and so on. It is precisely under circumstances of overaccumulation and the sway of departmental interests that even the most stupid and expensive construction projects become possible.

The threshold values of accumulations are not eternal. Their dynamics is determined by scientific and technical progress. Therefore, in the long range, the declining return on increasing capital investments is not an absolute law. The growth of technological production standards leads to alternating or changing thresholds. This process is characterized by its cyclical nature: with a given technological level the growth curve, reaching the threshold, begins to drop; however, the transition to a

new technical standard raises the threshold value and leads the growth curve to the new rising line. For that reason the growth curves, considered for several medium-term periods, combine in the long-term ("centennial") aspect in a complex cycloid-type curve. A kind of "oscillation" of pulsing fluctuations occurs. The cyclical development of this process is reflected not only in the systematic rise of threshold values (and, therefore, rate peaks) but also the spasmodic shift from one threshold to another (by virtue of the uneven nature of scientific and technical progress).

The drastic swing to a new threshold cannot be achieved by a sharp "burst" of upward-going accumulations, which have reached their optimum at a given point. Conversely, the overaccumulation which currently has acquired all the features of stagnation is just about the main obstacle on this way. It triggers an unjustified overstress in the national economy, hinders the orientation of the economy toward increased capital returns and enhancement of technological production standards. The accumulations fund grows essentially for the sake of expanded self-reproduction. Investments are used to produce goods which are reinvested in increasing output. From the viewpoint of the socioeconomic system, however, capital investments are not a result but an outlay. The high growth rates of accepted statistical aggregates largely reflect nothing but the dynamics of outlays.

## II

Economic growth loses its rational sense if it has no clear socially significant objectives understood by every worker and enhancing him as an individual. In the course of decades claims that consumption is the supreme objective of socialist production were nothing but a statement with an emasculated content and one more manifestation of the profound disparity between words and actions. Accusations addressed at "consumerist socialism" (as though socialism has objectives other than the well-being of the people) concealed the inability to turn the economy toward meeting the needs of the people. A turn to unrestrained growth of production investments led to a universal commodity shortage which extended to means of production and consumer goods. Investments in man—in his education, professional training, rest and entertainment, culture, book publishing and health care—remained hopelessly behind.

The road which led to the creation of a situation of overaccumulations was paved with good intentions. They were based on the belief that however high current capital investments may be, they are justified, for in the future such outlays would yield results, described with the help of several loose concepts of "abundance" or "the fullest possible satisfaction of needs."

Hence the persistent demand of "sacrificing" on the altar of blind faith: maximally stressing all resources and forces, reducing current needs in the hope that however

high the losses may be today, in the future they will be fully compensated with an increased national income and consumption fund.

The excessive rate of accumulation harms the vital interests of present generations. In this case the strategy of overaccumulation faces an insoluble contradiction: in demanding greater accumulation for the sake of the future growth of consumption, at any given moment it limits the possibilities of the growth of consumption and lengthens the period of attaining the proclaimed objective and hinders reaching the target.

Appeals for a "one-time dash" in the growth of accumulations are closely related to "sacrificial" motivations. It would be pertinent to recall the slogan of "three years of stubborn toil and 10,000 years of happy life." We are familiar with the consequences which resulted from China's efforts to ensure its practical implementation. The noble seemingly objective of building through the toil of the living generations the definitive "paradise of abundance" for future generations is justified neither historically nor morally, for it is based on the tricky and hypocritical mentality of "nothing first and everything later." "Abundance" is not a condition which can be reached once and for all but a system of daily economic activities.

It is immoral to pay for the future well-being "whatever the cost," or whatever the sacrifices. That which conflicts with the interests of present generations will not be understood by future ones. Furthermore, do we need such "concern" for future generations? They will be able to take care of themselves and will do this better (according to their own concepts, desires, tastes and preferences) and, above all, more easily and at a lower cost, for each step on the path of scientific and technical progress facilitates our advance.

Having become a daily event, the promised "future well-being" turns into a myth, without the characteristics of any of the merits of this literary genre. In the same way that initial short bursts of accumulation threaten to turn into permanent, initial temporary sacrifices in consumption risk to become eternal.

Today the scientific and moral groundlessness of the concept of "sacrifice" is manifested in its full dimension: instead of promised abundance it brought real economic losses related to the need to restore the disturbed ecological balance and to surmount major national economic disproportions. For that reason the most important task in economic policy is to oppose the social forces which tend to impose the "ideals of sacrifice" to each new generation, constantly reproducing the strategy of overaccumulation and, with it, that of "short-time sacrifices."

The practicing of an active social policy, strengthening the social trend of the economy, and a turn to consumption requirements demand a reorientation of the policy

of accumulations. We must substantially raise the consumption rate (the first step in securing a proper living standard and ensuring the fuller satisfaction of current needs) and show no fear at any sharp drop in accumulation rates, for the stereotypes of its "steady" level and, even more so, of "steady" growth notwithstanding, the ups and downs of accumulation rates are a normal phenomenon, providing that such fluctuations are harmonized with the production-technical cycles and coordinated with the specific situation. Today, when overaccumulation can hinder perestroika the need to eliminate it becomes urgent.

#### Footnote

1. The accumulation rate is characterized by the share of the national income used for accumulation purposes.

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#### Glasnost: Economics and Politics

18020001e Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 13, Sep 88 (signed to press 25 Aug 88) pp 42-44

[Article by Vladimir Kadulin]

[Text] It was only yesterday that we boasted that, compared with 1985, in 1988 the total number of copies of periodicals had increased by 62.4 million, thus indicating an annual increase in excess of 20 million. With full justification we linked this growth to perestroika and the enhancement of the masses and, naturally, the increased combativeness of a rather significant number of central and local newspapers and journals, properly considering this as an unquestionable accomplishment of glasnost. We saw its strengthening also in the possibilities which were provided to anyone last year freely to subscribe to any periodical other than four journals.

Such free subscription enabled us to bring to light the real and virtually undistorted social evaluation of the work standards of a given periodical and the extent to which it satisfied the increased requirements of the readers. For example, in Leninskiy Rayon, in Moscow, where the editorial premises of KOMMUNIST are located, subscription to newspapers showed a 5-percent increase between 1987 and 1988. The number of subscribers to IZVESTIYA increased by 14 percent and of SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA, by 2 percent; meanwhile the newspapers KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, TRUD and KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA lost some of their regular readership. This year's subscription to the weekly ARGUMENTY I FAKTY in the rayon was 256 percent higher compared to the previous year; meanwhile, subscriptions to the journal MOLODOY KOMMUNIST did not attain even the 60 percent level. However depressing it may be to write about it, the majority of our party journals lost a tangible number of subscribers.

Unquestionably, if conditions governing subscriptions for next year remain the same, the specific and impartial criticism of readers, free in making a choice and dissatisfied with a given publication for whatever reason, as well as the equally economically tangible support of the newspapers and journals they deem most valuable, will continue efficiently to work for perestroika and glasnost. Unfortunately, the freedom of the readers' choice proved to be substantially curtailed.

On 20 July last, the USSR minister of communications issued an order which stipulated that subscription to more than 40 newspapers and journals should remain within the stipulated volumes and that the other publications should not exceed the level of subscriber copies for each republic and the city of Moscow as of 1 January 1988.

Today that same Leninskiy Party Raykom as, in fact, the other rayon committees in the capital and, to be precise, throughout the country, have run into substantially more trouble. How else could it be, for the characteristics of the present subscription campaign could lead anyone into an impasse. For example, the heads of the party organization of the APN would telephone their own raykom: What to do if only several dozen copies of newspapers and journals, which are needed on a daily or even hourly basis for their work, have been allocated for this entire huge collective of the news agency? The same question worries the thousands-strong collectives of Metrostroy, Moscow University and very small collectives, as well as private citizens in the rayon.

Reasons for such concern are numerous. Next year, for example, the number of subscribers to the journals ZVEZDA and INOSTRANNAYA LITERATURA will be reduced by one-half; the number of subscribers to LITERATURNAYA GAZETA will be down two-thirds. The number of subscribers to the newspaper SOVETSKIY SPORT has been reduced by nearly 2,000 copies in the rayon in which the sports stadium imeni V.I. Lenin and a variety of sports organizations are located. Despite all efforts, it is impossible to fully understand the reasons for changes in the amount of subscriptions for one publication or another. As long years of experience of our economy, burdened by shortages, can confirm, any sort of limitation has its own logic, not free from administrative or other vagaries.

By virtue of the oddities of such a logic, subscriptions to the most popular publications, those which have earned a firm reputation among subscribers as active fighters for perestroika, have been subject to restrictions. We are as yet only in the stage of preparations for converting to wholesale trade in means of production, having rejected the rationing system for the allocation of resources. As long as it exists, however, it encourages stockpiling of such resources for future use, thus withdrawing them from national economic circulation for long periods of time. Naturally, in this respect newsprint, which is in

extremely short supply, is no exception. Printing facilities as well have a precise departmental limit. Understandably, under such circumstances it is publishing houses engaged in the production of the type of mass political and literary-artistic publications which are today in the greatest demand among the readers, that are the first to exhaust their production capacities and resources.

Perestroyka is revolutionary in its nature, for which reason it demands revolutionary action which rejects artificial obstructions. We believe that the publishing boom and related problems created by it have required daring and unusual solutions. To our extreme regret, once again the inertia of the old approaches went to work, nurtured by the firmly established mentality of scarcity, and the practice of issuing allocations of anything which enjoys greater demand. This is clearly confirmed by the 20 July order of the Ministry of Communications.

A clear decision, sanctified by old tradition, which seemed so simple and accessible, turned out, when investigated, to be far from optimal. Yes, during the period of stagnation limiting the publication of many newspapers and journals made it possible to "avoid" the chronic shortage of paper and of printing capacities and did not trigger any particular indignation in the stream of a lazy social life. The incredible increase in the readership's interest in intelligent and honest printed matter and the thirst for the truth concerning our past and present essentially changed the situation on the press market. In this situation, limiting editions of already scarce periodicals could not fail to, and indeed did, trigger a stir and, perhaps, a distorted, a poorly controlled demand for publications, with all the negative social consequences stemming from this fact. The mechanics of handling shortages, the participants in which so frequently clashed with the standards of socialist community life and the law, is all too well known to be worth any particular emphasis. The more so since the scarcity of printed matter is hardly different from any other scarcity. Therefore, restricting the size of publications, which officially remains on the previous level, has actually drastically worsened the situation of subscribers.

Naturally, one could be pleased by the average statistics per Soviet family, according to which today a family averages some 7 copies of different publications. This situation, however, does not offer anyone the pleasing prospect of being able to subscribe next year to any one of the publications he may like and the regular familiarity with which is, to many people, a professional requirement as well. This prospect, however, is entirely realistic: the size of a newspaper or journal, under the conditions of a free subscription, is something entirely different from a restricted edition, even though the number of copies may remain the same in either case. We could be pleased for the sake of the personnel in the communications departments. Processing and delivering to subscribers an ever-growing amount of periodicals have brought them a great deal of difficulties and trouble; poorly paid mailmen are being exhausted under the

weight of their sagging mailbags while the managers of Soyuzpechat newsstands loaf during most of the working day. As it was explained to us, the increased retail sales of limited editions of newspapers and journals, aimed at better satisfying readers' demand and, furthermore, benefiting low-salaried people to whom a subscription is an excessively expensive pleasure, was to facilitate the life of communications enterprises and improve the cost accounting indicators of their socially useful activities. It is true that one month after the order was issued, again in the interest of the reading public, dissatisfied with the new subscription procedure, it appeared as though the decision to increase sales of individual copies had been abandoned. Had our people become unaccustomed to long-waiting lines? Naturally, however, it is not a certainty that if you stand in line at the Soyuzpechat newsstand you should be able to purchase your desired portion of spiritual food, for at newsstands demand is met 50 percent for the central press and 35 percent for journals. Subscribing for scarce publications by pooling resources, recommended by some senior personnel of the Ministry of Communications, is as inaccessible today as are individual subscriptions. It is also possible, the Soyuzpechat personnel who seem to care about our needs advise us, to put down one's name for scarce periodicals in one of the 326,000 libraries in the country. In fact, there are many solutions. All one needs is, perhaps, to arm oneself with patience for years on end. Finally, the fact that most of the copies allocated for subscribers go to labor collectives should be some kind of consolation for subscribers who have been unlucky with the local communications departments. This would ensure, we are being assured, greater social justice. This may be so, to the extent granted by Her Majesty Luck, in winning the lottery, the desired publication, naturally, by those who are most worthy and most needy. However, ceilings have not been set even for labor collectives at least on the level of last year's number of subscriptions.

The assessment given by the broad public to the procedure of the present subscription campaign is not simply negative. It is even worse than the that of the situation in the relatively recent past which, as remembered by everyone, was of a clearly manifested political nature. Should this amaze us? Guided by the interests of socialism and perestroyka, the 19th All-Union CPSU Conference deemed the further development of glasnost, one of the basic principles of which is the inalienable right of every citizen to obtain full and reliable information on any problem of social life, a most important political task. The press and perestroyka are today inseparable concepts. One can understand those who, in the letters they sent today to all possible addresses, including KOMMUNIST, consider, with rare unanimity, subscription limitations a real restriction of the right of the citizen to obtain information of interest to him, and an effort on the part of opponents of perestroyka to hold back the development of glasnost.

We should not present matters as though there exists some kind of "anti-glasnost conspiracy." The essence of the matter lies elsewhere: in the fact that the selected



option for solving the "paper" problem also turned out to be a "paper," a technocratic one. It clearly failed to consider the political aspect of the matter. I can anticipate objections: naturally, the existing situation is distressing but cannot be ignored. One must deal with the real situation as it is, for politics, including that of the size of editions, is the art of the possible. Were all possibilities of satisfying the increased demand for newspapers and journals, which actively participate in shaping and explaining the so greatly needed cause of perestroika in the ideology of renovation, used? It would be hardly possible to answer this question in the affirmative with suitable firmness.

Discussions on this unfortunate scarcity of paper and printing facilities have been going on for decades. We do not have to go far into the past to find the origins, the reasons for such a striking neglect shown toward the most important industrial sectors, the development of which greatly determines the level of civilization of a country and the culture of its people. But why is it that in the middle of the 12th 5-year period, during the time of perestroika, do we not hear that in the cellulose-paper and printing industries the situation has somewhat tangibly changed for the better? The time has been too short for major structural changes in our national economy and for ensuring the accelerated progress of sectors, the contribution of which to the spiritual and intellectual renovation of society is as great as it is economically profitable? But let us also take into consideration in our thoughts the dispiriting fact that a country with tremendous natural resources and a huge scientific and production potential is producing no more than 30 kilograms of paper per capita, compared with slightly under 300 kilograms in the United States, and that despite this, capital investments in the paper manufacturing industry are being reduced from one 5-year period to another.

Why is it that under the conditions of paper hunger inadmissibly little is being done to reduce so-called technological and all other waste of this now priceless raw material? We speak of the development of glasnost and the taming of paper shuffling and of the avalanche of document turnover. Meanwhile, the Goskomizdat complains, 133,000 tons of paper in extremely short supply have been appropriated this year for so-called accompanying documentation of ministries and departments. Was there not, here as well, a real possibility of effectively supporting periodicals which are so intensively read today, by reducing all sorts of "incoming" and "outgoing" and totally unread reports and references?

Furthermore, how to reconcile complaints of paper scarcity, which set our teeth on edge, and printing presses exhausted by their unbearable load, with the customary sight of shelves in bookstores and libraries where publications nobody wants have been gathering dust for years? Under such circumstances, would it not be justifiable to engage in an efficient maneuvering of paper resources and printing capacities in favor of extensively read newspapers and journals, perhaps by reducing the

publication of entire books, including collected works which are not in particular demand? Such a move, incidentally, should by no means be considered of a temporary, a tactical nature. Global trends in the development of publishing have led to the fact that the share of periodicals is increasing tangibly in the overall volume of printed matter.

The leading book and journal publishers in the country are literally gasping as a result of paper hunger and the lack of modern presses. Meanwhile, we have innumerable departments and organizations engaged in tempestuous publishing activities and obtaining for such by no means socially necessary purposes approximately 130,000 tons of paper annually. The nature of the overwhelming majority of sectorial journals largely took shape during the period of the country's industrialization and has experienced no substantial changes since that time. Goskomizdat suggested that the publication of a number of sectorial journals and other publications not in demand be stopped and that publishing activities of ministries and departments be streamlined. These suggestions, however, were met by the latter not very favorably and, in the final account, vanished in the endless sea of consultations and coordinations.

Would any self-respecting department willingly abandon today its own publications, although they may not be enjoying any demand? We shall not be able to deal with departmental ambitions which are costly to society, with persuasion, anymore than we could put an end to mandating subscription to departmental publications.

It is only the free marketing of printed matter, unrestrained by "ceilings" or other administrative-pressure measures that would help us to achieve a balance, which is so needed by perestroika, between demand for such goods and supply. It is fully possible that it is precisely by abandoning subscription ceilings for newspapers and journals and the practice of mandatory distribution of unpopular publications, that we could find the main reserves for saving on newsprint and printing facilities, which are in such short supply now and, perhaps, also possibilities of expanding glasnost.

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**The Pensioner Is Not a Sponger on Society**  
18020001f Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 13,  
Sep 88 (signed to press 25 Aug 88) pp 45-51

[Interview granted to M. Krans by Anatoliy Georgiyevich Solovyev, deputy chief, USSR State Committee for Labor Social Insurance Administration, honored lawyer of the RSFSR]

[Text] *The new law on pensions is being drafted. As to when and how it will see the light and the changes it will make in the pension insurance of citizens, for the time*

*being we know little. The expectation of innovations affects not only nearly 60 million pensioners. Experience has convinced us that pension policy affects all working people. The working man can rest confident that the quality of his labor today will influence the way he will be secured tomorrow. The conscientious worker should, even after his retirement, find himself in better conditions than those who dissembled and were lazy. He would like, with such a transition, not to have to drastically change his customary way of life. All of this influences his attitude toward his job.*

*Today we are concerned by the correlation between pensions, which change little, and rising prices and the fact that the firm "ceiling" which has been set as far as the amount of pensions are concerned, despite an overall increase in wages, has already brought those who work well close to those who work poorly. How is this considered from the standpoint of social justice? And how is this considered from the viewpoint of the overall socioeconomic strategy of perestroika, which proceeds from the need to take all possible steps to stimulate better work? These questions, concerns and worries are manifested in the editorial mail. The readers express critical remarks and submit suggestions. We have readdressed one of them to a person who deals with the formulation of changes in pensions, Anatoliy Georgiyevich Solovyev, deputy chief, Social Insurance Administration, USSR State Committee for Labor.*

*And so, what kind of reform can we expect?*

**[Question]** Anatoliy Georgiyevich, is it possible already now to say something about the concepts governing the reform? How are they part of the overall strategy of perestroika?

**[Answer]** The drafting of any new law begins with the comprehensive and painstaking analysis of the strong and weak aspects of the existing system and its correlation with the processes and trends which are characteristic of the contemporary stage in the development of society. Let me cite a few data which describe the situation which currently exists in the pensions area.

Let us consider an indicator such as the correlation between the level of pensions and wages. At the present time its average is 47 percent. Is this too much or too little? Everything depends on the criteria by which we are guided. Let us compare this to the situation in other countries. In the United States, for example, for more than 10 years now pensions have not exceeded 30 percent of the average wage. In some countries this indicator is somewhat higher than in ours but, as a whole, we do not appear in a bad light at all. It is true, however, that there are other objective indicators as well, which must be taken into consideration. By this I mean, above all, the correlation between social security expenditures and national income. In our country they account for more than 11 percent and three-quarters of such funds are spent on pensions. In the United States the

situation is approximately similar. In Western Europe, however, expenditures for social needs are significantly higher, in the range of 20 percent or more; they are about 15 percent in Czechoslovakia and in the other European socialist countries they may be somewhat lower but nonetheless they are higher than in the USSR.

**[Question]** The picture which emerges looks quite satisfactory. But, let us say, our readers, such as R. Tsvilev, senior scientific associate, All-Union Scientific Research Institute of Soviet Legislation, and V. Rogozhin, docent, All-Union Correspondence Financial-Economics Institute, believe that for a long period of time pension legislation was not substantially advanced and, at best, "marked time." "The result," they write to the editors, "was the gradual surrender of positions in the economic guarantees of the right to pension insurance, a reduced living standard for veterans, of which our public was not informed."

**[Answer]** You see, the well-being which I mentioned is relative. We are comparing amounts of pensions and wages. The latter, however, are different from the American or the Western European, and the comparison is not in our favor. For that reason, in terms of absolute amount our pensions are unsatisfactory. For the time being they cannot ensure a worthy living standard to all labor veterans.

**[Question]** The situation of the pensioner in society is largely characterized also by the condition of the society itself, its level of development and its humaneness. However, "it is not only the problem of the piece of bread that concerns the aging person," notes I. Popov from Krasnoselka Village, Kominternovskiy Rayon, Odessa Oblast. "It is not his fear of being 'one more mouth to feed' in the family. It is not fear that should he become ill he would be left without medical aid.... What concerns him is something else: How to retain his social significance and standing in the family and society." Does it not seem to you, Anatoliy Georgiyevich, that until recently no proper respect was paid to labor veterans as a whole: in words they were not only equal but were even the most respected members of society; in fact, however, they were considered spongers.

**[Answer]** I cannot fully support this view. A number of steps taken in recent years to improve pension legislation prove otherwise. The fact that the 1956 law is obviously obsolete and, as a whole, considerably behind present-day requirements, is a different matter.

As to the attitude of viewing pensioners as spongers, in my view, it has existed because of the insufficiently complete and objective information concerning the very nature of social security, pensions in particular. Yes, pensions are paid out of public consumption funds which, like the national income as a whole, are created by those who are working today. However, we must bear in mind that it was precisely the labor veterans, who dedicated their forces and knowledge to society, that

contributed to the accumulation of the national wealth and created conditions for subsequent generations to be able fruitfully to work and live. Therefore, they have earned, they are rightfully entitled to material support today.

**[Question]** Tell us, please, in greater detail, how precisely has the current law on pensions become obsolete and why has the reform been necessary?

**[Answer]** Perestroyka in pensions is determined by a number of reasons. Negative phenomena and trends began to accumulate in the course of the enactment of the latest Law on State Pensions of 1956 and, perhaps, to a lesser extent, the 1964 Law on Pensions and Aid to Kolkhoz Members. How were they manifested? Above all, precisely the fact that with every passing year the correlation between pensions and wages worsened: in the "starting period" a pension was 62-63 percent of the wage. Furthermore, the connection between pension payments and labor contribution proved to be quite inadequate, above all because of the upper limit to pensions which was set.

Indeed, the 120-ruble "ceiling" which was initially set exceeded the average wage level by a factor of 1.6. Today this maximum (ignoring some corrections which affected relatively few categories of working people) remains virtually unchanged. Meanwhile, over the past 30 years average wages have almost tripled while minimal pensions have increased by a factor of 1.7, as a result of which equalization trends were clearly noted. Frequently, highly skilled and unskilled workers, people who had dedicated their entire strength and capabilities to society, and those who worked indifferently found themselves in an actually identical situation. Obviously, this does not inspire the desire to work better.

**[Question]** Was it the 1956 law which laid the foundations for equalization?

**[Answer]** Yes. Objectively, it was the stipulations of this legislation that determined this trend. This is not only a matter of a pension "ceiling." The pension rate itself was structured on the following principle: the higher the earnings, the lower the percentage rate. Whereas initially in the case of low earnings it ranged between 75 and 100 percent, as earnings increased, they gradually fell into a lower rate—50 percent. If this trend is maintained, by the end of the present 5-year period the majority of the people will end up receiving equal pensions.

This is one of the reasons for the need for reform. The other, a no less important one, is that we have in our country two parallel pension systems: for the kolkhoz members and for the other categories of working people. There are substantial disparities between the two. Today they are totally unjustified from the positions of social justice and the possibilities of society, based on the level of its economic development.

**[Question]** "The fact that the current legislation has become obsolete and needs radical changes is not questioned today not only by the specialists but also by people who have nothing to do with our system," notes in his letter I. Yershov, head of the rayon social security department, Genichesk City, Kherson Oblast. "But how dynamic will the new legislation be, and how rapidly and painlessly would it be possible to adapt it to changing social relations and take long-term developments into consideration? A good law must be one step ahead of the development of society. Unless this occurs, several years after the law has been passed we encounter the same type of problems." The author of this letter believes that haste in this matter is inappropriate, yet the solution of pressing problems should not be delayed. What to do in this case?

**[Answer]** It seems to me that a certain delusion exists in this situation, caused by insufficiently clear information. It has not been established anywhere that the law must be enacted tomorrow or the day after. In its 11 September 1986 resolution, the Politburo merely set the assignment of drafting it and set its main objectives and trends. No specific deadlines were set.

Why would it be impossible to enact the new legislation this year or even in 1990? If we truly want it to be not only different in terms of form and purely legal aspects, but also to be based on real economic and social grounds, we need substantial funds. All resources for the current 5-year period have already been allocated. For that reason such a law could be enacted only starting with the next 5-year period. Therefore, there still is time to do thorough work on the draft and submit it afterwards to nationwide discussion.

What has already been accomplished? A concept has been developed which includes the basic parameters of the future legislation. Its initial draft was rejected by the Council of Ministers. The point is that we submitted a single concept whereas we had been given the assignment of presenting several options and take various viewpoints into consideration, something which we did later.

**[Question]** Some of the letters doubt that the draft is being formulated democratically. Thus, Engineer Ye. Nesterova, from Moscow, writes: "Many citizens are concerned by the fact that the view of the public concerning the reform in pensions will be ignored in the draft. In my view, this concern has some grounds: during meetings with labor collectives, the views of scientists and working people have not always coincided, and the organization of the drafting of such a law gives priority to the views of specialists. Their views, which are discussed within a narrow circle, turn out to be decisive."

**[Answer]** Officially, the formulation of this legislation has been assigned to five departments: Gosplan, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Justice, AUCCTU and State Committee for Labor, which is in charge of coordinating

the entire project. In fact, however, the number of authors is much larger, and that "narrow circle" which your reader writes about, is considerably wider than she may imagine.

Let us point out, above all, that even before the decision of reform was made, we had received numerous suggestions by working people and entire collectives. Furthermore, we kept analyzing current legislation, compared with the experience of other countries. We studied the extent to which our social security as a whole is consistent, if one may say so, with international standards. Therefore, the Politburo assignment did not catch us unawares, for an information base had already been laid.

It was all of this, plus material that we we acquired later that we studied once again carefully. Naturally, we did not limit ourselves to it. A profound and comprehensive study was necessary of the various viewpoints and different approaches to the problem, i.e., it was necessary to take as much as possible public opinion into consideration. That is why we made a sociological study of 15,000 working people. We repeatedly met with labor collectives and organized a series of work meetings with representatives of state and economic authorities, public organizations and scientific collectives involved, one way or another, with this matter. We met with the ministers of social security of Union republics, specialists within our system and trade union officials. We set up task forces to work on the various aspects of the reform, which included scientists and practical workers. In general, let me say that a great deal of work has been done, discussions were frank and extensive and, above all, democratic.

Our suggestions on the essential aspects of the new law met with approval and support. This pertains above all to strengthening the connection between pension and labor contribution. Thus, an average monthly wage will be established to compute pensions not for one year, as is currently the case, but for 5 consecutive years of the last 10 years of work. An overall lowering of pensions, which may occur in this connection, would be prevented by raising their basic amount from 50 to 55 percent of earnings. To this effect, we are planning to include incentives for length of work amounting to a 0.5 percent increase in pensions for each year of work from 20 to 30 years for women and from 25 to 35 years for men, as well as 1 percent per each subsequent year of work.

**[Question]** In what areas were there differences and arguments?

**[Answer]** The most serious differences were on the question of the upper limit of pensions, which largely determines the possibility of differentiations and the future cost to society. According to some, the "ceiling" should be lifted altogether; others call for preserving it. Nor is there unity of views as to what precisely should the upper limit be. Some specialists are convinced that it

should be consistent with the level of the average wage while their opponents argue that it is necessary to limit the range between a maximal and minimal pension.

Foreign experience offers differing options. In many countries there is no maximum but the rates themselves set the conditions which make excessively high pensions impossible. This is achieved in a variety of ways: in some cases, the amount of earnings on the basis of which a pension is computed is limited; in another, it is only that portion of the wage on the basis of which contributions are made that is considered. It is difficult to say as of now what decision would be the most rational.

The ideas which were submitted to the USSR Council of Ministers after further work offered two choices. The first calls for setting a maximal amount based on the level of the average wage and make it flexible, so that as the wages increase, it could be reviewed each 5 years. The second option is to have no ceiling but to set up a regressive scale and, in computing pensions, after the "critical" amount, to add to the base rate not 1 percent but somewhat less per each year of work. Possibly, in the course of the discussions, a third option may be adopted.

**[Question]** In your view, is there not in the area of social security and, particularly, pensions, a contradiction between the requirements of social justice and economic expediency?

**[Answer]** I believe that in this case we must speak of artificially created contradictions or the possibility of creating them. Let us say that in the course of the discussion some specialists were in favor of making this system generous, I would say excessively so. This kind of approach could lead to the fact that people engaged in public production would, in some cases, earn less than pensioners.

**[Question]** But you already said that the pensioner is not a sponger, that he has earned his future security. Clearly, the question is precisely for him to receive what he has earned, therefore entailing no radical changes in his way of life in retiring.

**[Answer]** I believe that we must proceed on the basis of rational ratios between pensions and wages and that the ratios themselves must be based on human needs. For example, if a minimal wage satisfies nominally 75 percent of a person's needs we cannot set as our task the 100 percent satisfaction of such needs through the pension. In formulating the draft law, we precisely proceeded from a consideration of consumer budgets: minimal, adequate and sufficient.

As to minimal pensions, most participants in the discussion tend to agree that they should not be fixed, as has been the case so far, but flexible. The concept stipulates that the minimal pension should be 75 to 85 percent of minimal earnings.



All population groups will benefit from the new law although not all pensioners without exception. In their last year of work, many people find better paying jobs. One frequently comes across the paradox that a person has spent his entire working life earning a salary lower than his pension. As a result of the reform, he most likely will not be paid such an unearned supplement.

[Question] According to estimates, the actual worth of pensions over the past 20 years has dropped by more than 10 percent. "During the period since the adoption of the previous law," notes Vilnyus Engineer A. Gasparas, "prices of virtually all commodities have increased repeatedly. This has applied even to newspapers and journals, not to mention food products, clothing and shoes. Although lagging behind price increases, earnings nonetheless rose while pensions remained frozen during that entire period. Furthermore, it is as though veterans have been reduced to the status of second-class citizens."

We know that in our country no "poverty line" has been set and that the poverty line of pensioners is equally unknown. Nonetheless, all of us are familiar with the catastrophic situation of some of our old people. Many readers express the fear that the planned reform would worsen their situation even further, particularly among those who are receiving minimal pensions. Does the future law contemplate any kind of mechanism which would establish an interconnection between pension levels and cost of living?

[Answer] It was considered until recently that there is no inflation in our country, that prices are stable, for which reason it was claimed that there were simply no reasons to introduce in our system such a mechanism. Nonetheless, there has always been a relative reduction in pensions. One of the reasons for this, in addition to changes in the price index, was that wages rose, and retiring labor veterans received a higher pension than their predecessors. That is why, starting with 1985, pensions were raised by 10 percent of earnings on which they were based, and by 2 percent for each subsequent 2 years.

In the new law as well we intend to preserve this mechanism. It will ensure bringing the amount of pensions paid over a long period of time closer to the level of the new pensions. As to the price reform, in our view, corrections of the legislative standards could be ensured through supplements. This means that the amount of supplements will be based on changes in the price index. For example, if the cost of goods increases by an average of 30 rubles it is precisely that amount that will be added to the budget of every pensioner.

[Question] Was the question of pensioning age discussed?

[Answer] Yes, this question as well was discussed. However, few people spoke out in favor of raising retirement age. The point is that pension legislation most directly affects labor resources. If you change the working period in human life, resources either increase or decrease.

Incidentally, in some capitalist countries, where retirement age is between 5 and 10 years higher than in our country, as a result of high unemployment their governments are forced to lower this level for some categories of working people. Taking into consideration the prospect for a reduction in the scarcity of manpower as a result of the economic reform and the possibility of surplus manpower in some areas, we reached the conclusion that it would be expedient to preserve the existing situation.

[Question] At this point we come to another question which also concerns many of our readers. Here is what E. Yarin, labor veteran from Rubtsovsk, Altay Kray, writes: "In frequent cases giving us the opportunity to work after retirement is considered a kind of philanthropy. This ignores the fact that the labor returns provided by veterans are quite high and, in some areas, their work is even more efficient than that of the young. In order not to waste the wealth at our disposal and the valuable experience of the veterans, groundless restrictions concerning their labor activities should be eliminated."

Naturally, this is a complex and difficult problem. On the one hand, society is interested in the renovation and rejuvenation of cadres and in replacing the managerial structure. On the other, the collectives are frequently interested in efficient and knowledgeable specialists and are ready to do all they can to keep them at work. Is sufficient flexibility being displayed in this matter? In your view, what should be done to make more efficient use of the labor of pensioners? Furthermore, do you think that the very principle according to which one person may have the right to work and receive a pension while another may not conflicts with the idea of social justice?

[Answer] Let us look at this problem from a different viewpoint. Generally speaking, to what extent is receiving a pension while working justified? It would be difficult to provide a simple answer. Personally, however, I am inclined to believe that this is unjustified. Actually, what is a pension? As we know, it is part of the social consumption fund used to support those who are unable to work. On the basis of this definition, a pension should be paid to those who are unable to work and have no other means of subsistence. Such is its social purpose.

In frequent cases we turn the pension also into an instrument for the redistribution of manpower. We use it not only to support the population which cannot work but also to involve in production or retain in it people who are full of strength and energy. What is the economic return? In my assessments with which, in truth, not everyone agrees, more than 10 billion rubles are being spent in our country for such purposes and the returns are approximately half that amount. The reason for such a disproportion is, above all, the fact that most veterans would have continued to work anyway, even had they been receiving no pension.

Why, nonetheless, did the state take such an economically unjustified step? A scarcity of manpower in some

sectors and areas appeared at the beginning of the 1960s. In order to fill the shortage, proper incentives had to be created. The people had to be motivated to go on working or else to take less prestigious or less attractive jobs. In other words, for the sake of the public interest the state deliberately makes certain sacrifices and funds from the social security system, appropriated for the disabled, are partially paid out to able-bodied people.

In the concept of the new law we proceed from the fact that in order to attract labor veterans to work in the national economy special conditions must be created. However, they should not conflict with the purposes and tasks of the pension system. We have adopted the by no means new principle, according to which the purpose of the pension is to compensate for the loss of previous earnings as a result of reduced work capacity. Nonetheless, the overall income should not exceed the level of the former salary. Such a rule has long been in operation in terms of third-group handicapped and the military. It could become applicable to all working people, with one exception: categories of service personnel in short supply which, as we believe, would receive their pensions with no restrictions whatsoever.

Another solution would not be excluded as well. The need to make use of the work of pensioners is based on the specific conditions of a given area and production line. For that reason, views have been expressed to the effect that the ways and means of material incentive given to pensioners in this case should be selected by the enterprises and their collectives directly, depending on cadre availability. They could set supplements to wages, provide social benefits to veterans, and pay the proper pensions in full or partially out of their own funds. With that approach a significant portion of the funds spent on pensions would be released and could be used to increase the pensions of those who can no longer work.

At the present time, on the basis of the stipulations of the developed concept, a first option for the new law has been drafted. Now the government must consider it. In concluding this talk let us note that the discussion of the project will become widespread in the country after its publication. Our discussion, we hope, will become an occasion for considerations and serve the cause of preparations for the forthcoming nationwide discussion.

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#### **Returning to Water Problems....**

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[Continued publication of responses to the talk with Academicians B.N. Laskorin and V.A. Tikhonov: "New Approaches to the Solution of the Country's Water Problems," initiated in issue No 12 of this journal]

[Text] I have frequently criticized in the press the Minvodkhov and, sometimes, also Minenergo which, I

am confident of this, in an long series of quite important cases have caused our national economy irreparable harm, promoting the extensive way of development, which promises our ruination and playing the role of an outsider in global technical progress.

Although my articles, like innumerable other publications of this kind, have not triggered the proper action, I do not deem possible to remain aside of a discussion which, again and again, breaks out in the pages of your journal.

Let me begin by repeating some questions and facts I have written about earlier but without which we cannot do.

And so, who is responsible for the state crime committed in Karakalpakiya where, as a result of reclamation "improvements" of the land, the land turned out salinized and swamped; essentially, this is the death of the population, which is falling prey to diseases, and children are born with defects, a damage comparable only to the damage caused by the Chernobyl accident.

Why is it that so far the collector for effluent waters has not been built in the Aral, although it is so greatly necessary and was planned such a long time ago? For the past few years the Aral has been draining in the Sarykamysh Depression. And all of this is occurring while that same Minvodkhov is still calling for transferring the waters of the Ob to the Aral, over a distance of 2,500 kilometers, in order to save the Aral Sea.

Who is responsible for misrepresenting and falsifying the forecast on the allegedly steady decline in the level of the Caspian Sea, the concept which became the foundation of the "project of the century," i.e., the plan of transferring some of the stock of the northern rivers to the south? The fact that there had been a falsification was confirmed by three departments of the USSR Academy of Sciences and by the Caspian Sea itself, for even while this pseudoprognosis was being drafted, its level was rising quite rapidly, threatening many coastal installations.

Who is responsible for the "unpromising" plans of the Minvodkhov, which it promotes very energetically at the start and subsequently itself writes off every year after they have cost hundreds of millions of rubles?

Who is responsible for the comprehensive initiation of the construction of hydroelectric plants and huge transfer canals on the basis of plans which have still not been completely approved in accordance with stipulated procedures, such as the Katun GES project?

Does this not apply also to the Turukhan GES, the Volga-Chogray Canal and the second Volga-Don Canal about which specialists are saying to this day that it is totally unnecessary, for its functions could be entirely performed by the already existing canal network?

Who is responsible for blocking the Kara-Bogaz with a thick dike, as a result of which already now losses have reached half a billion rubles and in the future, as estimated by scientists, will exceed many billion?

Who is responsible for the fact that Hidroproyekt participated in designing the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant and the fact that many hydroengineering technicians were employed in running the plant without any understanding of what this involved?

Who is responsible for designing and building the Lenin-grad Dike and for dozens of "long-construction" reclamation projects?

Why are we building the type of irrigation systems, the recovery time for which is estimated at more than 100 years?

Why is it that, having invested 130 billion rubles in land reclamation over a period of 20 years (one-third of all capital investments in agriculture), as it were we failed to obtain any substantial increase in crop yields?

As long as we have no answers to those "who?" and "why?" we shall not make any progress. We shall remain in a condition of only partially civilized state which lacks the necessary juridical, economic and moral rules and foundations which would enable us objectively to assess our own projects and long-term plans.

It would be stupid to deny the importance of reclamation in general (however, this is precisely what my opponents are trying to ascribe to me). But it is not I who has compromised reclamation but those who bear responsibility for such things, which should be classified more as state crimes than blunders.

That is precisely the way I estimate the state of affairs, and if I am wrong let ministers and ministries take me to court. They do not do this, however, and they are not answering the "who?" and "why?" questions. Consequently, they acknowledge these accusations, for which reason it is they who should be tried. What other logic would be possible in this case?

Yes, such is precisely the case: achieving expected results is the rule, there is nothing supernatural in it. However, should results turn out to be unexpected and opposite to what was expected it is a crime, particularly when it is a question of technical planning, for technology is by nature a precise science, a precise prediction, and not a game of roulette.

How did we develop this faulty gigantomania with which, unable to build a wind-powered engine, we string a power cable to each cattle farm from hydroelectric power plants generating 2 million kilowatts?

The reason is that no single department finds it profitable to deal with "minor" mechanization and "minor" power generating. For it is only in the case of construction projects worth billions of rubles that the department would also obtain billions of rubles of allocations out of the state budget (the people's pocket), a personnel of millions of people and, obviously, deputy seats in the Supreme Soviet and membership in the CPSU Central Committee.

The reason is that entire generations in our country were raised in the spirit of the "great construction projects of communism." These great construction projects were planned and built through the manpower of camp inmates. This manpower had to be used somehow, it was an unskilled mass labor force. So, the great leader drew up the map of "his" country: a great canal must be built, great hydroelectric power plants must be built, such as the Tsimlyan, Kakhovka and Novosibirsk, here, here, here and here. We must nonetheless say that such "projects" were by no means always senseless. The point, however, is also that they raised entire generations of engineers and administrators in the spirit of gigantomania, in the spirit of "the more grandiose, the better," and of neglect of the real needs of the people and the national economy.

Those times are past, but the method applied then has remained, the method of supermaximal utilization of natural and demographic resources, inherent in our time not even in the Asian but, above all, the colonial-African way of development. It is this road and this development option that we are promoting and continuing to implement, if not in all but in many of the national economic sectors involving the use of nature. We have created also a corresponding school—inflexible, inventive, self-confident and faulty—which, in accordance with its own laws is continuing to plan our immediate and not so immediate future in the same direction. It scorns alternate sources of energy and "waterless" reclamation, for they do not include huge projects.

These days the Gosplan is considering a system for the comprehensive utilization and preservation of water resources for the period until the year 2005, submitted by the Minvodkhov.

How does this take place? Let us begin with the fact that the main role here is played by those same "transferors," whose project had to be blocked by the government with a special resolution. Now, however, they are doing everything possible and impossible to go back, at all costs, to the "transfer." This trend is inspired by Comrade P.A. Polad-zade, first deputy minister of reclamation and water resources, and the chief engineer of the project, Comrade L.I. Polad-zade, who claim that by the year 2005 water consumption in the country will reach 100 cubic kilometers per year (an increase of 25-30 percent) at a time when, although by no means streamlined, the trend toward reduced water utilization is nonetheless obvious: between 1980 and 1986 the use of

fresh water has been reduced annually by 18 cubic kilometers. The same trend is characteristic of worldwide practices in water utilization, resulting from the application of new industrial technology, water recirculation systems and more advanced irrigation methods.

How can one ignore this already quite clear and progressive trend toward reduced water consumption?

Here is the way this is done: Comrades P.A. and L.I. Polad-zade take as a starting point not the year 1985 or 1986, but the year 1990, which is still not here, and they "assign" to it the opposite trend, a trend which suits them: the trend that water consumption will increase, not somewhat but by 25-30 percent over the next 15 years.

It is thus that they reach the figure of 100 cubic kilometers of increase, and it is thus that they support their plans for water transfers and state budget appropriations for water resources, which should increase from 10.5 to 17-18 billion rubles annually.

It is also thus that over the next 15 to 20 years the per capita extortion from the population of the Soviet Union by the reclamation workers will, if not double, increase by at least a factor of 1.5 and will come close to 80 or even 100 rubles annually for every child and old person, for every Soviet citizen.

Taking into consideration the losses which have already been caused to the national economy in terms of water resources, and for which we shall be paying for many many years to come, such extortion becomes even greater. Already now, it substantially exceeds expenditures for aid for temporary disability, for example.

From the very first, the expert evaluation of the Gosplan determined that the project calls for an excess use of 25 cubic kilometers for industry and 40 cubic kilometers for agriculture.

The explanation given for this is the incredible Minvodkhoz "error," which is quite simple, and let me repeat it: the higher the anticipated amount of water consumption becomes, the more funds will the Minvodkhoz obtain from the state budget. At this point the figure of 130 billion spent over 20 years becomes petty.

Adding to this the fact that no ecological and, essentially, economic substantiation is added in such projects, the picture which emerges becomes even more striking.

This is no accident. It is a method, it is a procedure of ministerial activities.

We must also bear in mind the fact that in frequent cases expert evaluations of such huge projects and plans turn into a farce: the planners themselves determine who will and who will not participate in the expert commissions, what problems they will deal with and what problems

will be ignored, and should an expert find a project unsubstantiated, its creators would say: we disagree, nothing of the sort, our offspring is impeccable! This is as though a student who gets a failing grade would tell the teacher: I disagree, you know nothing, I know more than you do!

The fact that our natural resources—land, water, timber and minerals—have no price set to them leads to an orgiastic use of nature. Such an orgy should be restrained and measures for economical use should be formulated for all indicators, as thoroughly as possible. In this case, however, this was not done. To a large number of people this lack of order is much to their liking. The Minvodkhoz considers that this is its "advantage of socialism," and that in no case should anyone be allowed to change it.

This means that the ruination of nature under the influence of this school of thought in the forthcoming decades will hit us with unparalleled acceleration.

In the past few decades a special type of planner has developed in our country: the performer-adventurist, who is always ready to make the cost of a planned project fit a predetermined cost and any type of indicator which has been predetermined and suits the department, a person who is ready cleverly to circumvent any remark made by an expert by saying that "we have reached an agreement" (from above) and who does not even conceal that he will carry out someone's instructions even with the knowledge that they may be faulty and that this will greatly damage both nature and the people's well-being.

The years of voluntarism have not been wasted: they helped raise not one and not two generations of workers or, more accurately, of nominal workers. Those who were the most successful within that time are the ones who hold the highest positions in engineering organizations, ministries and departments.

It should not come as a surprise, therefore, that we are planning ever new canals, and hydroelectric, thermoelectric and nuclear power plants, while the already existing irrigation system is wasting one-half or more of the water, while the Minvodkhoz simply writes off 3.5 million hectares of irrigated land, when this has been the death of Karakalpakiya, and when we are wasting a mass of energy and fuel, when....

Let me cite examples from just one recently published book, "*Prichiny Ekologicheskikh Prestupleniy*" [Reasons for Ecology Crimes] (by O.L. Dubovik and A.E. Zhalinskiy, Izdatelstvo Nauka).

"In industry,..." the authors report, "about 40 to 42 percent of the heat generated from fuel combustion is profitably used, i.e., with an overall outlay of 1.7 billion tons of fuel, on the basis of nominal computations, less than 700 million tons are usefully used. The remainder... is wasted..." (p 115).



"...Ten percent of the overall extraction is spent to transport natural gas.... Forty-one billion cubic meters are discarded in the atmosphere at a temperature of about 500 degrees centigrade."

"...Thirty percent of the extracted coal, only partially burned and having yielded no heat, is discarded in the air as dust or dumped..." (pp 115-116).

By eliminating such losses we would not have to build a good half of the hydroelectric, thermoelectric or nuclear power plants planned for the next 10 to 20 years.

We would not have to increase the extraction of ore and steel production (as it were, our steel production is higher than in the United States by a factor of 2.5), so that we must then build superpowerful mechanisms for the extraction... of ore.

Same with the water: we use triple or quadruple the amount of water compared to world standards; same with timber: timber goods account for 3-4 percent of the amount of timber which has been felled and simply abandoned.

But... we are unable to avoid such "errors." We are still trapped by them and are unable to switch funds from one program to another and from one department to another. Minenergo is building water reservoirs while knowing perfectly well that other departments will turn them into sewer pits. This, however, will be done by others and not by itself, which it finds splendid! If such a stupid premise is clear why then, in fact, are designers taking into consideration all other ecological and economic indicators and circumstances? This makes absolutely no sense! Why not plan ever-new "transfers," if this is a ubiquitous attitude toward nature?

Why not build thick dams to block the Kara-Bogaz, the Gulf of Finland and the Sasyk Estuary? Why not initiate the building of the Turukhan GES although the project is still far from its definitive approval, when it is unknown where its energy will be used but we do know that no less than 20 percent of the energy it will generate will be lost along the power cables? Such is that praised inexpensive energy generated by the GES: it is inexpensive at the power plant but if we take into consideration all outlays without exception, all the losses caused by flooding and the moral, historical and ethnic losses, what will the real cost be of this "free" kilowatt hour?

One must always fear free gifts, particularly if given in large quantities: they can be treacherous and fraudulent. Not even a fish can be caught in a pond without some work. Without work, so to say, incidentally, fish could be caught in the Volga and the Ob, wherever one likes, but we seem to worship such "unearned income." We even painstakingly anticipate it.

There is a law in farming: the crop is always consistent with the least available element of nutrition of the plants, and the surplus of other elements cannot compensate for this minimum.

An approximately identical situation exists in the ecology: absolutely clean water cannot be balanced by polluted air and vice versa; it becomes even worse, however, if an entire series of requirements and laws of ecology and environmental protection are simultaneously violated. Incidentally, we have no such laws in our country. They do exist but in a most general aspect: the enterprises are mandated to observe certain rules and prohibited from doing something. But as to how specifically are culprits punished for violations is unknown. In fact, we cannot consider punishment the fine which is paid out of the state treasury!

A private company in the West could go bankrupt as a result of such a fine and thus worsen its reputation even further. It is true that in that case its solution is to sign a contract for the building of new and, naturally, huge projects in the Soviet Union. For here construction is done differently, based not on economic or ecological considerations but only on the need to retain a combative collective of construction workers and preserve the personnel of ministries and engineering organizations and budgets, and not only to preserve but to increase them progressively.

Yes, I have spoken about it, and many others have spoken about all this not once and not twice, but what is one to do if to ministries and ministers such criticism is no more than beating one's head against a brick wall? Minvodkhoz employs 2 million people, which is approximately the entire population of Finland; Minvodkhoz, however, finds this too little and demands more from the Gosplan and the people. The Gosplan which, at other times, itself developed leading technical ideas and projects and then undertook to implement them personally, not by departments or ministries (people's commissariats) but directly by the syndicates and trusts (as was the case, for example, during the Volkhovstroy years) today finds itself in the power of the departments which impose upon it their own interests, tear the state budget into pieces like a tasty pie. Whoever grabs the bigger piece is the hero. Even within the departments themselves this is understood by many people. Thus, as a result of a survey which was conducted several years ago among Minvodkhoz personnel, 25 percent of them answered that they were totally dissatisfied with their work. And this is only those who admitted it, who did not remain silent, and how many are there who were unwilling to acknowledge it?

The Minvodkhoz pretends that it is the victim of constant persecution, and that it is being harmed.

But what harm could there be a question of, if the ministry is currently promoting a sharp increase in its already truly huge budget?

This is nothing but the moaning of prosperous people who could "buy" outright an entire rayon or even oblast: they promise to the rayon or oblast to build schools, clubs and so on, providing that the rayon would start "clamoring" for the building of an irrigation system.

Yes, the farm would get its school and club but at what cost? At the cost of the loss of land which will be wasted by the Minvodka as a result of the virtually inevitable "long construction." (But then does land have any price in our country?)

What if Minvodka funds would be given directly to the kolkhoz or sovkhos: would the farm use it to build an irrigation system or not? It may, in one out of each ten cases.

Unwittingly, the question arises: How and by whom would such funds be allocated assuming that such a situation becomes not only possible but also typical over a number of years?!

Furthermore, why not, in fact, make it incumbent upon the Minvodka to invest some of its funds in civil construction or, to simplify it even further, road construction?

No one and nothing would suffer from this and even the Minvodka personnel (2 million people) would be retained.

Automobile plants are building household refrigerators and other consumer goods.

Finally, for quite some time the question has been discussed and has become pressing of closing down the Minvodka as a ministry. This would be right: I recall times when the Minselkhoz had its water resources main administration and there was better order, things were being run more economically, there was virtually no salinization of the land, and water resources were governed by rural resources and not vice versa, as is frequently the case today.

Here as well we approach that which is described in our country as public opinion and, I would say, public life as well.

It is impossible to count the number of authors of all those letters which the editors of NOVYY MIR alone receive, protesting the grossest possible violations of the ecological and demographic circumstances by all possible departments and, more than anyone else, the ministries of chemical industry, a great variety of construction organizations and, above all, Minvodka and Mine-nergo.

Sometimes such letters-petitions are signed by thousands, tens of thousands of people. Innumerable reports are being received from different republics and oblasts,

hundreds from Volgograd Oblast alone: there, in Volgograd, the entire Krasnoarmeyskiy Rayon is being poisoned: the more than questionable Volga-Don Canal is being built there, without final approval having been given, in the course of which 2.5 billion rubles (add to this that another 3 billion which the oblast's agriculture already owes the state will be frozen for a long period of time); a truly unparalleled "long construction" irrigation system will be developed there and tens of thousands of hectares of irrigated land will be written off. Actually, people write to us, today virtually no land is being officially written off; wasted land is being simply and silently discarded.

Thousands of engineers and construction workers are engaged in that rayon in developing projects such as the Volga-Chogray and Volga-Ural Canals; messengers and prospecting parties are running throughout the virtually entire republic, in search of ever-new "projects."

But what actually happens is that public opinion (and public life) exists only if positive results become apparent. If there are no results, they die out.

After society was able to block the project of transferring some of the stock of the northern rivers to the south, it regained its spirit, as though it once again began to trust its possibilities and its own government.

But then, departments with great experience in handling their own matters arose between society, on the one hand, and the party and the government, on the other. And what happened?

At that point, public opinion loses faith in itself and its self-respect. It keeps silent or even sinks into those same quarrels which were particularly emphasized at the 19th Party Conference. It loses its constructive potential before it has even been able to make use of it to any noticeable degree.

This involves the question of perestroika itself: Are we advancing or retreating?

Nature and its resources do not belong to any given department or government nor are they their sole proprietor; the real proprietor of a given territory are the people.

The people have just begun to understand and to gain inspiration from this understanding and in our country, as well as throughout the world, the people are now standing up differently in defense of the atmosphere, water and land, animals and plants; yet in our socialist and democratic state, they are facing illegality and arbitrariness in environmental protection.

When will all this end?

If we have already undertaken the restructuring of our administrative and political system, it is precisely now that an end must be put to this orgy. Otherwise we shall never end it.

It is precisely now that we must assert with particular thoroughness and caution our programs for the future, such as the plan for the comprehensive utilization and preservation of water resources until the year 2005.

Otherwise our new political system as well will find itself bound hand and feet by the old dogmas and plans.

Yes, a very serious problem is currently being raised in KOMMUNIST, and unless we provide an immediate answer, and unless the situation with environmental protection remains unchanged, as of today we could put a cross to our own future.

Respectfully yours, **S. Zalygin**, chairman of the Ecology and Peace Association of the Soviet Committee for the Defense of Peace

**V. Dubovitskiy**, candidate of economic sciences, from Ivanteyevka, Moscow Oblast, writes:

"As long as capital investments continue to be channeled into projects suitable to Minvodka, there could not even be a question of any economic effect or of any rated recovery of capital investments. Departmental politics are pressuring the farms, their production cost goes up, capital intensiveness increases and indebtedness grows.

"The need is pressing to change the investment policy of the state. Since the purpose of the USSR Minvodka is to improve the land, it should be paid precisely as much as is necessary to improve the land in a given area. It is the land user (sovkhoz, kolkhoz, or association of agricultural cooperatives) who should be the customer and manager of the funds. It is precisely the user of the land who should have the right to submit requests for the designing and expert evaluation of a project and have the possibility of controlling the course of construction and supervise the expediency of expenditures."

Hydroengineering Veterans **A. Shcherbinin**, **A. Tregubov** and **S. Yendovitskiy** from Volgograd report on Minvodka activities: "...Of late the development of land reclamation in the Soviet Union has resulted in a paradox: worsening of the land, loss and direct destruction of soil fertility. The land is being spoiled on a scale that is hard to imagine.

"Thus, in the Povolzhye and the Northern Caucasus, some 700,000 hectares of irrigated land have become swampy and salinized, which is nearly one-third of the entire irrigated land in that area. Such data come from the Register of Irrigated Land, which is drafted and approved by the leadership of the USSR Minvodka and the RSFSR Minvodka. Actually, the amount of spoiled land is greater, for these are only the official lists

of the 'dead,' but what about the 'missing in action!' For example, in Volgograd Oblast we must add to the 42,000 officially 'dead' in the 1988 season another 50,000 hectares which are falsely considered drained.

"What is the cost of this land?"

"A price has been set for condemned land. It is assessed at roughly 4,000-5,000 rubles per hectare. This is very low, but let us nonetheless accept it. The result is that 700,000 hectares would be appraised at 3-3.5 billion rubles! And this is only in the Povolzhye and the Northern Caucasus! But then the destruction, salinization and elimination of the fertility of the land take efforts and work. Canals must be dug, pumping stations must be built, there must be flooding, and all of this costs from 6,000 to 10,000 rubles per hectare, depending on local conditions.

"Therefore, in order to take such land out of circulation, about 6 billion rubles must be spent, with tremendous outlays of human and material resources. The overall damage caused to the national economy is some 9 billion rubles. Had this land been left alone and without the handling of the Ministry of Land Reclamation, such land would have kept yielding crops for an unlimited time. In the Povolzhye and the Northern Caucasus income per nonirrigated hectare is 200-300 rubles. Therefore, out of 700,000 hectares we would have annually earned between 150 and 200 million rubles. Now we have lost this possibility. In our view, the same type of computation should be made on the scale of the entire country.

"The gross errors and blunders we pointed out have already been made. However, the Minvodka and the USSR Gosagroprom are continuing the destruction of the land and are even increasing its scale. An example of this is the work on projects for transferring water from the Volga to the construction of the Volga-Don and Volga-Chogray canals and of numerous irrigation systems along the Volga. The overall cost of these two canals, with irrigation, will be about 10 billion rubles. By building the Volga-Don Canal we shall irrigate another 1 million hectares and of these, as is customary, we shall destroy one-third. This will be more billions wasted!

"The comprehensive destruction of natural resources throughout the country's territory has been going on for 20 years; the leaders of the department-departmental alliance-mandating authorities are pursuing their departmental and personal prestige projects. If the department wants it, science will substantiate it, the mandating authorities will approve it, and the executors will do anything they want.

"All that is left for us is to remain witnesses to the implementation of these plans. For example, if someone generates the idea of irrigating as much as 2 million hectares of land in Volgograd Oblast (10 times the amount at the beginning of the 12th 5-Year Plan), this would cost about 4 billion rubles of the people's money.

Why? In the last 10 years areas under irrigation increased by 100,000 hectares in the oblast while grain crops dropped between 10 and 30 percent. The cost of the output from irrigated lands is scandalously high. Above all, why take out of circulation and actually destroy fertile land and, furthermore, spend huge funds accomplishing this?

"The Long Term Program for Land Reclamation..." is one of the dogmas from the period of stagnation. We must see the light and abandon dogmas. We, engineers and hydraulic engineers, suggest at the present stage of perestroika and the development of democratic principles, that the following proposals be considered:

"1. As a department which has outlived its usefulness and which works on the basis of unacceptable principles of arbitrariness and bureaucratism, the USSR Minvodkhoz should be closed down.

"2. The construction of the Volga-Don and Volga-Chogray Canals as projects which destroy the land and nature and which cause tremendous economic harm, should be stopped immediately.

"3. All land resources should be given to the true owners of the land...."

The ecological situation in Kalmykiya was discussed in the talk with B.N. Laskorin and V.A. Tikhonov. A letter was received from Kalmykiya, signed by 29 scientific workers—botanists, agronomists, soil science experts, hydrologists and game breeders.

"The Kalmyk scientific public," the letter reads, "is quite concerned by the ecological situation which has developed in the Caspian area and, specifically, in the republic. Extensive animal husbandry was given priority starting with the end of the 1960s in the utilization of pasture land in the Kalmyk ASSR.

"...As a result, the load per hectare of pasture land increased by a factor of 2.5 while its productivity dropped from 6-7 quintals to 1.5-2 quintals. The consequence of such actions and other organizational blunders committed by the republic's leadership was the 1987 tragedy, when more than 600,000 sheep, 27,000 head of cattle, 1,800 horses and 75,000 saigas died from lack of food.

"The soil degradation process was accelerated even further as a result of the increased number of cattle on the republic's territory regardless of the fodder base, and the excessive cultivation of land in areas where pasture land and vegetable plantations in Astrakhan Oblast were and still are.

"Currently 20 percent of the territory of the Western Caspian area is showing strong desertification. Already 33 percent of the area (553,000 hectares) of the Chernyye Zemly pasture land is covered by moving sands. Within

that period land irrigation was extensively developed in the republic. The high level natural salinization of the soil and the absence or inefficient work of a collector-drainage system, and the low standard of use of irrigated land led to the fact that at the present time 18,000 out of 45,000 hectares of irrigated land, or 40 percent of the total, cannot be considered successfully reclaimed.

"We must point out that the speed of salinization of reclaimed soils in the republic is quite high: 3-5 years, after which the salinized land is written off and abandoned, and new land is developed. Actually, what has developed here is "nomad farming."

"The aspiration to reduce the cost of reclamation led to the development of truncated projects and technically imperfect irrigation systems. This is confirmed by the bitter experience in the development of the Sarpinskaya Depression, where losses in natural hay-growing areas totaled 14.7 percent of their territory and the planned yields were not reached in any of the irrigated parts.... The building and commissioning of the Volga-Chogray Canal will only worsen the degradation of the environment, which is assuming an irreversible nature.

"In an effort to prove the need for and great economic efficiency of the canal, its supporters use entirely groundless data. For example, harvests of 500 quintals per hectare in perennial grasses and 450 quintals in corn are stipulated for the farms in the canal zone, whereas between 1981 and 1985, the average for irrigated land in Kalmykiya for such crops was, respectively, 264 and 106 quintals per hectare.

"Cases of substantial padding of yield figures already occurred in drafting the system for the Sarpinskaya irrigation system. Now everything is being repeated once again. The ecological aspect of the project cannot withstand any criticism, for the future condition of natural systems along the track of the planned (and also being built) canal remains entirely undefined.... Changes in soil conditions will lead to the appearance of extensive salinized areas.... Many valuable species of plants and animals, protected by the law, will disappear from the genetic stock. The fate of the saigak population, which is the only one of its kind in Europe, triggers particular concern.

"Intensified hydraulic construction will lead to the establishment of new and the expansion of the areas of existing centers of dangerous infections.

"The solution of the problem of developing the agroindustrial complex in the Kalmyk ASSR is seen only as building new irrigation systems, excluding the comprehensive approach to the utilization of the farmland. Yet it is precisely such an approach that should be strategic in the development of this desert area. The main priority task is the restoration of the Chernyye Zemly pasture grounds. This requires, above all, reducing the cattle herds to a level consistent with the feed-generating



possibilities of the pastures. During the time that it will take to develop strictly scientific alternate choices to replace the Volga-Chogray Canal, attention should be paid to mastering and ensuring the efficient utilization of existing water reserves in the republic (ground waters on the territory of the Yergeninskaya Elevation, the waters of the Northern Caspian, infiltration lenses of fresh ground waters and others), laying group mains and digging wells, restoring neglected sources of water, etc."

The official response to the publication "New Approaches to the Solution of the Country's Water Problems" was sent to the editors by the Ichthyological Commission of the USSR Ministry of Fish Industry. The letter was signed by A. Yablokov, chairman of the Ichthyological Commission and USSR Academy of Sciences corresponding member; I. Nikonorov, deputy chairman, doctor of technical sciences; V. Dubinin, scientific secretary; and A. Isayev, expert. They write the following: "In order to survive under the conditions of perestroika, the USSR Minvodkhoz tries maximally to increase its volume of work and selects the most capital-intensive projects. It does its own planning as to which are the most convenient areas for the development of new land (ignoring the fears of geologists, soil experts, ichthyologists, ecologists and other specialists). It determines its own work structure, engages in research and planning and ensures the USSR Minvodkhoz with advantageous projects requiring tremendous capital investments.... As a result of the activities of the USSR Minvodkhoz, an ecological catastrophe and the drying out of the Aral Sea are taking place; most valuable fish stocks of the Volga-Caspian Basin are being undermined. Frequently some sectors are being developed at the expense of the interests of others. The interests of fishing resources are being harmed to the greatest extent. This explains the tremendous and irreparable harm caused to the fishing resources of many basins. The catch of valuable fish species, which amounted to some 1 million tons in 1948, has declined by a factor of 5. The Aral Sea has totally lost its significance in terms of fishing. The catch of valuable fish in the Azov Sea has dropped by a factor of 25. In the Caspian Basin the average annual water use is establishing an ecologically substantiated maximal level of non-recoverable water use. The further development of production forces can be attained only by finding water resources as a result of economizing within the set level."

The USSR Academy of Sciences Scientific Council on the comprehensive problem of "Optimal Planning and Management of the National Economy," sent its own opinion on the subject of the publication under discussion, signed by N. Fedorenko, academician and council chairman; N. Petrakov, corresponding member; and M. Lemeshev, professor and doctor of economic sciences: "The Scientific Council of the USSR Academy of Sciences deems inexpedient and ecologically dangerous the creation of big hydroengineering projects, such as the Volga-Chogray Canal, on the territory of the Kalmyk ASSR, the Volga-Don Canal (transfer to Volgograd Oblast), and the hydraulic engineering complex of the

Danube-Dnepr Canal in the Ukraine. The building of said projects must be halted and their financing stopped. Broad scale hydroengineering construction, related to the exaggerated development of water reclamation, is causing irreparable harm to the country's economy, agriculture in particular, aggravating social contradictions and worsening in a number of areas the critical ecological situation.

"As a rule, the difficulties related to supplying water to the national economy are caused not by the physical lack of water resources and their uneven distribution but by the extensive nature of water utilization on the part of the USSR Minvodkhoz. Ignoring the interests of the people and the objectives of perestroika, the departments are engaged in essentially obsolete, ecologically dangerous and economically ruinous projects. The expensive hydroengineering reclamation related to such projects accounts for an increasing share of the national income while causing harm to the national economy assessed in the billions of rubles.

"In order to surmount the negative trends which have developed in the activities of the minvodkhoz of the USSR and Union republics, the USSR Academy of Sciences Scientific Council deems necessary the following: to carry out reclamation projects on the basis of requests by agricultural enterprises; to change the practice of target financing of hydraulic reclamation with long-term crediting of reclamation projects; to reorganize the minvodkhoz of the USSR and Union republics and transfer reclamation functions to subdivisions of the USSR Gosagroprom; to entrust responsibility for the rational utilization and preservation of water and land resources to the soviets of people's deputies."

F. Kulintsov, doctor of economic sciences, professor, writes as follows: "The trouble is that we are totally unable to obtain from the Minvodkhoz an answer to the main question: What is the actual efficiency of water reclamation, what are its returns on a national scale and not in a few best model farms which we have always been able to create and emphasize? Naturally, their indicators are inspiring but the striking disparity between their results and the indicators in the majority of farms triggers serious concern.

"It would be difficult to find an indicator more convenient to the departments than the volume of crop output obtained on reclaimed land. Such an indicator could be increased steadily without any addition to the crops whatsoever: suffice it to assign a different category to the land. With the help of such indicators the conclusion may be drawn that each ruble of capital investments in reclamation, spent between 1971 and 1985, has yielded additional crops worth approximately 11 kopeks. However, in order to determine the real influence of such outlays on end national economic results, the increase in output on reclaimed land should be reduced, as follows: by the volume of output which was obtained on such land before its irrigation, current water resource outlays,

increased cost of chemical fertilizers, amortization of equipment, fuel, etc. The data needed for such a correction are the deepest possible departmental secret. I believe that once they become open knowledge, it will become clear that the computations made by V.A. Tikhonov, according to which capital investments in reclamation for the country at large would be recovered in 100 years, are excessively optimistic. Most likely, they will never be recovered and must be totally subtracted from the national income. Furthermore, in order to engage in a meaningful debate on this matter, one thing is needed: the department must lift the veil of secrecy on figures, without which any discussion on the efficiency of reclamation is simply unprofessional.

"Issue No 12 of this journal carried a letter by a group of scientists who, in their own words, had dedicated their lives to the study of water problems. It is precisely they who should answer the questions we asked above. They did not let us down. The amazed public has now found out that each ruble of capital investments between 1971 and 1985 yielded a crop output worth 69 kopeks. Comparing this figure with universally accessible data, it is easy to estimate that the growth of crop output in 1985, compared with 1970, supported by such capital investments, totaled 78 billion rubles. The trouble is that the entire crop output in 1985 amounted to 75 billion rubles and two-thirds of it came on land which is still not considered reclaimed. Clearly, the respected authors proceed from the fact that in 1970 our entire country was a sterile desert in which absolutely nothing grew and that it was only the heroic efforts of reclamation workers that enabled us to organize our agricultural production in the 1970s and 1980s. That is a truly innovative approach to the identification of 'blank spots' in our economic history! With such a daring use of even universally accessible statistical data it is easy to refute the arguments of scientists who doubt the efficiency with which the huge funds invested in the development of reclamation have been used.

"Nonetheless, the level of returns on irrigated lands is low and specific outlays per irrigated hectare are systematically rising. Whereas 10 to 15 years ago they totaled 5,000-6,000 rubles per hectare, they have now reached 10,000-12,000, with a tendency to increase further. The quality of the work done remains extremely low, as a result of which crop yields as projected in the plans are actually not achieved. Many land lots are only considered 'ready for irrigation.' The size of these lots in the country has come close to 10 million hectares. In order to bring such land to a state at which it could yield a normal output, a minimum of 27-30 billion rubles in additional investments would be needed.

"The results of such irresponsibility can be seen by taking as an example the development of new land in Uzbekistan. Here about 800,000 hectares of land need hydraulic reclamation; about 5 million hectares need significant improvements in soil fertility, and restoration of crop rotation, which would require tens of billions of rubles.

"It has been proved that high-intensiveness spraying machines, which destroy the fertile soil stratum, affect it adversely. Furthermore, such machines require extensive amounts of water without having any major positive influence on increased farm yields. The water carries away with itself the already scant reserves of fertility. Many machines spray the water under their own wheels, which packs the soil, already packed by other heavy machinery. Since the Minvodkhoz installed such machines "at its own expense," many of them are still rolling over the country's fields. Wherever such machines have been used the land has been written off. Twelve of the 19.9 million hectares of farmland irrigated in the country are sprayed manually. In order to spray this area manually, every year the kolkhozes and sovkhoses must use as many as 5 million workers. In order to reach a normal condition for the 12 million hectares, another 42 billion rubles will be necessary. As much as 40 billion rubles will be necessary to restore the disrupted fertility of the soil on the entire 19.9 million hectares."

Scientists and the public at large object to the building of a set of protective installations in Leningrad, commonly described as the Leningrad Dike, carried out by Minvodkhoz and designed by Gidroproyekt. Here is what Professor V. Znamenskiy, doctor of geographic sciences, writes from Leningrad: "As early as 1970 studies I conducted proved that such a dike would hinder by a factor of 1.5-2 the removal of pollution from the Neva Inlet and drastically worsen the ecological situation. At that time the results were submitted to Lengidroproyekt, but were ignored. I also turned to scientific, party and soviet organizations with those same "sensitive" problems but there was no response, and the construction of the dike is continuing. No counterarguments have been provided but counteraction has been strong and united.

"However, even at this point this construction could be stopped and much more modest, sparing and efficient facilities could be built, involving the so-called "eastern" variant, which calls for protecting the sea side of the city, blocking the canals of the delta with locks and building dams in the middle reaches of the Neva. In that case the Neva Inlet would be kept in its natural condition. This variant, which was suggested in 1964, was much more economical compared to the currently implemented "western" variant developed by Lengidroproyekt. Could it be that it is precisely this that the builders did not like?"

Professor A. Liverovskiy, doctor of technical sciences and winner of the state prize, from Leningrad, writes that suggestions to protect the city from flooding were entirely effective and inexpensive. One of them—based on the local protection of entrances to the subway, the city sewer system, the ground floors and the basements—would have required several tens of millions of rubles and not billions. The fear is that glasnost is somewhat late, writes Comrade Liverovskiy, and that today it is too late to change anything, for 600 million rubles have

already been spent, 75 percent of the dike is ready and it is hardly possible to abandon it, while dismantling it would be expensive. However, even by abandoning the completion of the dike we would be saving 500-600 million rubles which could be used to protect the city through another, more efficient and ecologically safer way. As to the technique for removing the dike, it is not all that complex: the approaches which were developed and improved could work in the opposite direction, procuring from the dike to Leningrad construction projects the gravel, sand and stone which are so greatly necessary.

"...Should we wait for the dike to bring about irreversible and, possibly, catastrophic consequences to the people? Perhaps it would make sense to make use of the power of glasnost, meet the wishes of the public and, finally, provide an unprejudiced and comprehensive objective study of the problem...."

Professor S. Sergin, doctor of geographic sciences, believes that "...it appears as though the Minvodkhoz is repeating in the basin of the Caspian Sea the strategy of hydraulic reclamation which was carried out in the basin of the Aral Sea. Taking water from the Syrdarya and Amudarya for the newly irrigated fields ended with the tragedy of the uncontrolled drying out of the Aral and the swamping and salinization of the irrigated lands and territories along the canals and with environmental pollution.

"In turn, the Volga, Ural and Terek are being equipped with water reservoirs, canals and irrigation systems. The water flowing into the Caspian Sea has declined by 10-15 percent as a result of irrecoverable evaporation. Another 5-10 percent will be taken by the Volga-Don and Volga-Chogray canals. The danger appears that after a while a new major drop in the level of the Caspian Sea will begin. Unquestionably, the Minvodkhoz with its idea of transferring water from the northern rivers will act as its "rescuer." However, the implementation of this project of maintaining the ecological systems in the south will have to be paid for with the breakdown of the ecological system in the north.

"It is inadmissible for hydraulic reclamation to pursue the economic and ecological exhaustion of the country. There is an obvious need drastically to limit the scale of new reclamation and concentrate on improving already extant irrigation and draining systems, the construction of roads and storage areas, and so on.

"The reclamation workers and their supporters complain that the discussion in the press is one-sided and that the press is full of criticism against the department and its objections are not being published. These complaints were made even at the 19th All-Union Party Conference.

"This is amazing! What kind of equality is this: the departments have the facilities and the money and the richest possible opportunities, whereas the public has only empty shelves in stores, a land which is losing its fertility and growing discontent.

"Equality of positions' will be achieved only when the department gives back to the agricultural workers, to the people, funds so generously allocated to it."

Following is the opinion of soil expert G. Andreyev, docent at the Dnepropetrovsk Agricultural Institute, candidate of biological sciences: "...It is not simply a question that the output from irrigation in our country is expensive but as time goes on we are receiving increasingly fewer output. In the present condition with irrigation equipment, heavy agricultural machinery, obsolete agrotechnology and remaining irresponsibility, the land is losing its fertility.... The building of new irrigation systems, repeating the errors of the old, is a crime. However, we are not prepared to engage in construction without errors and blunders, for to this day we have not interpreted what we have accomplished...."

I. Nekhoroshev, associate at the USSR Minvodkhoz Soyuzgiprovodkhoz Institute, reports the following: "...Let me take note, above all, of the view expressed by Academician B.N. Laskorin to the effect that there are methods which make it possible to supply water to the republics of Central Asia.

"Very promising, in my view, in this connection, is the essentially new and highly efficient technology for the treatment of saline water, based on the method of its natural freezing. In our country, with its continental climate in many areas, the desalinizing of salty water would be highly efficient.

"Naturally, this technology will have to be developed, experimentally tested and applied. The leadership of the USSR Minvodkhoz are carefully ignoring this essentially new technical solution, although they do not object to it in principle.

"What explains such an indifference shown by Minvodkhoz to a proposal which could quickly and efficiently solve some of the gravest problems of providing fresh water to millions of people and to the national economy over vast areas? If the proposed technology for water treatment becomes widespread, naturally, it will become unnecessary to build a number of major planned projects, not to mention canals for transferring water from Siberia to Central Asia. By losing such projects, Minvodkhoz would be deprived of huge resources."

V. Rybin, curator of the ancient Russian department of the Kirillo-Belozerskiy Historical-Architectural and Artistic Museum-Reserve, and member of the presidium of the Kirillovskiy Rayon Organization of the Environmental Protection Society, writes: "The political stance adopted by the journal and the scientific stance of the

academicians clearly indicate the new approaches to the solution of the country's water problems. What is obvious is something else as well: a "minus" acceleration in the activities of Minvudkhoz and the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Water Problems. Both the journal and the academicians are 1,000 times right but (how many times already!) we must sadly realize that in the same way that the Minvudkhoz has pursued a policy of "ecological apocalypse" with billions of the people's money, it will continue to pursue such a policy, paying no attention whatsoever to the central press. As early as 1 year ago we were hoping that the Minvudkhoz would be closed down. But it was not: it continues to dig, flood and drain. Tremendous efforts will be required to surmount the insurmountable."

Engineer I. Rakitin from Magadan writes as follows: "...I have developed a specific attitude, an extremely negative one, toward this department. Billions of rubles have been buried in the soil, money which could have been sufficient for building housing, kindergartens and schools. The most terrible part of it is that no one and nothing is stopping the Minvudkhoz.... The decree on stopping plans for the transfer have been passed but the financing of the project has not, and the Minvudkhoz is continuing with its preparations for turning the rivers around. The following question arises: Why has it been given the right irresponsibly to waste nature and funds?... Who can stop such crimes? Who will cut down the budget of this department and force it to do some work?..."

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### Darwinism Today

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[Article by Leonid Petrovich Tatarinov, academician, deputy academic secretary, USSR Academy of Sciences Department of General Biology, director of the USSR Academy of Sciences Paleontological Institute]

[Text] "...This book offers a natural-history foundation for our views," K. Marx wrote in one of his letters to Engels, after the publication of the "*The Origin of Species*," by Charles Darwin (K. Marx and F. Engels, "Soch." [Works], vol 30, p 102), thus acknowledging the greatest universal conceptual significance of the theory of the evolution of the organic world. Actually, as long as man was considered the "peak of creation," there simply was no natural-history foundation whatsoever for the Marxist views on the development of human society. In the light of the theory of evolution man was presented as part of nature, a product of its development, separated from the animal world by virtue of the laws of nature itself.

The theory of evolution has retained its conceptual value to this day. The triumph of the ideas of evolutionism literally transformed the thinking of even the most

orthodox social circles. Thus, in 1950, in a special encyclical "The Origin of Man," Pope Pius XII agreed with the accuracy of the evolutionary view on the origin of the human body, emphasizing, however, that naturally, the soul was created by God.

Evolutionary ideas have been expressed by many philosophers and natural scientists long before Darwin. However, it was precisely Darwin who formulated a theory which provides a materialistic explanation not only to the fact of the historical development of the organic world but also the problem of the organic expediency, the manifestations of which were interpreted either as the wisdom of the creator or the primary feature of animals and plants. The essence of this evolutionary theory is the idea that adaptability is the result of centuries of natural selection, which preserves, generation after generation, the most advanced species. Hereditary mutation, according to Darwin, merely provides the material for a natural selection. It does not have adaptability and a certain direction. Evolution is directed only through natural selection. Soon after the publication of the first edition of "*The Origin of Species*" (November 1859), in a letter to F. Lassalle, dated 16 January 1861, Marx noted that "here, for the first time, not only a mortal blow has been dealt at 'teleology' in the natural sciences but also an empirical explanation has been provided of its rational meaning" (ibid., p 475).

In Darwin's time scientific genetics had not been created as yet, and it was precisely the lack of clarity of concepts of heredity, which prevailed at that time in the natural sciences, that provided the grounds for numerous critical responses to his theory of evolution. As early as 1867, F. Jenkin said that natural selection cannot acquire adaptability, for separate changes in the species, displaying new useful characteristics when crossed with normal species, would be diluted in their mass. As a result, the new useful features would become increasingly less expressed from one generation to another. The conclusions of the discrete nature of genes, which were quite quickly reached by the science of genetics, which was born by the turn of the 20th century, freed the theory of evolution from the "Jenkin nightmare," as its critics metaphorically described it. However, on the crest of the first successes achieved by genetics, the so-called mutation theory of evolution formulated by H. De Vries, appeared, according to which new species appear spasmodically, as a result of major isolated mutations. Natural selection, according to De Vries, can only eliminate unsuccessful species and the manifestation itself of new species is not related to any selection.

Various criticisms of Darwinism were widespread in biology through the end of the 1920s, when the synthetic theory of evolution was created, which constituted a renovated Darwinism, based on the synthesis of Darwin's ideas with the achievements of genetics. Population genetics, which studies basic evolutionary processes in natural animal and plant populations, which was



founded by the outstanding domestic biologists S.S. Chetverikov and N.V. Timofeyev-Resovskiy, played a particularly major role in the revival of Darwinism.

In the Soviet Union, the normal development of Darwinism was disturbed by the activities of T.D. Lysenko and the resolutions of the August 1948 VASKHNIL Session. At that session, which took place under the banner of the so-called "creative Darwinism," eclectic and by no means always scientific concepts were proclaimed, which stopped the development of the theory of evolution in our country for 10-15 years. It was only in the 1970s that evolutionary biology was able to recover from the upheavals created at said VASKHNIL Session and subsequent erroneous resolutions of the USSR Academy of Sciences concerning biology.

In the Western countries, renovated Darwinism, or the synthetic theory of evolution, became widely acknowledged among biologists as early as the 1940s, although there always remained individual major researchers who held anti-Darwinist positions. The strongest resistance to Darwinism (and to evolutionism in general) was provided by social circles close to the church. For example, in the universities of Franco's Spain, until the 1970s teaching the theory of evolution was generally banned. In some social circles in the United States, to this day creationism is quite influential. Here as well, however, the situation has changed, and the creationists are forced to take into consideration the general acceptance of the natural scientists' theory of evolution. In our time, they are trying to have U.S. schools to teach Darwinism and evolution only as one of the possible hypotheses, with no scientific priority over the Biblical version.

However, after 20 years of triumph of the synthetic theory of evolution in Darwinism, in the last decade a new crisis has become apparent. It is related to the fast popularization in evolutionary biology of various saltationist concepts, i.e., concepts which support the spasmodic nature of the evolution of life. Works which promote saltationism have appeared in our country as well. Therefore, we cannot ignore saltationism by merely pointing out its inconsistency with Darwinism. A serious analysis of the facts supporting this theory is needed.

In itself, saltationism is nothing new: similar ideas were formulated by Darwin's predecessors and contemporaries. What is new is that today this theory has gained some support thanks to the achievements of contemporary biology: karyosystematics, molecular biology, development biology and paleontology. Although the facts on which saltationist concepts are based are, in our view, entirely inadequate, they are the basis for an ever-growing trend toward revising the main concepts of Darwinism. A kind of new philosophy of biology is being developed, which rejects the creative role of natural selection and ascribes a decisive significance in evolution to random phenomena. In its most essential concepts, saltationism is close to neocatastrophism, which also has become inordinately popular in the past 10

years. The neocatastrophists, who resurrect the concepts of J. Cuvier, the creator of scientific paleontology, are convinced that mass extinction, caused by global catastrophes, is of prime significance in changes in life forms on earth.

In addition to saltationism and neocatastrophism, other anti-Darwinist trends may be found in contemporary evolutionism. Some researchers, for example, are convinced that the course of evolution is governed by internal forces which operate within the organism and not by selection, and that evolution is based on the same factors as the process of the development of the embryo. In this article, however, we shall analyze only the saltationist and neocatastrophic concepts. We shall also take a brief look at the question of man's biological evolution.

### Formation of Species and Saltationism

In 1972 American biologists N. Eldridge and S. Gould suggested a new model of spasmodic formation of species, described as intermittent balance. According to this model, the species remain practically unchanged throughout their entire existence of up to 5-10 million years. New species appear as a result of very fast, virtually spasmodic changes, in the course of a few centuries or a millennium. The supporters of the model of the intermittent balance, or the punctualists, pit their concept against "Darwin's gradualism:" as we know, Darwin tended to believe in the very gradual nature of the processes accompanying the formation of species.

Essentially, punctualism is by no means the equivalent of saltationism which rejects in general the existence of transitions and continuity among species. Strange though it might seem, however, this distinction is not always realized, and many saltationists proclaimed themselves supporters of the punctualist concept which had become extensively popular. Today it is gradually becoming clear that the significance of this way of formation of species was drastically exaggerated. The impression is created that in paleontological chronicles the transition between species is frequently absent wherever there have been breaks in the geological sequence of stratification. In any case, some micropaleontologists, which have exceptionally complete data obtained as a result of deep drilling under the ocean floor, reached the conclusion that there is no punctualist formation of species whatsoever.

Therefore, paleontological data, with the help of which efforts are made to prove the legitimacy of the saltation nature of the origin of new species, are insufficiently convincing.

However, there is yet another aspect of the matter of the formation of species, related to saltationism. Facts are being acquired today, proving the possibility of a saltation origin if not of species but of reproduction isolation, which is a most important link in the process of the formation of species. Reproduction isolation, i.e., the

appearance of males and females incapable of reproduction, is by no means mandatorily a side product of the growing disparity between the newly developing species; the formation of a species cannot only end with a reproductive isolation but also begin with it. In this connection, it is very important to note that in normal populations of a single species as well there are individuals which are reproductively isolated from each other to a certain extent. This even applies to man; suffice it to recall the incompatibility based on the Rh factor. Reproductive isolation of individuals within populations is, as a rule, incomplete. However, the existence of reproductively isolated individuals creates prerequisites for a quite rapid (several generations) separation as a developing new species.

### Saltationism and Molecular Biology

Some mutations have a clearly expressed external effect. For example, the so-called homeotic mutations lead to the fact that one organ or another of an animal acquires a structure which is characteristic of another organ. Thus, in the drosophila flies in one mutation of the antenna they convert into an additional pair of extremities located directly on the head; in another mutation the number of chest segments increases, and the rudimentary wings—the balancers—turn into more or less normally developed wings; in yet another mutation, the proboscis of the fly turns into a pair of structures resembling legs.

The imagination of the first researchers was stricken by the fact that as a result of the homeotic mutations features which may be characteristic of other types of insects may appear (such as an additional pair of wings). What was not considered was that as a result all such atypically located organs in drosophila would appear and not some kind of new species belonging to another group of insects. The mutant itself turns out to be a deformed representative of his species and not the forefather of a new group of organisms.

Let us also mention the "information" concept of the evolution of the biosphere, recently developed by V.A. Kordyum. In his view, evolution takes place not through gradual transformations from ancestors to descendants, in the course of which the continuity of evolutionary conditions is retained, but through a "horizontal transfer of entire blocks of genes from procariots (bacteria and viruses) to eucariots, including higher animals and plants. As a result of saltation, entirely new classes and types appear literally within a single generation.

The idea expressed by V.A. Kordyum is gaining a certain popularity not only among geneticists. Recently American researchers D. Erwin and G. Valentine "explained" the origin of all basic types of marine invertebrates almost as would V.A. Kordyum, on the basis of a viral

infection of most ancient medusoid organisms inhabiting the seas some 600 million years ago; allegedly, the result was the appearance of mollusks, brachiopods, arthropods, and others.

In principle, the horizontal transfer of genes among different organisms is possible. To the best of our knowledge, however, this does not result in the appearance of entirely new life forms. In his book "*Nepostoyanstvo Genoma*" [The Impermanence of the Genome] (Nauka, Moscow, 1984) the outstanding Soviet Geneticist R.B. Khesin pointed out that it is only isolated genes and not their clusters (groups) that are transmitted in this manner. However, even isolated alien genes are rarely retained in the course of natural selection by their new hosts. The most likely is the migration of genes between the genetic systems of parasites and the host. Incidentally, R.B. Khesin studied a case in which the symbiotic photobacter bacteria, which lives in the luminescent organ in deep water leuognata fish acquired the superoxydismutase fish ferment, which he described as the virtually only confirmed example of the natural transmission of genes between procariots and eucariots.

Future discoveries may provide numerous further examples of such cases. Increasingly, researchers are coming across cases in which it would seem that proteins specific to vertebrates are found in a great variety of organisms. Thus, insulin was found in the intestinal bacillus of tetragimena infusoria and in some insects. Relaxin, which is typical to mammals (in giving birth it weakens the tie between the pelvic bones and facilitates the passing of the offspring) was also found in the tetragimena. For the time being, it is difficult to say whether this is related to a horizontal transfer of genes or to an independent evolution of proteins, which cannot be totally excluded.

This study indicates that the essential possibility of major spasmodic changes (saltations) in evolution exist. However, we are skeptical about the view that this may lead to the appearance of new groups and classes of organisms. Not only groups but also species of organisms are always distinguished by numerous qualities which cannot be reduced to isolated mutations. Specimens with noteworthy deviations of individual morphological features are aberrations in normal natural populations and not new groups of organisms.

### Neocatastrophism and the Theory of Evolution

In recent years the question of the reasons for the extinction of dinosaurs have once again drawn universal attention. Particularly popular are hypotheses explaining this event as a catastrophe originating in space.

Recently, American Paleontologists D. Raup and G. Sepkosky summed up data on extinction processes in 3,500 families of marine animals and plants over a period of 250 million years. The scientists concluded that different waves of extinction have followed each

other in a strict sequence over a period of 26 million years. One of the mass extinctions took place 65 million years ago, and it was precisely then that the dinosaurs disappeared from earth.

The strict periodicity of mass extinctions, postulated by Raup and Sepkosky, leads to the idea of their being triggered by some kind of space mechanism. One of the most interesting ideas of this kind was expressed by American Astronomer R. Mueller, who suggested the appearance of an as yet undiscovered star, a companion to the sun, rotating around the solar system on an elliptical orbit with a diameter of 25 trillion kilometers. Each 26 million years this star, significantly named Nemesis, allegedly comes closer to the sun and, as it passes through the Oort Comet cloud, triggers a "bombardment" of the planets within the solar systems with asteroids. The "iridium" loam, several centimeters thick, discovered in the borderline deposits of the Cretaceous and Paleogenic periods, was used to confirm the fact that an asteroid had fallen during the time of extinction of the dinosaurs. The concentration of iridium and other metals of the platinum group in this stratum is dozens of times higher than elsewhere.

American researchers—the physicist L. Alvarez and his son, the geologist W. Alvarez—who described the iridium anomaly in 1979, formulated the hypothesis that the surplus iridium is of asteroid origin. According to their estimates, the concentration of iridium in the border stratum is consistent with its content in an asteroid 10 kilometers in diameter. In crashing against our planet, the asteroid exploded and its entire substance scattered in dust in the atmosphere, precipitating simultaneously throughout the earth. The Alvarez' suggested that the dust from this explosion could have literally hidden the sun, as a result of which the process of photosynthesis could have been interrupted entirely for several months. It is thus that they explain what they consider the catastrophic nature of the extinction of plants and animals, first of the herbivorous, followed by the carnivorous.

It is true that from time to time big asteroids or comets have fallen on earth and geologists have so far described about 100 gigantic asteroid craters of different ages. It is unlikely, however, that said disturbances caused by the asteroids could have halted the process of photosynthesis. Today most researchers relate the mass extinctions after a clash between the earth and asteroids not to the interruption of photosynthesis but to a global cooling off which could occur as a result of blocking the sun with dust. According to some estimates, the fall of an asteroid 10 kilometers in diameter could trigger a global drop in temperature which would last several months or years and would reduce the average annual temperature by approximately 10 degrees. There also are doubts as to the asteroidal origin of iridium in the border stratum. Volcanic activities, which significantly increased by the end of the Cretaceous period, could also be a source of excess iridium.

We must point out, however, that the question of the periodicity and scale of mass extinctions is as yet by no means clear, for all data used in defining them are quite approximate. As a rule, extinctions which take place within the range of a stratigraphic stage (averaging 8 million years) automatically coincide with its upper limit. No extinction processes in the observed families can be noted prior to the end of the corresponding stage. Nor are there sufficient data to conclude that periodical clashes between the earth and large asteroids have taken place.

But let us go back to the extinction of the dinosaurs. These strange reptiles lived on earth from the middle of the Triassic to the end of the Cretaceous periods, for approximately 150 million years. Within that entire time they did not remain unchanged. Some of their groups, such as the prosauropodes, were extinct already at the start of the Jurassic; the number and variety of other, such as the stegosaurs and the sauropods declined substantially long before the end of the Cretaceous period. Scientists have identified between 500 and 550 types of dinosaurs but in the final stratum of the Cretaceous, the Maastricht, which lasted 8 million years, no more than 80 species have been identified. In the western part of North America, where the fauna of Maastricht dinosaurs was the richest, their number drops to approximately 30-35 species in the lower Maastricht, to 25 in the mid-Maastricht and 10-12 at the very end of that stratum. Such data do not allow us to draw the conclusion of the simultaneous mass extinction of dinosaurs which, actually, took at least 1 or 2 million years. Many groups of animals, such as turtles and mammals, crossed the line of the Cretaceous and the Paleocene, as though failing to notice it. The most catastrophic was the extinction of marine plankton organisms with a calciferous shell—the foraminifers and the coccolithophorids. However, this extinction as well took no less than 5,000 to 10,000 years.

The reasons for the extinction of many groups of organisms toward the end of the Cretaceous period remain unclear. Whatever the case, differences in time and scale of extinction among the different groups of animals and plants attest that it was not caused by a one-time catastrophe. Even if the end of the Cretaceous may have been marked by the fall of a large asteroid, followed by a global drop in temperature, it could not be so significant as to result even in a short disappearance on earth of belts of tropical climates with their specific fauna and flora. Otherwise, neither corals, crocodiles, palms or any other groups of organisms would have been able to survive the end of the Cretaceous period.

At the conference which was held in Los Angeles, in the summer of 1984, in summing up the results of the debates, R. Mueller, the father of the Nemesis concept, said that had global catastrophes not occurred toward the end of the Paleozoic Era, to this day the seas would have been inhabited not by fish but by trilobites.

Such statements are not isolated. The idea according to which evolution is possible only as a result of the freeing of the ecological niche, previously occupied by other organisms, coincides in some aspects with the view expressed by Ch. Bonnet, the noted 18th century Swiss nature-philosopher, who believed that eventually man would move into the higher sphere of the spirits and will thus leave his niche empty. "It is at that point that monkeys and elephants will develop their own Newtons and Leibnizes."

All the models of catastrophes not only fail to explain the occurrences on earth at critical times but also raise new questions applicable above all to the selective nature of extinction processes, their asynchronous nature and their long duration. The growing popularity of the idea of the determining significance of global catastrophes in changing the forms of the organic world is related not only to new discoveries but also largely to psychological factors, particularly the novelty of the idea and the illusory possibility of providing a unified interpretation to this entire conflicting and complex information.

#### Is the Biological Evolution of Man Continuing?

Ever since man separated from the animal world, biological factors in his evolution stopped having a determining significance. The social evolution of man is determined by the growth of production forces, the change of socioeconomic systems and the development of spiritual culture—science and the arts. Man's biological evolution was drastically blocked. Successes in medicine and health-care make it possible to involve in a rich social life millions of people in poor health, including some suffering from certain genetic disturbances. In man selection operates essentially on the level of embryonic cells. According to some data, no less than 40 percent of human fertilized eggs quickly die and an embryo either is not formed or else its development is interrupted at the earliest possible pregnancy stages. According to various data, as much as 10-20 percent of pregnancies end at early stages in spontaneous abortions. In the overwhelming majority of cases, the death of the fertilized cells and of embryos at their early development stages is determined by major genetic disturbances in the sexual cells of the parents. The result is that children are born mainly as a result of genetically healthy sexual cells.

The role of natural selection in man has changed radically. In animals and plants, it is the main evolutionary factor which leads to the transformation of the biological organization. In man this is a factor which maintains the preservation of the genetic stock and blocks the dissemination of mutations which drastically lower the ability to survive. In animals and plants selection acts not only in a transforming but in a stabilizing manner as well. The stabilizing selection as well is based on discarding major mutations but it acts immeasurably more strictly than in man and leads to limiting variability and increasing the stability of morphogenetic mechanisms and a certain ontogenetic autonomy. In man the range of variability in

terms of many parameters even increases, for which reason a comparison between human forms of selection and the stabilizing selection in animals and plants is incorrect.

Furthermore, it is by no means academic whether in our time, along with the social the biological organization of man, his physical appearance and mental capabilities change. We quite frequently hear claims that our children are becoming not only physically but also mentally more developed. However, no data whatsoever exists which allow us to relate this possible progress to genetic changes in the structure and functions of the brain and the sensory organs.

The acceleration, about which so much was written in the 1970s, is manifested in the accelerated growth, physical development and sexual maturing of children. As a result, the average size of an individual increases by 5-10 or even 15 centimeters; the child cuts his teeth earlier; the average age of menstruation in Europe has dropped from 16.5 at the start of the 19th century to 12-12.5 today. So far the precise reasons for acceleration have not been accurately established. It is also unclear whether any role is played in this process by genetic changes or is acceleration entirely due to increased material well-being in society, improved education of children and even a more attentive and warm attitude toward them.

Acceleration was first noticed in Western Europe at the turn of the 19th century. By the end of the century it had been noted that in the United States children of European immigrants were outstripping their parents in terms of their speed of growth and physical development. At that time the United States caught up with Western Europe in terms of the pace of acceleration. Subsequently, acceleration appeared in Russia and Japan. Currently its processes have slowed down or have even come to a stop. In connection with the discussion about the reasons for acceleration, it is of interest to note that during World War II the growth of secondary school students in Stuttgart slowed down. In the FRG, in the first postwar years, it was established that in orphanages the growth rates of children depended not only on their nutrition but also on the conditions under which they were being raised. In one such orphanage the cruelty of an educator, who punished children by beating them with a rod, could not be compensated even by additional nutrition; the situation, however, was corrected the moment she was replaced.

The question of whether in recent years our children are becoming more developed and brighter has been the topic of lively discussions. In Scotland, for example, a statistically proven increase in the IQ was noted in a mass study of 11-year old schoolchildren in 1932 and in 1947. Although the results obtained in determining the mental capabilities according to such tests are quite conventional, a statistically proven positive shift has indicated that during that period there had been changes



affecting the children. However, there are no data whatsoever to prove that such changes were related to genetic and continuing evolutionary development of the brain. It is more likely that the increased intellect of our children is the result of improved educational and training systems, the progress of which, it seems to me, is generally somewhat underestimated. It has long been established that normal mental development is largely determined by education and training and that it is extremely difficult to single out here any possible role played by genetic changes which upgrade inherent capabilities of the brain. We know that children who have been raised in isolation, for one reason or another, without contact with individuals, lose the ability to speak and to normally communicate with people. Similar conclusions are reached by observing the development of children who are deaf and blind from birth and who, without special training, remain helpless invalids, unsuited for normal social life. In training dumb and blind children, prime significance is ascribed to senses which in normal people play a secondary role: smell and touch.

The impression is created that the "trained" brain is distinguished not only by an increased volume of information it has stored but also a greater capacity to solve new difficult problems. The obtained data prove that the processes of synthesizing specific proteins—neuropeptides—intensify; they become localized in various parts of the brain and influence memory and various mental processes. It is not excluded that the mental progress of our children is related to acceleration, for it has long been established that healthier and taller children are, as a whole, distinguished by a more harmonious mental development, although in terms of accomplishments at age of maturity, apparently such differences disappear. However, there are no data whatsoever which allows us to speak of an evolutionary progress of the brain in contemporary man, for every newly born child must be trained "from scratch." Indirectly, the fact that the evolution of the brain has been halted is also confirmed by the fact that its size, which steadily increased in our predecessors for millions of years, has remained virtually unchanged in modern man over the past 40,000-50,000 years. In the distant predecessors of man—the Australopithecus—who lived in Africa from 4 to 2 million years ago, the dimensions of the brain ranged between 500 and 600 cubic centimeters; in the Pithecanthropus, who lived between 1.9 million and 650,000 years ago, the size of the brain reached 900 cubic centimeters; the brain of the Sinanthropus (400,000 years ago) reached 1,000 cubic centimeters, whereas the brain of the modern man averages 1,400 cubic centimeters in men and 1,270 in women. Interestingly, the "classical" Neanderthal, who lived some 50,000-40,000 years ago, exceeded that of the average contemporary man (1,600 cubic centimeters) although the frontal parts of his brain were less developed than in modern man. It is important to note, however, that in modern man the range of variability in the size of the brain has apparently increased and that there is no specific correlation between its size and

individual giftedness. It is not excluded that one of the factors which led to an increased range of differences in the dimensions of the brain was the weakened selection in modern man based on that feature as well. To the best of our knowledge, the smallest brain among gifted people was that of Frans Hals, the outstanding Dutch 16th century painter, and the French writer Anatole France, whose brain was slightly more than 1,000 cubic centimeters; the biggest brain was that of I.S. Turgenev (2,012 cubic centimeters). It is entirely obvious that any conclusions concerning the mental development of I.S. Turgenev and A. France on the basis of these figures is simply impossible. Let us emphasize that in order to cover the distance from the savage of the stone age to today's civilization, man did not require a larger brain and, in all likelihood, neither did he necessitate improved programs for its development.

Therefore, the idea that in contemporary man the brain is continuing its biological evolution could be considered, in any case, as insufficiently founded. Nonetheless, we must point out that not only education and training but also inherent genotypically established qualities play a tremendous role in man's character features, abilities and manifestations of his temperament. Thus, we read from time to time news about children with amazing capabilities to compute mentally. These capabilities are developed only with training but are detected sometimes without any whatsoever special pedagogical methods. As a child, Mozart experienced obvious pleasure in listening to the clavicin and, at the age of 4, began to compose. He was a member of a family of musicians and composers and was able from a early age to listen to professionally played music. However, it would be incorrect to explain his inordinate talent with this fact.

Finally, mental deficiency as well is frequently influenced by the genotype. Suffice it to note that in identical twins who have a virtually identical genotype, should one of them become schizophrenic, the same disease affects the other in 69 percent of the cases, whereas in nonidentical twins this occurs only in 10 percent of the cases. In the case of retardation of one of the identical twins, this affliction strikes the second in 97 percent of the cases, compared with only 37 percent in nonidentical twins. Identical twins are virtually identical also in terms of basic characteristics of the encephalograph. People with uniform alpha waves are characterized by a high degree of activeness and stubbornness, whereas people with diffused alpha waves frequently make errors when tested for attention and accuracy. It is possible to assume that the use of contemporary methods in the study of brain activities will enable us qualitatively to intensify the principle of professional selection among student youth for an entire series of areas of training.

The view is occasionally expressed that, in the final account, all species of animals and plants become extinct if not for external reasons then as a result of the gradual degradation of their genetic development program. This view is scientifically unsubstantiated. Each genotype

species is reshaped anew, on the basis of a recombination of maternal and paternal genotypes; this genotype could be successful or unsuccessful but cannot be considered "aged." The individual species of animals and plants have extremely different life spans, ranging from one to many tens of millions of years. Contemporary man, whose age does not exceed 40,000 to 50,000 years, is among the youngest species on the planet. The small crawfish, which is found everywhere in summer in ponds, has been known in geological chronicles starting with the Triassic, i.e., for more than 200 million years, and the study of this species has not detected any characteristics of the "aging" of its genotype. Iron bacteria, which are quite similar to those we find at present, have existed for 2 billion years. In a certain sense, anything alive on earth has a genotype, changed to a certain extent, of the primary living organisms on our planet. In the course of time the degradation of the genome occurs only in the case of uncontrolled accumulation of harmful mutations within it. In man, for the time being, this is being efficiently counteracted by selection on the level of the sexual cells, noted in 40 to 50 percent of the cases of fertilized eggs. However, with a sharp increase in the frequency of mutations, this selection may turn out to be insufficient.

It is not the mythical "aging" of the species but the threat of nuclear war, the ever-growing pollution of the biosphere with industrial waste and toxic chemicals, and increased radiation, that are the real threats to the existence of mankind. Today we know of more than 3,000 chemical compounds with strong mutagenic activity; pollution with such substances is, furthermore, steadily increasing. Today the mutagenic threat of chemical pollutants greatly exceeds the mutagenic effect of background radiation which, over the past 25 years, has increased as a result of artificial sources by more than 50 percent. The mutation burden in human populations, as we pointed out, remains dangerously high. Since 1956 the number of children with hereditary development defects has more than doubled, according to observations, and today more than 10 percent of all children are born with inherited defects. According to some estimates, no less than 3 percent of children in the United States suffer from mental retardation (oligophrenia), which is most frequently of genetic origin. According to N.P. Dubinin, doubling the frequency of mutations in man as a result of increasing environmental pollution caused by different mutagens (including radiation) could bring about a catastrophic destruction of heredity. The prevention of this danger also requires the struggle against the threat of nuclear war, an end to nuclear weapon tests and the formulation of principles for a wasteless technology which would lower or halt the further pollution of the biosphere with chemical waste and toxic chemicals. Developing methods for correcting genetic damages caused to the human cells and to the young in preventing possible mutations, using substances with antimutagenic effect, such as vitamin E, for example, could also assume great importance. The theoretical approaches to the solution of such problems are already becoming apparent.

### Concluding Remarks

If we try to determine the contemporary condition of evolutionary theory, we must note that Darwinism has fully retained its viability to this day, although neither modern genetics nor molecular biology existed in Darwin's time. Darwinism has already been expanded with contemporary data on heredity. Today the need arises for taking more fully into account in evolutionary structures molecular genetics, which has established powerful factors for the destabilization of the genome; the global biospheric factor, which ascribes to evolutionary processes some features of overall changes; the conclusions of contemporary paleontology on the pace of evolution and the ways leading to the development of new groups of animals and plants; finally, contemporary biological development data, which link evolutionary processes on the molecular and organism levels.

It is possible that Darwin somewhat underestimated the role of random processes in evolution: in particular, such an underestimating was the reason for his rejection of the evolutionary significance of spasmodic changes. Darwin could only guess the possible evolutionary significance of the biochemical commonality of organisms and the biochemical predetermination of some biological processes. He had a very vague idea of a possible evolutionary significance of the mechanisms of embryonic development, which act as factors which "channel" manifestations of heredity, although he himself pointed out in his "*Origin of Species*," stubbornness in preserving the organization and the aspiration to reproduce long lost features. The main principles of Darwinism, however, with its concepts of the undetermined nature of hereditary mutations and natural selection, in terms of the course of evolution, remain significant to this day. The seeming simplicity of Darwin's basic elaborations can only increase the admiration which most biologists feel today for this philosopher.

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### Possibilities and Rights

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[Article by Lt Gen I. Veldzhanov, deputy commander of the forces of the Belorussian Military District]

[Text] The problems I am about to discuss are difficult, delicate and, of late and to my sincere regret, also pressing. I evaluate them not as a scientist but exclusively on the basis of my own practical experience. In order for my views, emotions and concerns to be understood, obviously, I must say something, very briefly, about me. I am Turkmen by nationality. I was born in Kizyl-Arvat, where I completed the first seven grades in an ethnic school. It so happened that in all other schools—the railroad school in my home town, the industrial technical school in Tashkent, in the military

school, again in Tashkent, and in the two military academies in Moscow, the material was taught in the Russian language. This was related to specific vocational requirements, for neither a railroad man, nor a military in a multinational country can be a true specialist without knowledge of the language of international communications. That is precisely why the Russian language became my second native language. I also studied the languages of the republics where I did my military service. Nor did I forget my native language. Turkmen culture and national traditions are alive in me. They are reflected in my character, in my relations with the people around me and in my work. Good knowledge of Russian and the language of the native population among whom I had to live and work helped me better to carry out my official obligations and exercise my rights more fully.

Let me add that my own family is international. My son is a Turkmen by father; my daughter is Russian by her mother and is married to a Ukrainian. I have a grandson. His nationality is as yet unknown, for there is no such item in his birth certificate and he will acquire a nationality when he is no longer a minor and is issued a passport. In our family no one pays particular attention to this. When my son was the age of my grandson, he answered such questions without thinking too much: "I am Soviet." Incidentally, my son is married to a Belorussian woman.

Naturally, my views on the national problem were influenced by the fact that I dedicated my life to the armed forces, which are the most international organization of the state. Army service is the constitutional duty of all citizens in the country, regardless of ethnic origin. Statutes, regulations, instructions and other documents, military newspapers and journals, training classes and commands are issued in the Russian language, whatever the military unit may be and wherever it may be located. Naturally, anyone could subscribe to and read publications in his native language, as I do. However, the army demands a clear understanding on the part of everyone and in this case one cannot do without the language of international intercourse.

I recently received a letter from my young compatriot Shokhrat Berdyev. Since childhood he had dreamed of joining the military. After graduating from secondary school in Ashkhabad, he enrolled as student at the Baku Higher All-Army Command School imeni Azerbaidzhan SSR Supreme Soviet. He was dismissed during his first year. The reason was poor knowledge of the Russian language. However, he was a persistent boy and refused to leave the school. His tremendous desire was appreciated and he was reaccepted. During the second year, however, once again he was expelled, and this time definitively. He is now serving as a private.

But is Shokhrat to be blamed for his poor knowledge of Russian? This is our common fault, which to him became a catastrophe. I looked over the Russian language program for the 5th to 11th grades in secondary

general education schools teaching in the Turkmen language. In particular, it states that "the Russian language is the most important means of communicating among nationalities in the Soviet Union." Fluency in the Russian language must become standard for all young people who graduate from secondary schools; "the main educational purpose of teaching Russian in a Turkmen school is to teach the students to be fluent in Russian, orally and in writing, and to read and understand fiction, popular science and sociopolitical publications in the Russian language."

That is a good explanation, is it not? The drama of Shokhrat Berdyev's life, however, proves that a great deal separates curriculum statements from reality. And what about the result? The result is that only 25 percent of the Turkmen who live in the republic are fluent in Russian and can read Pushkin and Tolstoy in the original.

Naturally, all of us are in favor of the free development of national languages, which are the foundations of national culture. It is no secret to anyone that fluency in Russian broadens access to the achievements of science and technology and domestic and world culture. Mastery of the Russian language will denigrate or impoverish no one but, conversely, would enhance and ennoble all national and ethnic groups in the country. Any outbreak of linguistic chauvinism or nationalism is inconsistent with the interests of any nation or ethnic community. To me these are elementary truths and the problem lies elsewhere.

The Constitution reads as follows: The citizens of the USSR, whatever their race and nationality, have equal rights. The guarantee of such rights includes the opportunity to make use of their native language and the languages of other peoples of the USSR. However, the opportunity, as we see from the example of Turkmenia, is quite distant from reality. Unrealized opportunity, in this case, does not allow in practice the full exercise of constitutional rights. Is it not in this area that we should seek answers to the following questions: Why is it that there are few Turkmen among high party and state personalities on the Union level? Why are there few diplomats and military leaders? We speak of social justice. But imagine a Turkmen who has completed a school based on the curriculum I mentioned and who has come for examinations at a higher educational institution in Moscow or the capital of another Union republic. If enrollment in a VUZ is based exclusively on capability and talent (which is precisely as it should be), what are the chances of my compatriot: he would be totally unable to show his capabilities and talent. He cannot become an officer and, drafted in the army, becomes a private; he cannot master contemporary technology and thus expand his outlook and knowledge.

Military skills are taught in secondary schools, vocational-technical schools, technical colleges and VUZes and DOSAAF training organizations in the Russian language. This is proper, for otherwise it would be difficult

to apply the acquired knowledge under actual army conditions. I believe that it would be useful to extend this experience also to the teaching of some of the precise sciences, in order to facilitate the way to knowledge in such areas.

It may be said that I am promoting all too frequently departmental interests. I do not conceal this. Yes, I am promoting departmental interests too. However, it is precisely to our department that applies the following statement in the Constitution: "The defense of the socialist fatherland is the sacred duty of every citizen of the USSR." Nonetheless, this is not the heart of the matter. Lack of knowledge of the Russian language leads to the direct or indirect curtailment of rights and to giving direct or indirect advantage to those who have mastered that language.

It would be difficult to imagine real democratization without the solution of such problems and the lifting of the barrier between **acknowledgment** and actual exercise in practice of equality among nations and self-government in all areas, not in words but in deeds. If part of the population has mastered the language understood by the majority, while another part is fluent in languages understood in some areas, unwittingly the equal right of all citizens to administer public affairs is undermined. As confirmed by historical experience, the eternal unvoiced order of managers who try to rise above the managed and to consolidate their dominating status, has been to limit the possibilities of the popular masses to upgrade their educational and cultural standards, to keep the administered in a state of ignorance in social and governmental affairs. Under such circumstances the managers acquire a certain exclusivity, for they possess greater information and it is only they who can judge of everything efficiently and competently. Incidentally, such exclusivity provides very favorable grounds for negative phenomena as well, for it makes it possible to make decisions affecting many people to suit the managers' interests. The scandals which occurred in the Central Asian republics, and which are being exposed today, are due, in addition to other reasons, to this reason as well.

I am not in favor of Russification. No! Furthermore, I am in favor of increasing the study of national languages by the fraternal peoples. Here and there, courses for the study of the local language are being offered to people who come from other republics. In my view, particular attention should be paid to the Estonian experience, by which I mean the availability of courses for the accelerated study of the language. This is not all that difficult, for we have solved even more difficult problems than that. However, knowledge of the language alone is not enough, particularly for a manager. One must know the customs, traditions and history of the people among whom one lives and works.

If we are aspiring to a comprehensive strengthening and development of a single Union state and the further enhancement of the role of republics, autonomous

oblasts and okrugs in the solution of nationwide problems, and the active participation of the working people of all nationalities in accelerating the country's socio-economic development and the work of authorities and managements, and if we wish to enrich the forms of relations among nationalities in the interests of the entire Soviet people and each nation and ethnic group, if we wish to enhance the material and spiritual potential of each republic within the framework of a single national economic complex, if we are interested in increasing the division of labor among different parts of the country, equalizing conditions for economic management and living standards and for active participation of the republics in the economic development of new areas and of exchange of cadres among republics, knowledge of the language of international communications is the most vital condition for progress in all areas of our life. The **opportunity** for its study, guaranteed by the Constitution, is increasingly becoming a vital **necessity**.

I am a Turkmen and will never become a Russian in the same way that a Russian will never become an Azerbaijani, a Georgian a Lithuanian or a Moldavian a Tajik.... However, how many hard, bitter or happy years and decades we have lived together, sharing the same joys and same difficulties. There is within everyone of us something intangible that is Russian, Ukrainian or Turkmen.... What there should be more of is what is progressive in our own national features. Incidentally, it is precisely in the narrow national features that the most backward aspects are hidden. For example, in Turkmenia, to this day blood revenge, dowry, and so on have not been forgotten. It would be hardly possible for an educated person not to realize the shame and savagery of all this. However, by no means is everyone able to oppose such customs.

I am convinced that the most radical means of surmounting such "traditions" is the internationalization of social awareness and the enhancement of the general culture of all Soviet peoples. M.S. Gorbachev pointed out that "multinationality is a unique feature of our culture. We speak of it frequently and customarily but, apparently, we have still not learned how fully to value it. The peoples of the USSR are linked through common historical destinies which are the foundation of our fraternity and relations, which have been tested with the harshest possible trials. The source of our strength lies in the free development of national cultures, enriched by the spiritual experience of the fraternal peoples and all mankind."

The fact that I speak Russian does not make me lose anything Turkmen but adds to what is Soviet, common and one for all of us. Knowledge of a second and third language has never hindered anyone in his life, lowered his general culture or set him up against his own national culture unless, naturally, we deal with ossified time servers and bureaucrats. The aspiration of a certain



segment of our creative intelligentsia to protect its language, culture and art from any outside influence is, in my view, similar to the actions of those who try if not to turn the wheel of history back +at least to stop it. Neither is possible.

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### Religion and Nationalism

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[Article by M. Syrodeyeva, doctor of philosophical sciences]

[Text] For more than half a century the mass information media did not have (or, rather, were not given the possibility) to deal with such a complex problem as that of nationality, which requires particular tactfulness. Like the social scientists, the matter was concluded with "toasts" in honor of friendship. A turn to a more serious and realistic interpretation not only of achievements but also of accumulated problems was noted after the principle-minded assessment which the January 1987 CPSU Central Committee Plenum made about the familiar incident in Alma-Ata. Nonetheless, when the events concerning Nagornyy Karabakh broke out, the press not only tried to provide information (unfortunately, insufficiently full and efficient) but also addressed itself to the study of the main reasons for the long-maturing dramatic events which created pain, puzzlement and compassion, reasons which were socioeconomic, administrative-managerial and ideological-educational.

Nonetheless, no one dared cite one of the clear and essential reasons (albeit because its roots could be traced to times long preceding the revolution). The reason is why? Why not frankly acknowledge that in the heat of emotions intolerance, which is rooted in the religious factor, plays a substantial role? This should be mentioned for the sake of truth, for the sake of preventing in the future any worsening of the national and social problems as a result of confessional differences. Incidentally, the question of interrelationship among nations and ethnic groups, national self-awareness and religious views, clearly neglected by our social scientists, requires profound theoretical and specific social studies.

In a federation such as our Union, where members of numerous nations and religious faiths live side by side, claims to a priority and superiority of one religion or another, pitting one religion against another as being less humane and more fanatical, and so on, are particularly dangerous. Any religion "Circuitously (K. Marx) expresses universal moral standards and preaches the ideals of justice, love, humaneness and moral perfection. Nonetheless, within the community itself of like-minded believers (incidentally, not only religious but also laic) there always exists the danger of showing intolerance

toward dissidents or nonbelievers. This danger has been repeatedly manifested in history, most frequently concealing interests which are entirely material, egotistical and power-motivated.

All holy writings are contradictory, as is man himself, and as is the world, with the constant struggle between Good and Evil.

"Do not harm living beings," states the "Ahimsa," the famous principle of Hinduism. But along with it exists the sanctified (see "The Laws of Manu") caste discrimination and unabated cruelty toward the low-caste, the "untouchables," who, to this day, could be harshly punished or even put to death merely for the use of a rural well, entering a temple, and so on.

"Thou shalt not kill," we are warned by one of the 10 Biblical commandments. Meanwhile, there is harsh penalty for those who have "rejected God's law and disobeyed his commands:"

"...You shall be weighed down like a chariot loaded with sheaves. And the nimble shall not have the strength to run and the strong shall not save their fortress and the brave shall not save their lives... for God has spoken" (Book of Amos, chapters 2, 4, 13, 14).

"A believer must not kill a believer..." insists the Prophet Mohammed. "And if anyone kills a believer with malice, he will go to hell forever" (the Koran, IV: 94, 95). Next to this, however, is a multiple repetition of curses toward those who have not taken the path of Allah and intolerance of "unbelievers."

Similar concepts, full of intolerance of unbelievers and the "impure," may be found in Judaism and have become grounds for political fanaticism in Zionist ideology.

These are the "letters" of the sacred writings, while real human history is even more complex and contradictory. Yes, religion is the "sigh of the oppressed creatures" for which reason the persecuted, oppressed and insulted by destiny have frequently stood under its banners but it has also been used as a weapon of punishment, revenge, violence and aggression! This has occurred not only in the past but is also occurring today, in our civilized 20th century, in various parts of the earth, concealed behind religious differences.

So what is to be done? Are we achieving, in general, the ideal of peaceful cohabitation among nations and people with the existence of religious pluralism? I believe that a positive answer is entirely possible. But... in order to achieve this, we must realize that each religious doctrine has, in addition to universal human values and ideals of goodness and perfection, not only specific cult rituals and so on, but also historically determined transient elements which bear the mark of their age and fully belong to the past.

Initially, the sermons of the prophets invariably met with lack of understanding and mockery, and they were persecuted, exiled or killed. This makes natural the strong expository pathos of prophetic admonitions toward those who are unwilling to share their views, not to mention those who fight them. The "defensive" position gradually turns into an offensive one and the followers of all religious faiths are not free from the latter, although the humanistic interpretation of religious doctrines, which lead man to the ideal and to the way of achieving it, is incompatible with violence.

The destinies of people of many nationalities and religious faiths are linked within our country. We are joined by common objectives: the creation of a society of justice, a society of free and harmoniously developed Man. We face the long and hard road of development which atheists and believers must walk together. In order to protect our community, our common readiness to walk this path and to implement the historical human ideal, we must firmly abandon intolerance which borders on violence or else which justifies it.

The constitutionally proclaimed freedom of conscience must be guaranteed not only by the laws and social institutions but, above all, by ourselves, regardless of whether we are atheists or religious people. An accurately understood freedom of conscience, which in our century becomes one of the indicators of true civilization and humanism, rejects the classification of people on the basis of their faith and national features into "loyal" and "disloyal," into "ours" and "aliens." If we wish respect for ourselves we must respect others. An end must be put not only to a "suspicious and unsympathetic attitude toward believers" (KOMMUNIST No 4, 1988) but also to dislike based on religious differences, frequently identified with national differences. The church organizations themselves, which influence believers, who are Soviet people, as well as "dissidents," people who profess other faiths and who are nonbelievers, atheists, have a great responsibility in the elimination of such phenomena. Irreligious and religious people must combine their efforts for the sake of the implementation of ideals which stand above differences in views and religious beliefs.

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### Professionals and 'Dilettantes'

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[Article by V. Khayt, candidate of art sciences, department head at the All-Union Scientific Research Institute of the Theory of Architecture and Urban Construction]

[Text] Last September, many Muscovites who walked along Gorkiy Street, unwittingly stopped at the windows of the grocery store, where several projects developed by

Moscow architects were displayed. However, this was not a display of accomplishments: the people were asked to compare suggestions on the location of the future building of the Operetta Theater and to communicate in writing or by telephone their views to the Main Architectural-Planning Administration of the city (this opportunity was used by several hundred Muscovites). By the end of the year "open door days" were organized, during which the heads of the main administration saw Muscovites who crowded the huge conference hall. They described their work, answered questions and issued specific assignments to designers. This was just about the first harbinger of the new relations between architecture and the public, or between the planning-building complex and the consumers of its output, and democratization and glasnost in the area of construction and the urban economy.

The democratization of social life cannot be limited to a choice of directors. Its purpose is also to expand the rights and opportunities for independently selecting the ways and means of consumption, differentiation and, in the final account, individualization of needs, including those concerning the habitat: the apartment, the home, the structure of the building and, finally, having a comfortable and beautiful city. It is precisely the consumers, not only individual but also collective, including "customers" such as state enterprises, cooperatives and local soviets, that have been virtually eliminated from the solution of precisely such problems.

Until recently anything planned by urban construction workers and artists, including designs of monuments, which are dear to everyone, was a deep secret accessible only to the initiated. Furthermore, no criticism of construction policy was accepted. Perhaps the architects themselves were not eager to acquaint the public with monotonous facades, lattices or straight edges.

The discussion, expertise and adoption of plans today take place as a rule within a purely professional environment, with the participation of the respective administrative authorities, and the results are presented to the consumer as being the only possible and correct ones. Obviously, such a professional-administrative authoritarianism has nothing in common with true democracy.

I believe that the habit of tolerating construction shortcomings, along with the existing command-administrative management methods and insufficient alternate standards brought about not only the scarcity of housing but also a type of dependency, a simplistic understanding of the free nature of apartments provided by the state and the entire urban infrastructure, for one does not look a gift horse in the mouth and one ought to be thankful for whatever one receives. That is the reason for which housing which is being built for the housing-construction cooperatives is nonetheless somewhat better and, above all, takes more into consideration specific requirements and needs.

Until recently press criticism of architectural-urban construction practices was ignored in professional circles as a manifestation of incompetence, dilettantism and lack of understanding of the tasks and requirements facing Soviet architects, and resource limitations. Architects and architectural experts hurled punitive rebuttals against the rare critical articles published in the press, defending departmental ambitions and the "honor of the uniform" of those responsible for the condition in the sector.

Nonetheless, an awareness of the need for change developed in professional awareness in the 1980s. The urban residents began to be considered more not as the target of planning but as the subject with his own, not always realized but legitimate requirements concerning the environment, demanding the right and opportunity actively to participate in shaping it. Today the public is gravely concerned with the state of the protection and restoration of historical and cultural monuments and the loss of originality of our cities and rayons. In recent years the central, local and professional press has frequently discussed the struggle on plans for the development of the flood-lands of the Desnya in Chernigov, the laying of a highway across the preserved historical-architectural zone of Lefortovo in Moscow, the building of a collector in Ryazan and so on.

Nonetheless, we lack even basic information on the plans of the construction workers. The services for the study of public opinion and, in particular, of consumer expectations and preferences, which could be used in planning, have not been developed. In my view, we must decisively expand sociological and cultural-psychological free-planning studies oriented toward analyzing historically developed requests and preferences of different population groups: national (which is particularly important under Soviet conditions), regional, age-group, professional, cultural and taste, and the subsequent differentiation of plans.

It is obvious that an "average" consumer does not exist in principle. However, the orientation toward him in the substantiation of various decisions is no accident. It is a consequence of the fact that in the ordinary mind egalitarian social utopian views have become widespread in many doctrines of contemporary architecture, to which the monotony of housing cells and houses (whose ideal is almost the absolute similarity to bee-hives) was not a formal method but an expression of a clear social program, reflected in a primitively understood social equality.

Similar views shared by influential Soviet architects and sociologists in the first post-revolutionary decades were manifested in debates on socialist settlements. In December 1929 PRAVDA published an article typically headed "The Socialist Cities. Use the Plans of the Utopians." It was only on 1 May 1930, i.e., on the eve of the adoption of the familiar VKP(b) Central Committee Decree "On Work on the Restructuring of the Way of

Life," that M. Koltsov published his article "On the Threshold of One's Home," in which the efforts to use utopian works of the past in actual projects were criticized.

Equalization and orientation toward average requirements, and insufficient attention paid to specific local conditions imbue design standards to this day. How can we get out of this Procrustean bed?

I believe that mandatory discussion of plans in labor collectives, by local soviets of people's deputies and meetings of future residents or the personnel of the projected enterprises and establishments, throughout all stages in the creation of the projects, mandatorily stipulated by instructions or other legal acts, must become the most important form of interaction between urban builders and the broad public. Naturally, the organization of the public evaluation of projects is by no means a simple matter. Above all, the urban residents must be given the opportunity to become extensively and comprehensively familiar with them. Projects must be published in the local press, displayed on television and exhibited in the vicinity of the future construction site (today this is done only when construction is already in full swing). Naturally, this requires changes in the language of the project documents, which today are addressed only to professionals; choices must be increased by offering alternative options, models, photomontages and realistic rather than conventionally depicted facades and perspectives; explanatory substantiations must be extensive, so that the contemplated decisions could be understood by everyone.

Nonetheless, natural limits exist to the competence of nonprofessionals, which must also be taken into consideration. For example, carried away by the exceptional successes of the initial contacts with Muscovites, the managers of the architecture administration in the capital turned to their fellow citizens with a suggestion to submit proposals on telephone for no more and no less than a hypothesis for the new general plan for urban development. A number of people called but the questions and suggestions affected almost entirely specific features and had no direct connection to the problem. Yet this was to be expected, for not every specialist would risk to express a view on whether Moscow should grow in a northern or western direction, where to build new residential districts and institutes, how to lay out future main arteries or subway lines. Nonetheless, a great deal of the advice of nonprofessionals on the question of the reconstruction of the Sretenka Rayon, which was discussed on television, was quite convincing.

The initial attempts at such discussions have indicated that frequently remarks and objections coming from the local population are dictated by individual and group interests, the unwillingness to take public requirements into consideration and the aspiration to protect themselves from temporary inconveniences (such as the noise

and dirt of building under their own windows). The construction of about 200 projects was frozen at the beginning of 1988 because of objections raised by residents.

In this case as well, however, public opinion should not be scorned. Obviously, the planners must develop a self-critical attitude toward their decisions and seek ways of their implementation which would harm to the least possible extent the interests and needs of the population (this question becomes particularly grave under the conditions of ever-increasing reconstruction of existing projects). Furthermore, they must also learn how to convince the population of their accuracy and the justification for one project or another.

In preparing for the extensive use of public discussions as an important form and stage of designing, from the very beginning we must see to it that they do not become a protocol formality which organizations and individuals empowered to make decisions on problems of architecture and urban construction may ignore. Otherwise the ideas of glasnost and openness will be discredited and the willingness to participate in such debates will soon be reduced to naught.

Professional journals should include a special and permanent section in which to reflect the opinion of consumers on the state of architecture as a whole and its individual products and, particularly, housing and public buildings. The public assessment should be extended also to construction output, so that the consumer can become its real supervisor. In order accurately to rate the quality of housing, the state acceptance commissions could be relieved from making assessments, limiting their task to drawing up a list of unfinished projects to be immediately corrected and, after a 1 year use for example, to determine the opinion of the residents and the exploitation authorities, and it is precisely on their basis and with the participation of specialists to solve the question of awarding bonuses to construction workers for high quality or to penalize them for poor work.

Great opportunities exist, in my view, for the development of independent construction. Professional architects have carefully avoided for decades cases of "self-construction," while the local authorities have tried to restrict it maximally, banning both independent creativity in construction and in finishing housing and public buildings, in landscaping, planting greenery and developing adjacent territories, and the development of folk traditions in house building, which could provide a uniqueness to residential blocks and to the architecture of individual cities and areas.

In such types of independent activities, the abilities and talents of individual citizens may be expressed and their leisure time could be spent more efficiently and with greater social significance. The awareness that an apartment, a house or a city are one's own, in the sense that one has invested one's own labor and creativity, would

contribute to keeping skilled cadres in production, reduce irrational population migrations and upgrade social activeness, particularly in places of residence.

Granting people the right and opportunity of more actively developing a new architecture environment, the quality and nature of which do not satisfy new residents who, immediately after occupying their premises begin to change them, to embellish and to improve them, could (and should) become an important form of participation in construction. Opposition to the independent activities of house residents, wrapped in administrative prohibitions, leads to negative social consequences and developments, as the Estonian scientist T. Niyt has said, "acquired helplessness" on the part of the population. All families in a Moscow residential complex were allowed to make changes in the layout of their apartments, a right which, actually, was used by no more than a few. In itself, however, granting such an opportunity makes it possible drastically to upgrade the extent of satisfaction with the quality of the housing.

We should not tolerate piles of broken glazed tiles, discarded wallpaper, and abandoned sanitary equipment which decorate, as we say, brand new buildings. Would it not be better to set aside some of the funds for finishing and equipping house buildings and for landscaping, planting greenery, and decorative completion based on individual orders or for the independent creativity of the residents (naturally, desirably with the skilled help of architects and designers). So far, such suggestions are being applied only on an experimental basis.

Appeals for the participation of consumers in design-building activities presumes the comprehensive training of "dilettantes:" from understanding the laws governing the formation of an architectural environment and the development of an artistic taste to acquiring certain skills of construction technology. It was no accident that the question of including a course in architecture in the secondary education curriculum was raised at the 8th Congress of USSR Architects. Unfortunately, we are publishing an exceptionally small number of popular books and pamphlets on architecture, particularly for young readers. It is impossible to procure even catalogs of standard designs of individual housing for the countryside and garden huts. Based on the experience of other countries, the USSR as well should have a journal for nonprofessional builders and for those who would like to make their apartment or home more comfortable and beautiful, more modern and more original.

The suggested ways and means of improving the interaction between the design-building complex and the consumers are aimed above all at the more qualitative solution of the problem of shaping the urban environment. In reality, however, this problem is not only professional but social as well. We believe that the daily



direct participation of the population in the restructuring of cities and their humanizing would contribute to the greater involvement of the masses in the administration of social affairs.

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### **Morality Without Moralizing**

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[Text] The acquisition of a new quality by socialism, consistent with the contemporary standard of global civilization, is, at the same time, a process of profound moral cleansing and renovation of our society. However, glasnost alone, even taking its price into consideration, contains such great respect for the individual, and faith in historical reason and in the common sense of the people, that it would be no exaggeration whatsoever to describe it as a real moral university. Progressive public awareness is unwilling to tolerate the separation between means and objectives; the question of the moral sense of economic, political and ideological changes occurring in the country is to us no less important than the changes themselves. It is not only the place of morality in the system of human value preferences that is changing. Also changing is the very understanding of morality. What does morality mean to us today?

What are we arguing about? An intensive ideological polemic, which is so profound and comprehensive as to develop into an open confrontation between sociomoral positions, remains characteristic even after all incantations regarding moral and political unity, and a most unexpected feature of the contemporary spiritual situation of Soviet society. Any problem, big or small, instantly becomes a topic of sharp debates. What is their reason: invisible grounds, endlessly varied and frequently random, or else is it a true real reason which perhaps is not even clearly realized? What is their object?

It may seem initially that the main ideas which excite social forces and leave them on opposite sides in the struggle are, on the one hand, the idea of the individual and, on the other, the idea of statehood. Roughly speaking, some favor the human "personality" and others favor the "state." That is precisely the way many of the active participants in such discussions think. This may be close to the truth without being the truth itself. The concept of individual and statehood mark, in such a general aspect, only an area of arguments without as yet giving an idea of their real content.

In order to achieve a proper understanding of the nature of our (theoretical and, particularly, practical) differences, what is important is not the abstract and stereotyped pitting of the individual against statehood but a clear awareness of the specific differences between a dependent and a free individual and between authoritarian and democratic statehood. In that case we can more accurately identify the spiritual barrier which divides us into individuals reduced to the status of a "cog" in a well-structured mechanism, considered merely a means toward the good of the whole, and consistent with an all-absorbing and impersonal statehood, and an individual who has an intrinsic value, who is worthy of happiness and satisfaction of individual aspirations, oriented toward freedom of judgment and action, coexisting with a sensibly limited statehood, clearly aware of its limits, totally controlled by the citizens and serving them.

The combination of socialism with democracy is a still unstudied task and, one would think, an extraordinarily difficult one. It is an area for historical research and risk. In a certain sense, it is a leap into the unknown. The bourgeois freedom of the individual, which was the height of freedom in the past and, at least officially, was the most developed, grew on the basis of private ownership relations and is organically accompanied by an individualistic way of thinking; the way to it was literally long and twisting and, frequently, bloody. Russia had the courage to skip a number of particularly unpleasant rungs on the historical ladder, related to capitalism; the October Revolution blocked the "classical" channel of gaining democratic freedoms, based on private ownership and paralleled by individualism. But on the basis of what material foundation could individual freedoms grow, and what to do so that formally they are no less extensive than in the Western democracies and, in terms of their content, could be obviously superior to them and reliably protected from bourgeois degradation, which is corroded by individualism and the indifference of sated philistinism? The perestroika initiated in our country, in the course of which the shaping of democratic structures is paralleled by the simultaneous creation of their material base, is precisely an attempt to find a socialist solution to such problems.

However, the question could be asked of how is all of this related to morality and ethics? Our answer would be, most directly. Morality cannot be understood without going beyond its own limits and without putting it in a specific historical space and without correlating it to the basic contradictions of the age. Furthermore, the question of morality and its place in the system of human values and priorities has become exceptionally urgent in our society and an important line in future arguments. One of the main accusations which the opponents of perestroika hurl at its supporters is that the latter replace the sociopolitical criterion of society with the "scholasticism of ethical categories." This accusation of ethical scholasticism, which seems entirely justified on the surface, is in itself scholastic. In any case, it is rather abstract, for it does not take into consideration the

specific historical context of the interrelationship between politics and morality in our country. Nonetheless, today's veneration of the moral hollies cannot be understood separately from yesterday's scorn of the same. And even if we agree with the fact that contemporary sociopolitical terminology abuses ethical terminology and appeals for morality frequently indicate a lack of understanding of the essence of the matter, nonetheless the precise meaning of this moral "shift" in social awareness must be identified.

A little bit of history or something on the correlation between morality and politics. The understanding of morality and its correlation with politics repeatedly changed in the course of the 70 years of Soviet history. Let us note that it is a question not of real rights which had their own quite contradictory logic and were not always properly interpreted, but of models of moral mandatory behavior and concepts of good and evil, of what was worthy and what was unworthy, which, replacing each other, gained official status and predominated in social thinking.

In the first decade which followed the October Revolution, social awareness, inspired by communist ideals, developed its own moral paradigm. The question, specifically, was as follows: To what extent, in general, was the new, the communist age compatible with morality in its traditional meaning? Ethical nihilism became noticeably widespread in Marxist literature and in a Marxist-oriented environment, the youthful environment above all. It was considered that morality is the sum total of external standards of behavior, alienated from the individual, which were organically part of the spiritual-repressive mechanism of exploiting classes. It was seen as an expression of spiritual coercion exerted over the working people, which merely continued and added to the material coercion to which they were subjected.

The rejection of morality was based on at least two errors: first, the historically defined (bourgeois in particular) form of morality was identified with morality in general; second, the fact was ignored that bourgeois morality as well performs not only apologetic but also general humanistic functions and contains a broad universal meaning. These errors were, naturally, not simply the consequences of lack of reason and knowledge but of fully explainable social enthusiasms. They were part of the overall context of proletkult errors.

Toward the end of the 1920s the concept that morality is totally reduced to class interests, to the political objectives of the proletariat, gained the upper hand and, for a rather lengthy period of time, was dominant. To begin with, the acknowledgment of the universal significance of morality, including the simple forms of morality and justice, were considered a proof of menshevism and of hostile ideological views. Let us note that the unchallenged triumph of this view coincided in time with the period of the elimination of the kulaks as a class. That was a significant coincidence! Second, morality was

reduced to the solution of practical problems: the implementation of economic, social and cultural changes in the country. The activities of the Soviet state and all of its actions were automatically ascribed a morally lofty meaning and the entire area of building socialism was considered an endless combine of human happiness. There was no gap between morality and ordinary politics. Within the framework of such an understanding of morality, cases of women leaving their husbands and of children rejecting their parents, if the latter were subjected to political repressions, seemed entirely normal. The "color" of the age was found not simply in the fact that such cases either occurred or were widespread, but the fact that they were considered seemly and entirely worthwhile.

In the mid-1950s, during which the fever of the cult of personality came to an end, a new situation developed. From the viewpoint of the country's domestic development, it was necessary ideologically to open social life and to acknowledge that there were areas which were quite distant from politics or, in general, had no direct class meaning, and that a person could commit some socially significant errors without being or becoming an "enemy of the people." It was necessary practically to expand the area of individual autonomy, which required, as a minimum, to remove morality from the "total yoke" of politics. A new situation developed by then in international relations as well. Nuclear weapons, which were being accumulated in amounts which threatened the very existence of mankind, required a transition to a policy of dialogue and reciprocal understanding among countries with different sociopolitical orientations. Yet in order to engage in a dialogue and reach an agreement, a common value platform, a single human language, were necessary. One could not invent such a language, which becomes crystallized in the course of the age-old development of culture. It was the language of universal moral concepts.

The CPSU program, which was adopted at the 22nd CPSU Congress in 1961, was an answer to these requirements and, correspondingly, an important landmark in the moral history of our society. The belief was developing in social awareness that morality is a necessary and totally irreplaceable form of social life, which existed alongside with and relatively independently from sociopolitical criteria, that it has its own area of application and logic of development and is the continuation of the single humanistic experience of mankind. From the viewpoint of bolshevik tradition, this formulation of the question was unprecedented. To realize this, it would suffice to look at how frequently the word "morality" and other derivatives of the word were used in basic party documents. In the text of the first party program (1903) the word "moral" is encountered once and had no terminological importance; in the second program (1919) no such words were to be found; they were used on more than 20 occasions in the third CPSU program (1961). Let us note that the new edition of the same program (1986) includes the increasingly frequent use of

such terms and that the universal orientation of morality is emphasized more clearly and persistently. The abundance of moral terminology in the CPSU program does not in itself prove the moral health of the party, in precisely the same way that its absence would indicate sickness. The connection between verbal morality and actual morality is more complex. It is more frequently inverse than straight. However, addressing oneself to moral terminology can be entirely considered as a certain although, naturally, not total argument, whenever we wish to bring to light a consciously formulated image of morality.

As the poet has said, this is no face to face encounter. It is difficult to say what image (or images) of morality predominates in the social consciousness of Soviet society today. It is obvious, however, that in fiction, political journalism and, partially, the social sciences, an entirely new vision of the world is developing, which proceeds from the understanding that morality is a universal phenomenon of permanent value, which gives priority to human values and moral assessments above all other, including political and ideological ones. Morality is considered no longer as one of several spiritual phenomena but as the foundation, the roots of spirituality in general, as the "ferment" of all culture. It assumes the responsibility of being the final and supreme judge on earth.

Therefore, concepts of morality considered in terms of its correlation with politics, changed in the social awareness of Soviet society. Here we can single out several qualitative stages which form a single line: a. Rejection of morality under the pretext that proletarian politics makes it unnecessary; b. Subordination of morality to politics; c. Its separation from politics, as an independent form of culture, existing side-by-side with politics; d. Putting morality above politics as a target-setting and control authority. In short, the "stock" of morality on the "stock exchange" of social consciousness gradually increased in value. At the same time, the attitude changed toward the moral and ethical experience of the past, toward so-called "abstract humanism." It shifted from confrontation to compromise and from opposition to reciprocal understanding, from rejection to acceptance. Where many "superclass" thinking authors see scholasticism of ethical categories and the surrender of ideological positions, actually it is a question of one of the most noteworthy trends of spiritual development in Soviet society. The fact that ethical categories which were either rejected or put in the service of political objectives in the past, have now assumed the significance of the supreme criterion in the assessment of social events, confirms the extent of spiritual maturity reached by socialist society.

Let us not confuse communist with Varlam's ethics. "What is moral is what is useful to society," was the thought of Varlam, the sinister character in the movie "Repentance." Simple to the point of being primitive, this formula is the ideological shelter of all Varlams, a form of their delusion and self-delusion. Its trickiness

lies in the total lack of clarity of who has the right to decide what is useful to society and what is harmful to it. The vagueness of social theory is refined by the practical correlation of forces and, as a rule, theory is adapted to suite the stronger. In this case, usefulness to society is identified with the wishes and prerogatives of those in power, of those who hold a privileged status. Such has always been the case in history. That is what prevails in the world to this day. However, to hold power and to possess moral truth are totally different things.

We do not have to look into historical archives to find the origins of Varlam's "truth." Suffice it to read our literature on ethics. Naturally, the picture of Soviet ethics of the past 25 years should not be painted in a single, not to mention black, color; it had pages of which we should not be ashamed even in the more sharply conscientious atmosphere of glasnost. Nonetheless, Varlam's spirit hovers over our professional ethics. This makes it incumbent upon us to reinterpret the most important stipulations of Marxist ethics in order to exclude the possibility of their jesuitical interpretation.

In his programmatic speech on ethics and communist upbringing, delivered at the 3rd Komsomol Congress, V.I. Lenin expressed clear formulations: "Our morality is fully subordinate to the interests of the class struggle of the proletariat;" "communist morality is based on the struggle for strengthening and completing communism" (*Poln. Sobr. Soch.* [Complete Collected Works], Vol 41, pp 309, 313). Let us ignore today the fact that these definitions have been repeatedly subjected to theoretical and historical vulgarizing and consider their true meaning in the context of the entire Leninist concept and communist world outlook as a whole. In order to answer the question, we must know precisely what is meant by the class struggle of the proletariat and communism. The meaning of the class struggle of the proletariat is the elimination of classes and uniting the working people against all exploitation. As a historical ideal, communism is nothing other than a social connection in which the "complete well-being and free and comprehensive development of all members of society" is guaranteed (op. cit., vol 6, p 232); "The free development of one means the free development of all" (K. Marx and F. Engels, *Soch.* [Works], vol 4, p 447). If we expand Lenin's definitions now, the result will be the following: from the viewpoint of communist morality, the free development of every person, the intrinsic value of the individual and his full well-being are basic values. Morality, strictly speaking, also means humanism, humaneness, chosen as standards of life.

The meaning of Lenin's words will not be distorted but, conversely, become clarified if we say that **only that which is moral truly serves the communist cause.** In general, let us note that V.I. Lenin used the concepts of morals and morality in the broad meaning of the terms, as synonymous with the conscious and free attitude toward reality. In this sense moral is the opposite of the

administrative-bureaucratic approach and external coercion, force and usurpation of the consciousness and will of some individuals by other. It expresses the following fact: the actions of people building communism are consistent with their objective and lead to it only when they are voluntary, conscious and initiative-minded, expressing the people's profound inner conviction. Building the new society means building new forms of social relations among people.

V.I. Lenin equates equality of education in communism and education in the spirit of communist morality. His thought that "the entire objective of education, instruction and teaching contemporary youth must be that of developing in it a communist morality" (op. cit., vol 41, p 309), indicates that moral upbringing is not reduced to a sum of steps or, in general, localized as a separate, as an isolated process, but takes place in all social practice and is internally part of all types of social activity (to the young this means, specifically, education, training and upbringing). It also contains another, an even more important aspect: education, training and upbringing acquire a meaning consistent with the spirit of a communist system only when they are oriented toward educating the individual not for the sake of making man fit some kind of predetermined stereotype, burdening his memory with dead knowledge and shaping within him ways of orientation in the social hierarchy, and so on, but developing within him his creative potential, his independence, awakening within him the active subject of historical action and turning him into a comprehensively developed individual. From an education the purpose of which was to program the pupil and to make him fit a predetermined model, we must convert to the type of education the purpose of which is to lead the pupil to an infinite creative self-development, to unlimited human growth.

Naturally, such a conversion presumes profound trust in the freedom and dignity of man and the existence of nonalienated, direct social forms of relations among people. That is why the upbringing of the individual is bound to imply, at the same time, educating the individual in a spirit of communist morality. By the nature of things this is incompatible with "making someone happy" by coercion. When V.I. Lenin speaks of an education in a spirit of communist morality, essentially he is discussing a conversion from socio-hierarchic relations among people to relations of solidarity and comradeship, a future in which the management of people is replaced by the management of things, when people no longer "educate" (use, coerce, oppress, etc.) one another but together change and humanize their natural and social environment. Strictly speaking, such a historical possibility is what communism is, understood as human relationships; such a historical opportunity is also offered by communist education, expressed not in terms of red tape and bureaucratization but in terms of the live and initial significance of this term.

Lenin's understanding of upbringing reveals best of all the nature of the link between communism and morality.

V.I. Lenin conceives of communism as the type of historical movement in the course of which ethics is converted from theory to practice, while morality, which at one point became historically shaped in a special aspect of social consciousness, goes down to earth and imbues all areas of human activity. Communism and morality are one and the same and one cannot be separated from the other. If morality switches to the area of phrases, wishes and ideal thoughts and is not applied in relations among people, it means that it is not communist. In precisely the same way, if any practical experience cannot withstand moral criticism, if it includes an immoral principle, one could say with full confidence that such an experience is not communist. If communism breaks with morality, this is bad for morality but is even worse for communism. Communism begins with moral trust among people and ends where this trust has been lost. Naturally, communism must not be turned into a state doctrine; morality is neither the only nor the leading motivation for the communist movement. However, the social practice of the communist movement, considered in all of its dimensions—economic, political, cultural, etc.—is truly communist only when it either implements the standards of goodness and humaneness or, to the extent to which this has not been accomplished, considers itself open for practical criticism from the viewpoint of these standards. It exists in the future, in the course of which necessity blends with ethics, happiness coincides with goodness and good intentions merge with lofty actions, and ideal morality becomes real morality.

Morality and necessity. This type of orientation toward what is morally superior, toward the ideal, and toward the impeccable and absolute nature of ethical criteria puts the moral individual in a state of critical attitude toward himself and the world. **The ethical imperative of humaneness and the daily motivations of practical expediency quite frequently clash with each other, not accidentally but inevitably and legitimately.** Life, entangled in the clashes among different social interests, is not simply an illustration of moral standards; real people, multi-dimensional people, full of contradictory feelings and aspirations, cannot fit the rigid framework of ethical abstractions. However, does this mean that under the pressure of the logic of life we must lower our moral criteria? It is usually thought that cruelty for the sake of enhancing the power of the state is different from the cruelty of the rapist and the robber. However "different" it may be, it nonetheless remains cruelty and, on the ethical level, must be unconditionally condemned. Unfortunately, however, we are still in the stage of development in which the way to the social good frequently goes through moral evil. However, finding the practical courage, which means going through all this evil, one must not display spiritual cowardice and try to convert evil into good. No, evil cannot become good. Evil always remains evil even if we assume that it is extremely necessary. Awareness of this truth is a characteristic feature of any humane moral awareness. And today, when once again we are guided primarily by moral



criteria, and are reinterpreting the most tragic pages of our own history, this precisely proves the maturity of ethical judgments and our moral dignity. It is bad when evil is committed. However, if such evil is not even described as such, this becomes a true calamity.

The imperative nature of ethical criteria which, by virtue of absolute necessity, are extremely abstract, prevents the justification of any of the transient stages and final forms of social relations, and keeps human and social life on the level of humanistic perspectives. They do not accept any exceptions and apply both to the past and the future. However, exigency and the incorruptibility of moral assessments are particularly important in terms of what is happening today. It is only in this case, strictly speaking, that we determine how moral criticism itself is. If such a criticism is not accompanied by personal risk and inconvenience, if it has simply been pushed back, being merely one voice in a chorus, could it be truly trusted? I do not wish to be seen as a person who calls for moderating one's anger in assessing the past. The "exhumation of the dead" is also important and this is nothing new. The French, for example, took a long time to explain their attitude toward the Vendome Obelisk. My idea is different: this anger will acquire a truly moral meaning when we eventually manage to turn it to the living, to ourselves. Yet not everything which we are doing today, although this may be considered an urgent necessity, could be such as to trigger general enthusiasm.

We believe that by now the need for radical economic reform has been already proved, theoretically as well as historically, a reform which provides broad scope for market mechanisms and competitiveness. Any soberly thinking patriotic person who wants the good of his country will support the process of emancipation of the economy, for this is the only possible way of giving it a contemporary shape and pace. However, this path is as inevitable as the side effects which parallel it are undesirable.

For that reason it is difficult to agree with the new moral testament that "what is efficient is also moral." Naturally, efficiency is moral for, in addition to everything else, it confirms a serious, responsible and respectful attitude toward people (a professional who knows his work well shows respect for those who will benefit from the results of his work, whether such results are books, commodities and services, and is socially moral even if his personal qualities are bad). In particular, efficiency is moral when its opposite is inefficiency. But to promote efficiency into a new moral holy means to lose the necessary critical distance from reality and to forget that economic necessity does not automatically mean moral justification or that it always needs an ethical-humanistic correction. Actually, a moral defense of economic efficiency and business is a view which has long been familiar; Benjamin Franklin himself believed that money is a virtue.

The attitude of a moral person toward himself and the world is characterized by constant spiritual stress. Such an individual cannot always follow what he preaches (a clear conscience is the invention of the devil, some outstanding moralists have said), and cannot proclaim as a universal standard much of what he is forced to do. How to relieve this stress and how to ease the conflict between high ethical aspirations and always limited vital objectives? Two extreme solutions are possible, prompted by historically developed assessment patterns. First, the total discrediting of empirical motivations and placing morality above "base" reality as a special, self-seeking condition of the spirit, locked within itself. In this case, moral will draws its pride from the fact that it can rise above the real world which is sunk in vices, turn away from it, and scorn it.

Second, the rejection of moral standards as a relatively independent criteria of evaluation, and as an ethical defense of daily occurrences. In this case morality is "diluted" in practical interests and empirical needs or, which is one and the same, practical interests and empirical needs are raised to the level of ethical virtues. The historical reasons which trigger an instrumental attitude toward morality could be most varied, from the anarchic despair of rejected and declassed population groups, to triumphant pragmatism of young newly developing social forces.

The truth is found in eliminating both the absolutizing of morality as well as a nihilistic attitude toward it, although recurrences of such approaches are constantly manifested. Marxist theory and socialist practice considered as the standard, and in terms of their historical nature, are incompatible with the instrumental/practical approach to morality for the reason that they are aimed at the complete humanism of a communist society; hence the essential critical attitude toward each specific situation in social development. They are even more distant from any moralizing views, for they proceed from the deep faith in the possibility of the real humanistic transformation of social reality. The dialectical depth of Marxist-Leninist ethics is found precisely in the fact that, while legitimately rejecting the moralizing approach to the world, it does not become degraded to the level of moral nihilism in order to ascribe a socially active meaning to humanistic concepts, while critically assessing social reality itself from the viewpoint of humanistic criteria in order to go beyond the historical and theoretical alternatives where no choice exists between unprincipled practicality and ethical snobbery. It would be the greatest possible cowardice to reject practical actions dictated by circumstances merely because they do not meet the standards of absolute holiness. An ethic which paralyzes the social creativity of the masses is a meaningless and harmful illusion. However, it would be an even worse error if, under the pressure of circumstances, we begin to "lower" moral criteria or to abandon them. We must clearly realize that the actual practical way of action, even though absolutely necessary, does not always deserve moral approval.

Morality is an amazing phenomenon: its presence is unnoticeable but its absence has a most fatal influence. It is said that nothing depends on morality and that the violation of its standards is no threat to anyone. But then why not betray a comrade, for example, if this is the price for saving one's own life? Why not remain silent or, even better, agree with a superior who is a petty tyrant if this would assist one's career and well-being? Why not, for the sake of "superior" interests conceal from the people the dirt of political intrigues, and so on and so forth? But the moment we take this path, it becomes clear that this is the direct road to the precipice. We suddenly find out that everything—economic successes, social stability and psychological balance—depends on morality. Although invisible, and seemingly insignificant, its absence suddenly turns into a frightening destructive force. Nature, Engels believed, avenges itself for any scornful attitude toward its laws. The same applies to morality. No one—man or society—can violate its laws with impunity. This truth has been repeatedly experienced by mankind, including our Soviet society. The "insanity" of the 1930s and 1940s, and the dull complacency of the years of stagnation proved, although differently, quite tangibly that economic successes, political luck, idea-mindedness and practicality are worth little unless they are rooted in the deep layers of universal human values. It is not only the normal life of man and society but human and social life in general that are possible only within the framework of morality, within a moral universe. What lies beyond it is physical if not spiritual death.

What is moralizing and why is it harmful? Thus, the belief that underestimating morality could have catastrophic consequences has already become prevalent in the social consciousness of Soviet society. But what could we describe as the overestimation of morality, a type of inflation of its role? Is this possible, and if so, does such an extreme exist today to an extent which could be considered socially dangerous? Unfortunately, an objective evaluation leads to an affirmative answer. Yes, such an extreme, such a social disease does exist and has become noticeably widespread of late: moralizing. At this point a stipulation is necessary: moralizing could be described as an overassessment, as excess morality in precisely the same manner than the cynical scorn of moral standards is its underestimating, its scarcity but in a conventional sense only. Actually, both are beyond morality but on different sides of it: cynicism does not reach morality, while moralizing goes beyond it.

Moralizing considers morality as some kind of magic wand which can cure any social ulcer; it expects of it the explanation or, even more, the solution of specific strictly practical (economic, managerial, cultural-educational and other) problems each one of which must be solved through its own and always specific means. Briefly, in a few words, the social nature and social harm of moralizing can be described as an attempt to limit oneself to the moral solution of social problems and shift

the practical struggle for the humanistic enhancement of real social relations to an individual-psychological level, the level of moral condemnation.

In the world of man nothing can be accomplished without moral indignation and moral inspiration. Without them evil cannot be destroyed and good cannot triumph. However, they are only the beginning, the first word. If we limit ourselves to moral indignation and moral inspiration, the result would be a big lie. As Ch. Fourier said, morality becomes helplessness in action, a cowardly apology of imperfect reality. Let us take as an example bureaucratism which, as recognized by many, is the greatest possible social evil blocking the path of perestroika. Along with the profound historical analysis of this phenomenon, there are frequent efforts to reduce the entire problem to the moral-psychological qualities of officials. It is claimed that the entire problem is that many officials have turned out to be spiritually callous, having forgotten their moral duty, etc. Hence the conclusion that poor officials must be replaced with good ones. Without belittling in the least the importance of a proper selection in the performance of one social function or another, let us note that more important and essential are, nonetheless, the personality qualities which are encoded in that very function and are required for its successful existence. A person does not become a bureaucrat because he has one set or another of certain negative personality features. Regardless of how moral a person may be, entering the bureaucratic system he is forced to act as a bureaucrat, for otherwise he would be rejected by the bureaucratic system. In the best of cases he will be a "pleasant" bureaucrat. Those who turn bureaucratism exclusively into a moral problem are in fact forced to restrict themselves to educational steps where a radical reorganization of social and political structures is needed. This example shows that moralizing shapes a quasiactive attitude toward the world. **Moralizing is a historically developed ideological trap as a result of which social contradictions are given a psychological interpretation and social tempests turn into a spiritual rebellion.**

Generally speaking, one must be very cautious when dealing with morality and moral appeals. In his essentially ethical work "The Tasks of Youth Unions," V.I. Lenin considers problems of morality totally (and, one may assume, deliberately) avoiding the traditional categories of goodness, duty, conscience, justice, honesty, etc. What can explain this seeming paradoxical fact?

One should not accept as unadulterated truth anything that morality thinks about itself. Morals and morality are not officially proclaimed by society and accepted by the individual on the level of conceptual thoughts only in terms of what goes beyond them and is reflected within them but, frequently, in their distorted aspect. One cannot judge of a society or an individual by what they say about themselves but must determine what they actually are. This applies above all to their morality, for it is easiest of all in this area to be misled and yield to illusions.

It is wrong to reduce morality to moral consciousness. It is equally wrong, however, to identify it with actual mores. In terms of the nature of their values, mores could be better or worse but, in any case, they are always limited. Mores are the social customs of individuals. They are different in the different social groups and at different ages; they localize the position of man in social space and time. By classifying man within a certain specific community, mores isolate him from representatives of other communities; by ascribing an irreversible nature to a specific historical condition, they become obstacles on the way to converting to another, a higher state. In order to become moral the individual must leave behind the area of isolation created by mores. He must rise above the empirical limitations of his way of life; the moral individual thinks in terms of universal human categories and it is humaneness itself that he raises to the level of a guiding principle in his life.

Morality, consequently, cannot be reduced to moral consciousness or actual mores. It is their happy intersection, which appears when a human relation, ideally set within the moral consciousness, becomes the actual position adopted by living individuals or, in other words, when practical behavior, squeezed within mores, is inspired by an idealized humaneness.

Considerations of morality have led some philosophers to the conclusion that it is cruel and anti-human, for it tries to subordinate the live and concrete individual to abstract principles. It may appear as though this conclusion has some grounds. Actually, however, if we have in mind superior unquestionable orders, morality expects of man some kind of holiness and formulates requirements which go beyond his possibilities and are, in this sense, superhuman. According to the logic of morality, man should observe its rules even to the detriment of his personal interests and despite the pressure of circumstances. It demands of man self-sacrifice. The question is, by what right? We shall not consider all the arguments which give a sensible meaning to this apparent "unreasonability." Let us merely stop with one aspect which, it seems to us, totally justifies a moral rigorism. The unique specificity of morality is that its requirements are not only consciously and voluntarily chosen and developed by the individual but also the fact that every person or every human community (such as a party) should address such requirements above all and mainly at themselves. Morality demands a self-accusation. For that reason, any sort of moral sermons and readiness to condemn others are also a withdrawal from morality and a violation of its profoundly intimate dimension. True morality begins where moralizing ends.

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### **Nikolay Bukharin; Episodes of a Political Biography**

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[Text] We are going through unforgettable times. Step by step, historical truth is being restored and justice is triumphing. Real possibilities have appeared now for the truly scientific, objective and comprehensive and, therefore, profoundly party-oriented study of the Soviet past and the restoration of our recollection of people who had been forgotten for so many years, but who had actively influenced the course of social development.

It so happened that when historians began to study the paradoxes and dramas of the prewar past, they turned to the "critical points" in the transitional period from capitalism to socialism and raised the question of alternatives in the historical development of the country, the personality of Nikolay Ivanovich Bukharin emerged literally from non-existence, as the figure of a political personality who was sentenced half a century ago and, it seemed, firmly forgotten. For decades his name was not included in referential works and encyclopedias and he himself appeared in research works only as a negative personage, as just about the "evil genius" in Soviet history. Such a surgical "extraction" of a noted party leader from the past (a fate which afflicted many other people) inevitably distorted the overall picture and scale of perception of a number of historical events and personalities.

In his time Stalin not only achieved the physical destruction of Bukharin but, as it seemed to many, deleted him from history forever. It is obvious now that this was a temporary victory. Once again in contemporary social awareness, as was the case 50 years ago, the two opposites of the end of the 1920s-1930s—Bukharin and Stalin—actively oppose each other. Discussions about these two personalities clearly depict today's political views held by the opponents and their assessments not only of the past but also of the present. Hiding behind these debates is, above all, a debate about the future, about what will socialism become tomorrow. What is important for the present, however, may be not simply to pit Stalin against Bukharin but to understand what it is that brought them together in the mid-1920s and what separated them by the turn of the 1930s. These problems affect not only the biographies of two major leaders of that time. Their study leads us to a fuller understanding of the destinies of the country and the people at crucial moments of prewar Soviet history.

At the time when Bukharin was to play an important and complex role in the internal party struggle of the 1920s and 1930s, he had gained tremendous political experience and enjoyed great authority within the party and among communist youth.

N.I. Bukharin was born on 9 October 1888 in Moscow, to a family of teachers. He became acquainted with Marxism in high school. During the 1905-1907 revolution he took part in antigovernment demonstrations and in 1906 joined the RSDWP. Two years later he was co-opted in the Moscow committee and participated in the struggle against the "otzovists." While a student at Moscow University, in the economic department of the school of law, he worked as party agitator and organizer in Moscow and was repeatedly arrested, and subsequently exiled to Onega, from where he escaped and emigrated abroad. Lenin's acquaintanceship with Bukharin is traced to the autumn of 1912. Lenin involved him in work in PRAVDA and PROSVESHCHENIYE. Bukharin participated in the labor movement abroad, wrote speeches and reports for the bolshevik faction in the Duma and, at the same time, worked within the Russian social democratic circles in Vienna and struggled against mensheviks and Trotskyites. At the same time, he undertook to study economics seriously. It was no accident that Lenin described him subsequently as an "excellently educated Marxist economist" (*Poln. Sobr. Soch.* [Complete Collected Works], vol 36, p 305) (subsequent references to V.I. Lenin's Complete Collected Works will indicate volume and page only).

During World War I Bukharin differed with Lenin on the questions of the state, the right of nations to self-determination and the correlation between the struggle for democracy and that for socialism. Nonetheless, Lenin did not tend to overestimate the importance of his theoretical differences with Bukharin, considering that the latter's thoughts had to "mature." For example, he spoke of Bukharin's "small errors" on the question of the state and the "big lies and debasement of Marxism by Kautskiy" (vol 49, p 391). It was no accident that Lenin agreed to write the preface to Bukharin's book *"The Global Economy and Imperialism"* (written in 1915-1916), which he used in his writing against Kautskiy and, indirectly, also against the errors made by the author himself. Some specific observations and conclusions drawn by Bukharin helped Lenin in his work on the book *"Imperialism As the Highest Stage of Capitalism"* (see, for example, vol 27, p 339). Furthermore, in itself the existence of an opponent such as Bukharin unquestionably contributed to Lenin's thought. This can be seen by a number of preparatory materials for another one of Lenin's classical works *"The State and Revolution"* (see vol 33, pp 171, 265 and 329-338).

During the conference of RSDWP(b) sections abroad (Bern, February 1915) Bukharin opposed the demand of the right of nations to self-determination and, in general, the requirements of the minimum program. The essence of the differences was that, as Lenin emphasized, "A

socialist revolution is impossible without the struggle for democracy," and that it was unwise to delete from the program one of the democratic requirements (vol 49, pp 346-347). What matters here is not only the problem of the right of nations to self-determination in itself but also the method used to analyze the problem. Bukharin's approach was not entirely dialectical.

In October 1916 Bukharin traveled to America. In New York he actively worked for the newspaper NOVYY MIR. In his letter to A.M. Kollontay, Lenin expressed his satisfaction with the struggle which Bukharin was waging at that time against the right wing and Trotsky (see *ibid.*, p 387). At the same time, Bukharin contributed to the organization of the left-wing Zimmerwald faction of the American socialist movement, which later became the nucleus of the U.S. Communist Party. After the February revolutionary in Russia, Bukharin returned to the homeland via Japan. He supported Lenin's April theses. In August 1917, at the Sixth Party Congress, he was elected Central Committee member which instructed him to draft the manifesto of the Sixth RSDWP(b) Congress "To All Working People, to All Workers, Soldiers and Peasants of Russia." Bukharin actively participated in the revolutionary events in Moscow where he struggled against mensheviks and the S.R. He played a major role in the anti-Kornilov campaign. As a Central Committee member, he opposed hesitations in the party on the subject of the armed uprising and the seizure of power. After the victory of the October Revolution in Petrograd he was one of the leaders of the armed uprising in Moscow, and in January 1918 spoke for the bolsheviks at the session of the Constituent Assembly.

Bukharin's position at the Sixth Party Congress requires a special analysis. For a long time it was assessed in our scientific publications one-sidedly. It was said that he had brought forth an anti-Leninist system for the development of the revolution, based on rejecting the alliance between the working class and the poorest peasantry and that he did not share Lenin's conclusion of the possibility of the victory of the socialist revolution in a single isolated country. It was also claimed that he considered the Russian Revolution only as providing an "impetus" to the socialist revolution in the West, essentially rejecting the possibility of the victory of the revolution in Russia without the help of the proletarian revolution in Western European countries.

The report which Bukharin presented at the congress gave some reason for such conclusions. However, was the emphasis accurate? It was true that Bukharin's report included errors and inaccuracies. Nonetheless, this is not the full truth. Errors or, rather, differences of opinion on essential problems could be found in the speeches of many other delegates to the congress. There was nothing unnatural about it. The making of collective decisions at party meetings did not exclude but presumed that a unified and accurate viewpoint would be developed in



the course of the various clashes of views among opponents standing on common principled grounds. From such positions there is nothing in Bukharin's report that could be held against him. Furthermore, as a result of a critical discussion, Bukharin reached the conclusion that in the final stage of the Russian Revolution, "by virtue of objective reasons, the poorest strata of the peasantry could be our allies" ("*Shestoy Syezd RSDRP(b). Avgust 1917 Goda. Protokoly*" [Sixth RSDWP(b) Congress. August 1917. Minutes]. Moscow 1958, p 110). A commission was set up after debates on the report, in which the reporter was a member. The commission elaborated a more specific draft of the revolution and unanimously decided to submit it to the congress. Was it possible, in general, for this normal process for the elaboration of collective resolutions at the congress to be considered through the lens of Bukharin's "anti-Leninist" views? Naturally, it was not.

Now as to Bukharin's views on the future of the Russian Revolution and his orientation toward a global socialist revolution. Let us point out that at that time that was the party's prevalent viewpoint. As Lenin wrote, "We began our project exclusively while relying on a global revolution" (vol 42, p 1). At the congress itself, the idea that socialism may have to be actually built alone, without the help of the proletariat of the developed countries, was, in general, not of topical political relevance. The real political danger at that time was not an orientation toward a global revolution but efforts to link the socialist future of the Russian Revolution to the mandatory existence of proletarian revolutions in the West. However, this viewpoint, which was rejected by the congress, was raised not by Bukharin but by Ye.A. Preobrazhenskiy.

Bukharin's views on the "conflagration" of a global revolution, expressed at the Sixth Party Congress, therefore, reflected a rather widespread viewpoint. Naturally, this does not relieve him in any way of the responsibility for objectively harmful political actions at the beginning of 1918, based on those same and by then hopelessly obsolete views. At that time he assumed an erroneous stance on the question of peace with Germany, which was of crucial importance to the destinies of socialism in Russia. Proceeding from the old concepts, Bukharin demanded a revolutionary war. At one of the Central Committee sessions he said: "The only tactics we have are the old ones, those of a world revolution" ("*Sedmoy Ekstrennyy Syezd RKP(b). Mart 1918 Goda. Stenograficheskiy Otchet*" [Seventh Extraordinary Congress of the RKP(b). March 1918. Proceedings]. Moscow, 1962, p 261). "The trouble," wrote Lenin on this subject, "is that the Muscovites would like to support the old tactical position. They stubbornly refuse to see the way the new objective position has changed" (vol 35, p 254).

The internal party discussion was triggered by the clash between the old party concepts and the new practices, and the lagging of theory, as understood by some members of the party and its leadership, behind life. The gravity of the crisis, naturally, was due not to the "evil

thinking" of "left-wing communists," but to the extreme nature of the situation itself, which left no place for lengthy debate, when it was a question of the life or death of the Soviet republic. Naturally, it was not a question of the fact that Lenin "outargued" Bukharin and "routed" the "left-wing communists" (in general, Lenin avoided such phraseology, which later became so typical of Stalin, concerning his erring supporters), or the fact that he yielded to superior power. After factional oscillations, which were excessively long for such crucial times, Bukharin and his supporters were persuaded by life itself for, as Lenin noted, instead of the "old means of solving factional differences, the old means consisting of an inordinate number of publications, debates, and quite a number of divisions, instead of that old method, events brought to the people a new way of learning. It was the method of trial through the facts, events and lessons of world history" (vol 36, p 15). That is why in 1918 matters did not reach the point of division and "the most noted supporters of 'left-wing communism,' such as Comrades Radek and Bukharin, openly acknowledged their error" (vol 41, p 19).

Despite the theoretical differences between Lenin and Bukharin during the civil war, both perfectly found a common language on many political matters. For example, at the Eighth All-Russian Congress of Soviets (1920) Bukharin supported Lenin's ideas on the concessions. It was no accident that, criticizing Trotsky on that matter, Lenin kept referring to Bukharin (see, for instance, vol 42, pp 120-121). During those years Bukharin engaged in excessive practical work as editor of the party's central organ—PRAVDA—and as member of the Central Committee and propagandist of Leninist ideas. Many members who had joined the party after the October Revolution became familiar with these ideas on the basis of the "*Communist Alphabet*," which Bukharin wrote jointly with Preobrazhenskiy. By the end of 1920, Lenin said the following on the subject of this book: "We have a party program, superbly explained by Comrades Preobrazhenskiy and Bukharin, smaller (in reference to the GOELRO Plan, author) but highly valuable" (ibid., p 157).

As a whole, characteristic of Bukharin's views of 1918-1920 were "revolutionary romanticism" and a leftist political position. In a certain sense, he expressed most fully the spirit of "war communism," which, to one extent or another, was shared at that time by the entire party.

It was in 1920, at the peak of "war communism," that Bukharin published his theoretical work "*Economics of the Transitional Period*." Summing up and, to a certain extent, absolutizing the war-communist economic and political practices, Bukharin not only made theoretical errors but also reflected concepts which were quite widespread within the party at that time. We must take into consideration that the concept of the NEP had not

as yet been formulated and that the concept of direct conversion to socialism became the main party line after the Ninth RKP(b) Congress.

In recent comments to the publication of Lenin's remarks concerning Bukharin's books, his real theoretical errors have been ignored and priority has been given to accusations of praising "extraeconomic coercion," as the basic method for building socialism, and sermons on getting rid of "any guiding principles in the area of economic policy" (see "*Leninskiy Sbornik XL*" [Leninist Collection No 40], Moscow, 1985, p 429).

This approach to Bukharin's work was erroneous and, essentially, antihistorical. An entirely opposite concept was being developed in the readers about Bukharin's views, for they could not be correlated with the radical changes which took place in Bukharin's views after the conversion to the NEP or Lenin's attitude toward the problems he had raised. Actually, how to combine assertions of the erroneous theory of "extraeconomic coercion" (views which, incidentally, were abandoned subsequently by Bukharin himself) and the fact that it was precisely on the margin of chapter 10 of this "extraeconomic coercion during the transitional period," that we keep coming across Lenin's notes such as "true," and "very good!" All of this ends with his conclusion: "This is an excellent chapter!" (ibid., p 424).

The study of Lenin's notes on the margin of Bukharin's book "*The Economics of the Transitional Period*" confirms the unquestionable unity or, in any case, similarity between many of Bukharin's conclusions and Lenin's positions. Nonetheless, Lenin pointed out the truly essential errors made by Bukharin, which he considered as being not in the least the praising of "proletarian coercion." Actually, in his notes Lenin exposed the gnosiological roots of former and future political errors made by Bukharin, although this was not his specific objective. The final Leninist conclusion does not contain a single word on the errors of which Bukharin was accused later (obviously, at that time they did not seem essential to Lenin and, perhaps, he did not consider some of them erroneous to begin with). However, he exposed theoretical errors, elements of scholasticism and retreats from the dialectical method.

It is indicative that in the course of the discussion on the trade unions as well, in 1920-1921, Lenin aimed his arguments not in general against Bukharin's views on the slogan of "production democracy," but against the one-sided interpretation of this slogan, Bukharin's lack of understanding of the dialectics of persuasion and coercion under the conditions of dictatorship of the proletariat (see, for example, vol 42, p 216). However, even then the conflict between Lenin and Bukharin did not at all lead to a break in their relationship: Lenin perfectly realized how valuable people such as Bukharin were to the party.

The period between 1921 and 1927 marked the blossoming of Bukharin as a political leader. In 1924 he was elected Politburo member and assumed a leading position not only in the Central Committee but also the USSR Central Executive Committee and the Comintern Executive Committee, the chairman of which he became in 1926, replacing G.Ye. Zinovyev. Bukharin actively participated in the work of the Komsomol, the AUCCTU, the Trade Union International, the Red Teachers Institute, the Communist Academy, the K. Marx and F. Engels Institute, and other social, cultural, scientific and training institutions. He frequently represented the party abroad. At the same time, he continued his work as PRAVDA's editor and, subsequently, as editor of the journal BOLSHEVIK. He was a member of the editorial boards of many other publications. He was the author of the drafts of a number of essentially important party documents and delivered reports and speeches at congresses, conferences and meetings of the activists.

We know that after Lenin's death a sharp struggle broke out within the party's leadership, in which basic ideological differences were combined with the "personal aspect." This struggle put on opposite sides of the barricade noted party leaders such as Trotsky, Zinovyev and Kamenev, on the one hand, and Stalin and Bukharin on the other. Characteristic of Bukharin was his essential rejection of leftist interpretations of building socialism. Virtually all of his major works of that time are directly or indirectly aimed against Trotskyism. It was precisely this principle-minded position that made Bukharin become Stalin's ally, leading him to engage in fierce polemics, which frequently prevented him from listening to the sensible reasoning of his opponents. Ideological irreconcilability developed into personal enmity, making collective work impossible. Stalin, who was accused by Trotsky, not without reason, of unprincipled centrism, made skillful use of this situation to strengthen his own political positions. He succeeded in "cutting off" his rivals from the leadership, starting with Trotsky and followed by Zinovyev and Kamenev. However, the Bukharin-Stalin bloc could not be firm and durable. As subsequent events were to prove, Stalin's theoretical and political views on a number of essential aspects were objectively much closer to those of Trotsky, his political opponent, than Bukharin, his temporary ally.

The 1920s became for Bukharin a period of serious political work and of revision of many former ideas. He actively developed Lenin's idea of the worker-peasant alliance as the foundation of the Soviet system and as a mandatory prerequisite for building socialism. Unquestionably, Bukharin had learned the lessons which Lenin had taught him in 1918-1921, and decisively revised his previous "leftist" positions. However, his philosophical views changed little, as confirmed by his book "*Theory of Historical Materialism*," which had several editions during the 1920s and which triggered sharp criticism on the part of many Marxist theoreticians of that time.

Bukharin was one of the first to raise the question of Lenin's theoretical contribution to Marxism. Unfortunately, in Soviet historiography matters were frequently presented in an entirely opposite light. Yet suffice it to open the collection *"Attack,"* to read the following: "Quite broad circles within our party and outside it usually consider unquestionable the fact that Vladimir Ilich was an incomparable and brilliant practical worker in the labor movement; as to his theoretical elaborations, the assessment here is usually much lower. It seems to me that the time has come to make a certain minor or perhaps even major revision. I believe that such an inadequate rating of Comrade Lenin as a theoretician is based on a certain psychological aberration shared by all of us. The theoretical contributions made by Comrade Lenin have not been condensed or compressed. They are not presented in several well-rounded volumes. ...It is precisely for this reason that quite a number of people believe that Comrade Lenin yielded significantly as a theoretician to Lenin the practical worker. I believe that this concept will be defeated in the immediate future, and that in the more distant future Comrade Lenin will rise in front of us in his entire magnitude not only as a most brilliant practical worker in the labor movement but also as its most brilliant theoretician" (N. Bukharin. *"Ataka. Sbornik Teoreticheskikh Statey"* [Attack. Collection of Theoretical Articles]. Moscow, year of publication unknown, p 242). These words, which were said 1 month after Lenin's death, became to a large extent Bukharin's programmatic theoretical work in the 1920s.

The further development of Lenin's concept of the NEP, as applicable to the specific conditions of the 1920s, and the active development, on the basis of these principles, of the party's socioeconomic policy, are directly related to Bukharin. In 1923-1924, in the course of sharp clashes with the opposition, Bukharin interpreted the theory and practice of the new economic policy and fought for surmounting one-sided and erroneous approaches to the NEP, conceived exclusively as a retreat, although, from the very beginning, on the subject of the "concession to the NEP," he favored excessive concessions (for example, he opposed foreign trade monopoly and was the author of the unfortunate "get richer" slogan).

Bukharin's viewpoint on the "high road to socialism" was formulated in his book *"Put k Sotsializmu i Raboche-Krestyanskiy Soyuz"* [The Way to Socialism and the Worker-Peasant Alliance] (Moscow, 1925), which was of essential importance in his theoretical and political evolution. Bukharin's theoretical concepts on building socialism largely determined the party's practical activities in the mid-1920s. Bukharin's "main book" was an attempt theoretically to substantiate the building of socialism in a single country on the basis of the NEP (as it had developed in the mid-1920s). In our view, this book develops a theoretically possible model of building socialism, making maximal use of Lenin's ideas on the need for "bridges" and transitional measures aimed at leading a country of small peasantry to socialism. Bukharin's concept largely relied on Lenin's views on socialism as a "system of civilized members of cooperatives."

However, one essentially important link was absent in this virtually impeccable theoretical system. The concept presented in *"Way to Socialism..."* did not presume any radical corrections under the influence of changes in the domestic and foreign policy situations. It was entirely based on the idea of the gradual "exhaustion" of the NEP and the slow (sometimes described by Bukharin even as "very slow") "growing in" of the country within socialism, without dialectical breaks and revolutionary transitions, moving into a new qualitative status. Yet, as it has become obvious today, such type of revolutionary breaks are a mandatory prerequisite for the development of socialism and not only during the transitional period.

Bukharin's work came out in 1925, which was destined to become the year of a major political turn and sharp internal party struggle. The decisions which were made then were quite contradictory. They completed the structuring of the "classical" NEP with the further development of commodity-monetary relations, free trade, allowing hiring and leasing, abandoning the physical forms of the tax in kind and organizing supplies to the cities on the basis of market conditions. All of these measures were oriented toward the individual peasant farm. It was on this basis that industrialization was to be supported, the course toward which was undertaken that same year.

At the same time, the question arose of how to combine the freedom of the petty commodity system with the tasks of industrialization. By 1925 the problem had been already formulated in practical terms, on the level of a "transfer," of a nonequivalent trade between town and country. However, this "transfer" was complicated by the conversion to supplying the cities on the basis of market relations and the freeing of production activities of individual peasant farms. The normal cost accounting relations and a balanced economy excluded such a nonequivalent exchange or, rather, set strict limits on its way, creating the danger of a crisis. Nonetheless, all of its opponents, who had defined their positions by 1925, continued to discuss this "transfer."

The dramatic nature of the decision which was made was, precisely, that of ensuring such "transfer" of funds for industrialization on the basis of a long-term preservation of individual peasant farms, demanded the party's constant efforts to find and support complex political compromises. This path was initially taken by the party but its entire difficulty had hardly been fully realized at that time. Practical policy between 1925 and 1927 was based on Bukharin's viewpoint to the effect that it is not the kolkhozes that are the high road to socialism. The 2-year gap in making decisions on industrialization and the cooperativization of the countryside, and the possibilities which were lost of solving the grain problem as a result of this, led to the fact that, as Bukharin himself subsequently established, the country entered the historically inevitable stage of building socialism through the "gateway of exceptional measures."

Stalin's personal viewpoint, who subordinated the making of political decisions to the struggle for power and who had taken the path of maneuvers and intrigues behind the scene and who was unable or, perhaps, unwilling to find the kernel of rationality in the critical statements made by his opponents (such as the warnings issued by Kamenev and Sokolnikov at the 14th Party Conference on the growing crisis phenomena in the NEP economy), played a significant role in the errors which were made in the 1925-1927 period.

It is indicative that in 1926-1927 Bukharin had already begun to review his previous viewpoint on a number of problems. He abandoned the idea of the "very slow steps" and was in favor of a faster pace. By this token, Bukharin acknowledged certain weaknesses of the policy which had been formulated in 1925.

A somewhat delayed interpretation of the new problems of building socialism, created by the initiated industrialization, was made by the party's leadership in 1926-1927. As late as the end of 1927, there were no clear differences within the Politburo on crucial problems of economic policy. At the 15th Congress, the party's leadership presented a unified program for the gradual "reconstruction" of the NEP in order to solve the problems of the socialist reconstruction, the development of production cooperation, expanding planning and mounting an active offensive against the capitalists in town and country. However, not all circumstances were taken into consideration at the congress. To begin with, it said virtually nothing of the fact that there were serious difficulties with grain procurements and that it would be impossible to obtain sufficient grain. Nonetheless, as early as August 1927, the first warning bell was rung: Under the influence of rumors of an approaching war, hoarding developed; waiting lines appeared, and, as was noted at the 15th VKP(b) Congress, the country experienced "the economic difficulties of the eve of a war without having a war." The initiated crisis already demanded taking a different view on the general economic situation. At the congress, however, the question of the crisis in grain procurement was not raised at all. As A.I. Rykov subsequently established, at that time no one could predict the seriousness of the mounting crisis.

Meanwhile, the new situation (the aggravated international situation and the grain procurement crisis) was already questioning the very program of a "smooth" transformation of the NEP. In January 1928 the Politburo unanimously passed a resolution on the use of exceptional measures and on applying administrative and judicial pressure on the kulaks and the prosperous peasants in order to secure grain for the towns. This decision was supported by the entire leadership, including Bukharin, Rykov, Tomskiy and Stalin. As M.I. Kalinin was later to acknowledge, the fact that he had voted for exceptional measures did not mean in the least that he supported them. At that time the party's leadership simply failed to see the possibility of any other solution. Bread lines were appearing in the cities. The

discontent of the workers was rising. Tension developed in the countryside. The situation was considered hopeless. Grain had to be obtained at all cost to feed the cities. At that time Bukharin himself did not oppose the sporadic use of exceptional measures. However, the overall outline of essential differences between Bukharin and Stalin also became apparent. If we consider Stalin's views of January 1928, we can already see his orientation toward making quite radical decisions. Stalin felt that it would be impossible to ensure the "transfer" and resolve the grain problem through the mechanisms of the "traditional" NEP. Exceptional measures alone were equally unsuitable, for their application would inevitably lead to reducing the areas in wheat and lowering the volume of marketable grain. At that time Stalin developed the idea of the coercive "implantation" of kolkhozes as a new channel for "transfer" (their marketing power was twice that of the individual peasant farms), with the simultaneous development of grain farming of the sovkhos type.

In principle no Politburo member opposed the "transfer." It was only problems of its forms and limits that remained arguable. They became aggravated as the practical actions taken by Stalin and his immediate circle, aimed at solving the crisis, increasingly clashed not only with the resolutions of the 15th VKP(b) Congress but also the Leninist principles of relations between the working class and the peasantry.

On 1-2 June 1928, Bukharin wrote a letter to Stalin, indicating very serious differences and aggravation of personal relations between them. It began as follows: "Koba. I am writing rather than talking to you, for I find it very hard to speak and I fear that you will not hear me out to the end, whereas a letter you will read. I consider that the domestic and foreign situation of the country is very grave." In analyzing this situation, Bukharin reached the following conclusion: He did not deny the need for kolkhozes but believed that they would not be able to "provide a solution," for it would take several years to build them. Stalin himself accepted this fact. It was also impossible immediately to provide the kolkhozes with working capital and equipment. Preparations had to be made for the new harvest, serious preparations at that. "And what are we doing?" Bukharin asked. "General problems of policy were not discussed" even once, and even within a small circle. Bukharin's efforts to raise these questions failed in the Politburo. As a result, the leadership lacked an integral plan and we are acting, Bukharin writes, "worse than extreme empiricists of the coarsest type." The letter shows that Bukharin was aware of and rejected the improvisational nature of Stalin's policies, which were leading toward the party's ideological disorientation. The main thing which Bukharin pointed out was the growth of extraordinary steps into a new political line, distinct from the line adopted at the 15th Party Congress. That line had not been codified in the congress's resolutions but had been shaped as a result of Stalin's political practices.

To Bukharin, the question was the following: Since in the immediate future the kolkhozes will not provide grain,



we must direct ourselves toward the enhancement of individual peasant farming and normalizing relations with the peasantry. To this effect, he submitted his own economic program. Stalin's view on the matter was different: During the period needed by the kolkhozes to solve the grain problem, this weakness in "transfers" could be eliminated through exceptional measures. At that moment the main differences between Bukharin and Stalin remained not so much in matters of the pace of development or the establishment of kolkhozes but in how to survive during that period, while there was not a sufficient number of kolkhozes and while they could not as yet provide grain.

The differences intensified in July 1928. Stalin presented his theory of the "tribute," at the Central Committee plenum, i.e., the theory of an additional tax levied on the peasantry, a supertax, which "we shall be forced to collect temporarily in order to preserve and further develop the current pace of industrial development." Bukharin as well did not oppose the "transfer," i.e., the appropriation of some of the peasant's output in favor of developing heavy industry. He merely called for moderation in this matter. Where, then, was the difference in the positions held by Stalin and Bukharin? The former reached the conclusion that nonequivalent trade and the market are incompatible. The second was oriented toward a "transfer" through the market mechanism, on the basis of preserving for a rather lengthy period of time the individual peasant farms. Nonetheless, Bukharin did not deny that kolkhozes and sovkhoses were the best "transfer" instrument. The fact that the state would be unable to obtain commodity grain from them immediately was a different matter. Who was right? In all likelihood, neither of them. The 1925-1927 experience, which had brought about the crisis and the exceptional measures, as Bukharin was later to realize, indicated the difficulty of "transferring" funds from the individual peasant farm to heavy industry through the mechanism of the private market. Reliance on the extraordinary measures to support the "transfer," led to undermining the worker-peasant alliance, the retreat from the Leninist principles of building socialism and, in the final account, could lead the country to the brink of civil war. It was only collective theoretical and practical quest that would have made it possible to elaborate a constructive program for the period during which the kolkhozes were still weak and were unable to provide the necessary amount of grain.

However, as a result of Stalin's intolerance, possibilities of finding a joint and accurate solution became increasingly fewer. Subsequently Bukharin was to say that, remembering Lenin's testament, he observed with a great deal of tension the increased discontent among the peasants. However, at that time he was already surreptitiously being described as panic stricken by starting such a rumor in the country. Nonetheless, in July 1928, at the VKP(b) Central Committee Plenum, after a stubborn struggle, a joint resolution was accepted and the exceptional measures were lifted. To a certain extent, the

July plenum was a victory for the Bukharin group. At that time the Central Committee majority was still supporting Bukharin, Rykov and Tomskiy in their sensible and circumspect appeals.

However, practical experience followed a path quite different from the documents which had been adopted. The actual policy after the plenum was defined by Stalin's speech on the "tribute." Bukharin said that the "tribute" formula was turning around all previous party decisions and that in no way could he agree with it, considering this formula the harbinger of further emergency policies. Yet among the supporters of Stalin himself an orientation precisely toward exceptional measures was growing. Although voting in favor of their elimination, at the same time they admitted the possibility of again and again resorting to them. Kaganovich in particular, directly called for reapplying the exceptional measures "just in case." According to Bukharin, the emphasis should have been not on repeating them "just in case," but on maintaining the peace with the middle peasantry. However, "this was ridiculed," and charges of spinelessness were levied against Bukharin.

It became obvious to Bukharin in the autumn of 1928 that the alarming phenomena in economic life were continuing to grow. He cautiously analyzed these phenomena in his "Notes of an Economist," which came out in PRAVDA. In them he raised the question of the gold situation in the country was worrisome, that the country had no reserves, that the matter of the grain was showing no progress or was even worsening, and that we were setting a rather fast pace in industrial development, which was the origin of an increasing orientation toward taking exceptional measures.

Once again, in November 1928, he spoke of the extremely worrisome situation concerning future grain procurements and the areas in crops. He predicted the recurrence of difficulties and even their aggravation unless economic-political peace with the middle peasantry was emphasized. At the November VKP(b) Central Committee Plenum, Bukharin was able to secure a joint resolution, a major item in which was the acknowledgment that one of the main tasks was to stimulate individual poor-middle-peasantry farming. However, despite the unanimously approved resolution (with the most active participation of Bukharin and Rykov), the actual development of events once again took an entirely different course. The resolution was "forgotten." The stipulation of aligning oneself on the individual peasant farm was "dropped out" as Bukharin said. Ever more noticeably, a different orientation appeared in the local areas. As a result, by the end of 1928 the sowing of winter crops was reduced substantially. Once again the country found itself in a most severe grain crisis and major difficulties regarding payments to foreign countries arose. One of the consequences of this was the introduction of bread rationing and reduction of imports. The production program was threatened. However, Bukharin's just statements on the difficulty of the situation

which was developing in the country once again became targets of abuse. "In the upper leadership," in his words, "a situation in which no one can speak out has been created, for otherwise one inevitably is described as a 'panic monger' or 'anti-Leninist,' and that coming from comrades whose competence on such matters is, to say the least, questionable."

The question of exceptional measures reappeared by the turn of 1929. Bukharin, Rykov and Tomskiy launched their final attack. On 30 January and 9 February 1929 two statements were made by Bukharin's group to the members of the Central Committee Politburo and the Central Control Commission Presidium. They indicated the increasing disparity between practical steps and party resolutions. One of the main reasons for this, according to Bukharin, Rykov and Tomskiy, was the position held by Stalin himself, his special status and his inordinate power, which he used improperly.

These statements rate Stalin as a political leader. What kind of rating is this? To begin with, it turns out that as a result of Stalin's activities and the activities of his close circle major deformations are taking place in the party's leadership; instead of making major political decisions, Stalin is engaged in politicking and tagging political labels; he does not tell the entire truth of the difficulty of the situation. "How can economic problems be discussed," Bukharin asked, "if concern for grain is described as philistinism?... If concern for the strength of the alliance with the muzhiks is frequently described as a peasant deviation, and if the suggestion to issue additional allocations or to curtail them is considered anti-Leninist?... Who will open his mouth on such questions? That is the reason for which such questions are not being asked but are being held back. That is why the entire party discusses them, but "privately," in groups of two or three people. That is why the party members have even developed a double "line: one view "for the others," and another "for oneself." Attending meetings, unanimously voting and adopting official formulas are becoming a ritual, a required party ceremony."

Nonetheless, despite such a sharp assessment of the situation within the party, Bukharin asked: Was it possible to find a common language and pass joint resolutions? His conclusion was that **"it is both possible and necessary."** To this effect, in his view, one should abandon "petty policy," and go back to big policy which, in critical situations, **"tells the working class the truth about the situation, relies on the masses, hears and feels the needs of the masses, and carries out its work blending with the masses."** Bukharin persistently repeated that no one would force him to take the path of factionalism, that the crime lies in the waste of time and efforts in internal leadership struggle and that reciprocal trust must be restored and collective leadership organized.

The second statement which was made by the Bukharin group on 9 February 1929 was related to the fact that, despite its expressed willingness to cooperate in the

formulation of a common line, the Politburo and Central Control Commission Presidium drafted a resolution which put in political circulation the event of Bukharin's meeting with Kamenev in the summer of 1928. Bukharin, Rykov and Tomskiy categorically rejected ascribing to Bukharin any effort to organize a faction bloc with the Kamenev group. They qualified this as nothing but a "gross distortion of the truth," and the aspiration to fabricate "factionalism" and, in the final account, the wish to "discredit us," to "stigmatize us." Bukharin acknowledged that the very fact of the discussion with Kamenev was a "lack of caution and an error." He claimed, however, that the practical purpose of the discussion was simple: He asked him "not to participate in a persecution which had not been officially decided by anyone."

However, the statement issued by Bukharin, Rykov and Tomskiy did not reduce the problem of the situation within the party to a single event, as Stalin did. They had raised a more general question: Why did Stalin need to turn Lenin's "union" into a "tribute," what was the purpose of changing the formulation consistent with an entirely different type of relations, unless one wished to change the very nature of such relations?

Bukharin's group realized the entire danger of this formulation. Slightly more than 6 months since the first application of exceptional measures had passed, and the theory of the "tribute" could easily be accepted as the ideological perpetuation of such measures.

In the view of Bukharin, Rykov and Tomskiy, the draft resolution not only did not condemn the theory of "tribute" but even promoted it as a party resolution. The assessment of the country's economic situation in the 12th year of proletarian dictatorship was sharpened in the second statement by Bukharin's group. Despite great successes in building of socialism in general, it noted, we are introducing a system of bread rationing; there is semihunger in a number of areas, a scarcity of raw materials, an acute shortage of durable goods, signs of inflation and a difficult situation with gold and foreign exchange. At the same time, Bukharin provided a deeper study of crisis phenomena in the economy of the NEP. He now pointed out not simply errors of a circumstantial nature, related to prices, but also added that industrial construction and nonindustrial construction had been developing in the country in recent years largely by printing money and wasting gold and foreign exchange reserves and that the grain economy was growing at an entirely inadequate pace. The result was obvious signs of inflation and very serious economic problems. The threat to unification and the danger of the failure of industrialization appeared. "The country is suffering a shortage of bread," Bukharin wrote, "not because of the development of kolkhozes but despite this development; this bread shortage will become aggravated unless we link all the successes of our rural policy in the next few years only and exclusively to successes in the kolkhoz movement which, naturally, must be comprehensively

supported. A simple calculation proves that in the next few years they (kolkhozes and sovkhoses) will not be able to become the main source of grain. For a long time to come the individual peasant farm will remain the main source."

As a whole, the Bukharin group accurately assessed the draft resolution of the Politburo commission, as being above all a shot aimed at political destruction. This is confirmed by the fact alone that it was precisely at that time, February 1929, that the reform of the rural tax, and steps taken in procuring machines to the countryside and raising the question of the middle peasant had already eliminated, in the view of Bukharin's group, a number of serious differences in the area of economic policy. Nonetheless, an action was being mounted aimed at cutting off the Bukharin group from the leadership. Stalin and his supporters actually took the path of politicking. For example, they proclaimed Bukharin the opponent of the individual taxation of the kulaks, i.e., taxation determined with administrative regulations. Actually, Bukharin favored an even higher taxation of the kulaks but only based on the law, which would reduce possibilities of arbitrary behavior and excesses. The resolution contained many such exaggerations.

Bukharin, Rykov and Tomskiy emphasized in their February statement that they had never acted against the party's official resolutions. They had fought the distortion of such official resolutions by Stalin and his supporters through the adoption of "exceptional measures," and that they opposed equating Stalin with the party as "equals," or else the direct substitution of the Central Committee with Stalin and the consideration of any crime committed against Stalin as an action against the party as a whole. It was precisely on this basis that the accusations of Bukharin's "attack" on the Central Committee were based.

However, the least feature in Bukharin's stance was the struggle for power. In our view, in terms of his individual qualities, he laid no claims to the role of leader. Actually, as confirmed by KOMMUNIST reader and party veteran F.P. Novichenkov, who attended in 1933 the "party purge" of Bukharin, in answer to accusations of aspirations to leadership, Nikolay Ivanovich, one would believe, answered quite sincerely: "I have never aspired to leadership. I do not have leadership qualities." In February 1929 as well the Bukharin group did not ask that Stalin be removed from his position as general secretary. "All that we are thinking," they wrote, "is that Comrade Stalin should take into consideration the (very wise) advice given by Lenin and not reject collective leadership. We believe that Comrade Stalin, like any other member of the Politburo, could and should be corrected without the risk of being labeled for this reason as an 'enemy of the party.' The task of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission is to provide such basic working conditions for the members of the Politburo."

Nonetheless, the readiness shown by Bukharin's group to compromise, obviously did not suit Stalin in the least. At that time he was trying to expel from the party's leadership three other noted members of the old party guard. Political relations in the Politburo tensed, which greatly complicated the making of accurate decisions, although such a possibility did exist at the beginning of 1929.

All that was left for Bukharin was his right to appeal to the Central Committee, whose members hesitated for a long time and, at certain moments, supported Bukharin's viewpoint. Now they were faced with making a final decision. The Politburo came out of the VKP(b) Central Committee Plenum of April 1929 torn by contradictions and split into two opposite groups. At the plenum itself Tomskiy bluntly pointed out the nature of these differences: In the view of Bukharin's group, after the lifting of the exceptional measures at the July 1928 Plenum, their reintroduction was an error.

Bukharin's speech at the April Plenum took several hours and began on a truly tragic note: "Comrades, I beg of you to hear out my speech with the greatest possible attention, for I believe that this is the last speech that I shall deliver to the plenum as Politburo member." In this Bukharin was correct. He attended the plenum but already in a different quality. In his speech, Bukharin pointed out a number of actions taken by Stalin against the three members of the Politburo and which actually meant something like a "civil execution," a public discrediting without the decision of the corresponding high party body. However, he focused on something else. For the first time Bukharin provided an expanded criticism of Stalin's concept of the aggravation of the class struggle as successes were achieved in building socialism. According to Bukharin, this concept was a theoretical substantiation of the "extraordinariness." It was formulated by Stalin at the July 1928 Central Committee Plenum and developed by V.V. Kuybyshev in September 1928. In Bukharin's words, this theory confused two entirely different things: "a certain temporary stage of aggravation of the class struggle—one such stage we are experiencing currently—and the overall course of development."

A new emphasis in assessing the socioeconomic situation appeared in Bukharin's speech. While continuing to insist on the fact that the reason for economic difficulties was the violation of economic proportions, he emphasized the following: This is not to say that we have adopted an excessively fast pace of development of our industry. One could have thought this a while back but a close study revealed that this was not the essence of the matter. The pace could be even higher but providing that there is an upsurge in agriculture as the base of industrialization and a fast economic turnover between town and country. The difficulties themselves arose because tremendous investments in capital construction were made under conditions adverse to the development of agriculture, the grain economy in particular. The latter turned to be in the least advantageous position. "A

certain withdrawal of production forces from the grain sector began." The result was the loss of a most important export item. "In this matter," Bukharin emphasized, "we plunged semispontaneously... For a while we did not notice the situation with the grain and for a while we carried out the industrialization by wasting funds (foreign exchange—author) and emission of currency.... Instead of paying attention in the past to the situation in the grain sector and, in 1, 2 or 3 years, achieve a very substantial acceleration in construction, on a firm and fixed foundation,... we encountered inevitable difficulties." Such difficulties began to appear when those same sources and reserves of foreign exchange, gold and possibility of printing money dried out, when everyone realized that one could no longer continue in this manner. It was precisely that moment that coincided with the greatest difficulties. But once this was obtained, and once such difficulties became objective factors, we found ourselves in the first round of exceptional measures.

To go back somewhat, one could say that such difficulties had largely been predetermined by the resolutions of 1925. The neglected grain problem was largely related to an orientation toward the development of industrialization while retaining the old "wheels" of individual peasant farming, and neglect of problems of industrial cooperation. Yet it was precisely the kolkhozes, which had been set up to solve the grain problem, that made it possible to ensure the accelerated industrialization and the preparations for it. That which Stalin realized by himself as late as January 1928, without Bukharin's help, could have objectively taken place earlier, under a different set of circumstances. In all likelihood, in that case exceptional measures would not have been necessary. Therefore, in a certain sense Bukharin was also fighting the consequences of his own policy of 1925.

In April 1929 Bukharin reached the conclusion that the petty commodity producer had turned from a seller of grain to a deliverer of grain and that the market form of the alliance between town and country and between the working class and the peasantry had been violated. As a result of the introduction of exceptional measures and forced grain purchases, farming became a sector with diminished production incentives. The role of money declined and the importance of that instrument was weakening while, at the same time, administrative pressure was increasing and new forms of "extraordinariness" were appearing. No success resulted from combining the task of developing trade and the growth of the new forms of direct economic relations between town and country. For that reason the "machine of extraordinariness" was increasingly spreading throughout the country. Although it seemed to strengthen the weakened economic system, it also hindered economic development and created additional difficulties.

The main difficulty of managing under such circumstances was the intertwining within a single knot of the truly progressive elements of economic regulation, which contributed to progress, with the elements of the

"extraordinariness." Exceptional measures are incompatible with the NEP as "mutually contradictory objects. Exceptional measures mean the elimination of the NEP although, naturally, temporarily. As a system, exceptional measures exclude the NEP."

It was on the basis of this analysis that Bukharin presented his alternate program. It included importing grain from abroad, firmly abandoning exceptional measures, asserting revolutionary legality, regulating through prices, and strengthening the production of means of agricultural output. Here as well, however, he did not oppose the "transfer," the unequivocal exchange between town and country. He said, however, that the purchase prices of grain must be flexible rather than firm and depend on the time of year and the area.

Why did the majority of Central Committee members fail to support Bukharin's program? Above all, because of the first, main and rigidly formulated point. Bukharin emphasized that comrades who were saying either import grain from abroad or take exceptional measures were right. To this, Ordzhonikidze pointed out: "This year you may solve difficulties by grain imports but how will you resolve them next year?" Bukharin's suggestion was considered a retreat without providing any whatsoever serious guarantees for the future. The choice was not simply between importing grain from abroad or taking exceptional measures but between importing grain and the fate of industrialization. Naturally, to the party's leadership of that time, industrialization had priority. The unacceptability of Bukharin's suggestion by the majority led, in general, to the fact that all of his other suggestions as well were rejected, including an essential one, such as observing revolutionary legality.

Naturally, Kaganovich cannot be interpreted as expressing the view of the majority. However, he sensibly said that goods have been sent to the countryside and grain prices had been raised but that after all this the kulak nonetheless kept saying: I have surpluses, I shall not give you such surpluses. "What would you instruct us to do, what steps could you invent?" Kaganovich said turning to Bukharin, Rykov and Tomskiy. "You have not submitted a single new suggestion, nor can you, for such suggestions do not exist, for we are dealing here with a class enemy who is mounting an offensive against us, who is unwilling to provide grain surpluses for socialist industry and who says, give me a tractor and give me voting rights and I will give you grain." Kalinin as well opposed Bukharin's program. In his view, the grain crisis could not be solved exclusively through the market and the bare slogan of developing the initiative of individual peasant farming, for agriculture is splintered, its level of commodity is low, and so on. There was no possibility of increasing commodity sales from individual farming to the necessary level and, in his view, "in terms of the present this is already an error," as is an effort, on this basis, to ensure grain exports for the sake of purchasing equipment. Bukharin, like his opponents, favored collectivization. To him, however, an orientation toward a



long process of the establishment of kolkhozes was characteristic, whereas now an emphasis had to be put on individual farming and its parallel existence with kolkhozes. In Kalinin's view, the most accurate solution would be to link all steps taken to enhance agriculture to collectivization, in one form or another. He concluded that "if you would agree with us on this **basic problem**, unity will be achieved." No agreement was reached on this basic problem at the April 1929 Plenum. However, many members of the Central Committee spoke out if not in support of Bukharin's group at least for keeping it within the Politburo. It was thanks to this view that the group was not dismissed from the Politburo.

Despite the sharp arguments and seeming irreconcilability of the sides, the Central Committee majority proved to be reasonable and on a number of items Bukharin voted with the majority. He acknowledged the possibility of a high pace of industrialization. In the resolutions of the April Plenum, followed by the 16th Party Conference (April 1929), high rates of industrialization coexist with sufficiently moderate rates of collectivization. This was another compromise reached largely as a result of Bukharin's sensible policy and the fact that he analyzed his situation once again and changed his viewpoint on a number of major issues.

The November 1929 VKP(b) Central Committee Plenum took place under the sign that 1929 had become the year of the great change. The delegates to the plenum spoke of an unparalleled pace of development of capital construction and the mass nature assumed by the kolkhoz movement. All of these facts were rated highly by Bukharin's group as well. Its new statement published at the plenum (of 12 November) was assessed by N.K. Krupskaya as a huge step in the direction of the views held by the majority of Central Committee members. Bukharin, Rykov and Tomskiy announced the change of their position concerning not only accelerated industrialization but also comprehensive collectivization. Characteristically, they also engaged in the search for new forms of economic relations, emphasizing that "comprehensive collectivization of entire areas, on the one hand, and the extensive development of contracting practices, on the other, raise... the question of market relations in a **different way.**"

However, did all this mean a total rapprochement between the positions held by Bukharin, Rykov and Tomskiy, on the one hand, and the Central Committee majority, on the other? It did not. What the Bukharin group firmly continued to support was the position that "extraordinariness" was essentially inadmissible. By supporting Stalin on this matter, the Central Committee members made a fatal error which was to be realized by no means immediately. The same error was made also by those who, until shortly before then, had fluctuated, such as A.A. Solts, for instance, who, while acknowledging that in the past he had "some questions concerning the exceptional measures... from the viewpoint of the

approach to individuals, when an administrative pressure had to be applied on large human masses." The choice made by the majority of Central Committee members, however, was greatly influenced by the fact that Bukharin's alternative was not adopted, had not "worked out." Furthermore, the authors of the alternative themselves had abandoned it.

The only alternate item in the statement made by Bukharin's group remained the question of exceptional measures as a **system**. This included not only their principled position but also their aspiration to defend the Leninist traditions. It was precisely Bukharin, Rykov and Tomskiy, rather than the Central Committee majority, that in that aspect were following the behests of Leninism. The Central Committee majority had already chosen Stalinism. Until November 1929 the hesitations of Central Committee members led to the fact that Bukharin's group was able to play the role of a political counterweight and to block at least the most excessive manifestations of "extraordinariness." The defeat of Bukharin's group and its removal from the Politburo itself marked the beginning of an orgy of excesses in the countryside and the grossest possible violation of the Leninist principles concerning the attitude toward the peasantry. It was entirely clear that Bukharin's final alternative: the essential rejection of the "extraordinariness" was indeed the alternative to Stalinism. By making their historical choice, the Central Committee members also bear historical responsibility for the tragic events which followed in the 1930s. Essentially, they gave a vote of confidence to Stalin and his course of political and economic "extraordinariness."

In November 1929 Bukharin was expelled from the Politburo. This marked the beginning of the new and least studied period of his political biography. Present efforts to introduce in scientific circulation texts of Bukharin's latter statements frequently trigger an internal opposition on the part of many researchers. Some of them believe that Bukharin in the 1930s was a broken man, who did everything possible to ingratiate himself with Stalin and to assume his place in the chorus of praises for the "great leader and teacher," which were becoming increasingly louder in the party and in society. However, a more detailed study of some of Bukharin's articles indicates that not everything was all that simple.

Let us begin, above all, with the real political role which Bukharin played in the 1930s. He took part in an entire series of most important political steps: In the proceedings of the 17th Congress, the 17th Party Conference and the VKP(b) Central Committee Plenums, and the commissions which drafted the 1936 Constitution of the USSR and the Model Statutes of the Agricultural Cooperative; he was editor in chief of IZVESTIYA and member of the collegium of the People's Commissariat of Heavy Industry; he engaged in academic activities, was in contact with noted Western public figures, and so on. However, there was more to it than that. The

influence of Bukharin's ideas was still clearly felt in the views held by many Central Committee members and in the important decisions made during that time.

In order to understand how this was manifested, naturally, we should address ourselves to the documents. Here the materials of the Joint Central Committee and VKP(b) Central Control Commission Plenum, of January 1933, and the speech which Bukharin delivered at the plenum, play a key role. The desire to have him politically rehabilitated and to emphasize the fact that Bukharin had sincerely realized his past errors and was thinking above all of the future was quite clearly manifested in the very attitude which many Central Committee members had toward Bukharin. Even K. Ye. Voroshilov, who was very close to Stalin, said that he believed Bukharin "100 times more than Rykov and 1,000 times more than Tomskiy. Tomskiy was dissembling, Rykov was trying to be sincere but was so far failing. Bukharin is both sincere and honest...." What can explain this attitude?

When the "big leap" was made, accompanied by tremendous sacrifices and costs, the party faced the very serious question of how to live and function further. Should it retain the "extraordinariness" which was opposed by Bukharin in November 1929 or take the path of normalizing the country's socioeconomic and political life? A struggle was being waged on such problems and hesitations developed. At a certain point, however, the trend toward normalization gained the upper hand. The supporters of a moderate, a balanced policy, those who firmly believed that the situation had to be made to fit a certain framework, needed a constructive program. And it was that program or, rather, even the trend of their quest, that was found, in its general lines, precisely in the one Bukharin had drawn up.

What were the ideas which Bukharin developed at the January Plenum? Above all, he analyzed the results of the first 5-year plan. In his view, the beginning of its implementation already marked a sharp change in the country's entire economic and political development. At that time there were the problems of creating new fixed assets, eliminating contradictions between a growing large-scale socialist industry and a petty individual peasant farming and between the growth of the socialist sector (and its class bearer—the proletariat) and the growth of capitalism in agriculture (and its class bearer—the kulaks). One of the main problems which emerged in agriculture as a result of the 1929 turn, in Bukharin's opinion, was the gap which had developed between the new means of production which were being shipped to the countryside and the skill of the manpower. As a whole, however, despite all the losses, as a result of the first 5-year plan "we moved ahead to a **higher level**," we became a "new country," facing new problems.

The possibilities of influencing the countryside increased. The production alliance between town and country was strengthening. This basic form of alliance, in

Bukharin's opinion, was to be based on the "incentive of direct interest promoted through Soviet trade, and the market, but radically different from the old...." Later, in the tragic situation of 1937, Bukharin said that, having changed his previous views on industrialization and collectivization, he was unable immediately to clarify the question of incentives in agriculture. The moment "matters turned to a new approach to trade, Soviet trade, to me the entire picture of economic relations became clear." In his speech at the January 1933 Joint Central Committee and Central Control Commission Plenum, Bukharin emphasized the outlines of his concept of a socialist market, the normalizing of economic life, the interpretation of socialism as a commodity-planned economy in which trade, albeit on a new basis, would play a tremendous role.

At that same plenum, it was precisely Bukharin who expressed, more clearly than Rykov and Tomskiy, his fellow workers in the recent struggle, the idea that "the historically developed leadership of our party, headed by **Comrade Stalin**, this energetic figure of steel, had fully earned for itself the right to lead in the entire further process...." Naturally, these words have certain elements of a political game, the aspiration to remain a member of the leadership, and thus to influence the situation. One could hardly blame Bukharin for assuming such a position at that time. However, we should also bear in mind that it was precisely Bukharin who held an uncompromising stance by the end of the 1920s but was now openly supported Stalin, saying that we have the type of party system which we need (substantiating this with the worsening of the international situation, the fact that the situation in Germany could radically change and that the fascists could come to power). Unquestionably, such statements by Bukharin could not fail to exert an additional influence on the party and add more "bricks" to the building of the cult of Stalin's personality.

Nonetheless, Bukharin was by no means a supporter of Stalin and nor did Stalin consider him to be such. In his article "The Economics of the Soviet Country," which came out in IZVESTIYA on 12 May 1934, Bukharin continued to develop the idea of the need to establish normal and stable relations between town and country. Once again he voiced the thought that material incentives should be used and allowed to operate through the mechanism of Soviet trade. All of these ideas could not fail to meet with the support of certain party circles. Knowing this and feeling that Bukharin's ideas were taken seriously and that a certain portion of the Central Committee was listening to them, Stalin deemed necessary to address the members of the Politburo with special remarks which essentially groundlessly rejected Bukharin's basic thoughts. This included an obvious argument with Bukharin as an opponent and, at the same time, the fear of making such polemics public.

It may seem on the surface that the newly arisen argument was strictly theoretical or even terminological. Changes in production relations in the countryside were

defined by Bukharin as the result of the tremendous agrarian revolution carried out by the dictatorship of the proletariat, and the expropriation of the kulaks' means of production. To this Stalin answered that "one cannot reduce the policy of collectivization to the concept of an agrarian revolution" and clearly tried to emphasize the benefits (real and imaginary) of the policy of forceful collectivization, compared to any other variant of agrarian policy toward the peasantry. Bukharin wrote of solving the problem of the new fixed capital (new means of production) as being the main difficulty in building a socialist economy. Stalin opposed the reduction of industrialization to the creation of assets in general, for "such a reduction eliminates the difference between heavy industry assets... and the assets of other economic sectors which are neither leading nor being reorganized in accordance with our policy." He also drastically rebuffed Bukharin's article to the effect that in our country "the percentage of the accumulated part of the national income proved to be extremely high (hence the great "stress"), and that the redistribution of production forces had occurred partially at the expense of other sectors (including agriculture)." Stalin believed that "one could not even remotely hint at" this, for "it does not correspond to reality, and it slanders and defames party policy."

Ignoring the constructive ideas contained in the article, Stalin saw in it nothing but an attempt to prove that had the Bukharin group been given the opportunity, it would have achieved the same objective with lesser sacrifices. Therefore, Stalin's remarks included not simply differences in terminology but a difference in assessing the situation itself. The argument was still on the same topic: Was it possible to normalize the situation in the country or would the inability to master the situation be compensated for once again with violence, with "extraordinariness?"

After Kirov's assassination, the "sword of Damocles" hung over Bukharin as over many other former members of the opposition. However, many Central Committee members hesitated when it came to restoring the "extraordinariness" and a certain political struggle developed on the subject of Bukharin's person. It was as though he had become the symbol of a moderate trend and of suppressed and concealed opposition to Stalinism.

Efforts were made to keep Bukharin as member of the Central Committee and of the party. This was not because Bukharin could become some kind of alternate figure in the political leadership but because his ideas were an alternative to the "extraordinariness."

Bukharin became a symbolic figure. It was no accident that the February-March 1937 VKP(b) Central Committee Plenum, the purpose of which was to demand the exposure of double-dealers, saboteurs, and Trotskyites in the leadership (the elimination of party cadres on a broad scale began precisely after that plenum) opened

with a consideration of the "case" of Bukharin and Rykov. The dramatic nature of the situation consisted also of the fact that Bukharin and Rykov struggled alone, everyone for himself. They alone turned to the Central Committee members with different statements and letters. They alone engaged in a hunger strike of protest against the monstrous accusations with which Bukharin was charged.

The main charge against Bukharin and Rykov was presented in Yezhov's report at the 23 February Plenum. Allegedly, they not only were aware of the existence of a clandestine anti-Soviet Trotsky-Zinovyev bloc and an underground anti-Soviet Trotskyite parallel center (today it has been proved that these charges were fictitious), and not only were they informed of the "reasonable platform" of these organizations, the purpose of which was to restore capitalism with the help of foreign fascist intervention, but also that they shared those views and were in close touch with these organizations. Included among many other charges were those of organizing networks of clandestine groups in the localities, Bukharin's 1930-1931 aspiration to organize a peasant uprising and to create an autonomous Siberian state, which would suppress the Stalinist regime, the drafting of the "Ryutin platform" on Bukharin's and Rykov's initiative, one item of which was the elimination of Stalin, and the overthrow of the Soviet government through armed uprising.

Bukharin answered all the charges by saying that "they did not contain a single word of truth," and that "everything one may wish, everything conceivable and inconceivable" had been piled up together. Having substantiated the proof of the groundlessness of the accusations and discussed in detail the conflicting nature of various witness testimonies, Bukharin ended his speech with the following words: "I am telling here the truth and no one will force me to say about myself the monstrous things which are being told about me and no one will succeed in doing this under any circumstances. Whatever labels may be tacked on me, I will not depict myself as a saboteur, a terrorist, a traitor, a betrayer of the socialist homeland."

On the following day, 24 February, Bukharin once again took the floor to make a statement in which he presented to the Central Committee Plenum his apologies "for a thoughtless and politically harmful act of initiating... a hunger strike... which is a major political error which can partially be excused by the fact that... I was feeling very sick." On 26 February Bukharin was given the last word in which he once again firmly rejected all charges. "This is not because they are of such great personal significance," Bukharin said, "but also because I believe that under no circumstance should one accept something unnecessary, particularly when this is not needed by the party, the country or me personally." Bukharin described the various attacks on him mounted by Central Committee members as personal features in the struggle, as the aspiration to judge of his activities "not

from the viewpoint of party history but mainly from the viewpoint of the present moment." Throughout his speech, which was full of tragic notes, Bukharin was constantly interrupted by retorts and mockery. Essentially, he was prevented from delivering his speech to the end, stopped by the shout: "Time to go to jail!" "Very well, put me in jail," Bukharin answered. "Do you think that because you are shouting that I be sent to jail I would speak otherwise? I will not."

A commission, chaired by Mikoyan, which was set up at the plenum to draft the resolution "on the case of Comrades Bukharin and Rykov," undertook its work under conditions in which it seemed that the question was clear. However, even at that point Stalin had to resort to a political maneuver. This is confirmed by the fact that the final formulation of the resolution was submitted for discussion. Initially, Yezhov's variant of expelling Bukharin and Rykov as candidate members of the VKP(b) Central Committee and members of the VKP(b) and have them tried by a military tribunal with the use of the supreme punishment—death by firing squad—was supported by Budennyi, Manuil'skiy, Shvern'nik, Kosarev, and Yakir. Postyshev's motion of trying them in court without the penalty of death by firing squad, was supported by Shkiryatov, Antipov, Khrushchev, Nikolayev, Kosior, Petrovskiy and Litvinov. No one knows the turn which events may have taken, had Stalin not suggested a clever and fine move: "Do not try them in court but send the Bukharin and Rykov cases to the NKVD," allegedly for additional investigation. This variant was initially supported by Ulyanova, Krupskaya, Vareykis, Molotov and Voroshilov and, subsequently, all other members of the commission. Stalin reported this unanimous opinion to the participants in the plenum on 27 February 1937. The plenum unanimously voted in favor of that resolution with two abstentions: Bukharin and Rykov.

The final act of the Bukharin drama was the trial of the case of the "anti-Soviet right wing-Trotskyite bloc," which began on 2 March 1938. Its proceedings have been published and are accessible to the readers. Let us note that some Western researchers, such as the American scientist S. Cohen, read in Bukharin's courageous defense a "dizzying set of equivocations, double meanings, coded words, concealed hints, logical intricacies and stubborn refutals," which "demolished totally... the charges of the real prosecutor—Stalin." Having sentenced Bukharin to death by firing squad, the members of the USSR Supreme Court Military Collegium could hardly think of the fact that half a century later they themselves (and those who supported them) would be facing the moral court of their descendants and that Bukharin's political biography would become one of the elements of the spiritual experience of the present generations of party members.

What do we learn from Bukharin's bright and tragic life? One of the lessons is Bukharin's way of tackling problems of theoretical forecasting and theoretical study of crisis situations in the development of a society and the standard

applied in solving them. Unlike Stalin, in this respect Bukharin went quite far. He was not only able to change his viewpoint at the turn of 1929, under the influence of the logic of life, but also tried to provide a theoretical assessment of this turn and to formulate the concept of further progress. Unfortunately, since the end of the 1920s he was deprived of the possibility to influence practical policy and his theoretical work was not properly considered in the political practices of the 1930s. Actually, it is only now that we are returning to the questions raised by Bukharin. The fact that in its time the party failed to make a critical analysis of the "revolution from above" led to the retention of the negative aspects of Stalin's policies throughout the 1930s, at a time when it was necessary to think about other, gentler, more flexible and more refined methods of social management and of normalizing the country's social life.

Since Stalin's time Bukharin had been accused of drifting into the path of factional struggle and the creation of an opposition. We see today that it was precisely that which he had not done but, conversely, that he had maximally restrained himself and his supporters. As a result of abandoning the struggle, however, and efforts to keep differences within the Politburo, without appealing to the party, the party mass, obviously the last opportunity of preserving the principles of collective management bequeathed by Lenin was lost. Underlining the problem of abandoning the struggle is also that of principle-mindedness in politics. In 1929 Bukharin realized that many of his ideas were unworkable and that he had to change his views under the influence of the logic of reality and not the pressure of opposing political forces. Realizing this, he took the position of the majority of the Central Committee on virtually all basic problems. His principle-mindedness in politics was manifested in the fact that he firmly stood on the grounds of Lenin's understanding of the main question from which, in the final account, developed the tragedy of the 1930s, that of "extraordinariness." On this score he was unbending. Bukharin did not violate his own principles because of a readiness to balance interests, coordinate positions and aspiration to remain in power. In this respect he withstood to the end, regardless of the personal danger to which he exposed himself.

Bukharin's strong side as a political leader was his aspiration to a constructive approach, readiness constantly to update his theoretical arsenal and openness of the mind. Despite his defeat, he continued to interpret the contradictions in life and tried not to yield to politicking. Although we come across in his speeches echoes of the by then ordained praising of Stalin, their main content is found elsewhere: defense of the idea of normalizing social life and establishing legality in society, a humanistic criterion in evaluating reality and orientation toward cost accounting. To the very end, Bukharin sought the possibility of closely interacting with the majority of Central Committee members on a constructive basis, and work, in the ways accessible to him, for the good of the party and the people. It was



precisely for this reason that the party and the Central Committee listened to his views. The mark of Bukharin's ideas can be clearly seen in the resolutions passed during the first half of the 1930s.

Nonetheless, characteristic of Bukharin's positions was a peculiar theoretical impatience. He proclaimed the results of his work all too rapidly and frequently failed to think them through. He found dialectical analysis difficult as well as exceeding the framework of the established system of concepts, evaluations and programs, as was the case with the "classical" NEP and the elaboration of political decisions in 1925. However, whenever he reassessed his former positions, he did this on a principled and truly profound basis.

Bukharin was one of the party leaders of the end of the 1920s and beginning of the 1930s to whom the concept of morality and legality had not a pragmatic but a profound human sense. It was precisely this stance that became the political counterbalance to Stalinist "extraordinariness." In 1929 Bukharin was defending not only his own views but also the right of the collective party authorities to criticize and analyze all aspects of social reality, without "dead areas," and "nonpersons." He realized that if the fault for the difficulties was shifted to the people who were outside the party—the class enemies, saboteurs or unconscious people, or the opposition within the party itself—and if the subjective errors of the authorities were ascribed in full to the class struggle, such a partial, halfway indication of the reasons for errors and difficulties would make it impossible to learn lessons from them, to make the necessary corrections on policies and that the halfway nature of admissions would result in a dangerous inconsistency of decisions.

Bukharin, with all his qualities and shortcomings and unquestionable merits and major errors, belongs to the history of our party and our state. His theoretical legacy covers the broadest possible range of problems. It demands a reinterpretation in the light of the experience acquired by the party in recent decades. This would enable us to include everything that is truly valuable, that has withstood the test of time, in our scientific and political arsenal. The study of Bukharin's legacy must be objective, truthful and critical, i.e., as it was bequeathed by Lenin to the present generations of communists.

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#### **Military Doctrines and International Security**

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[Article by Major General Yuriy Viktorovich Lebedev and Aleksey Ivanovich Podberezkin, candidate of historical sciences]

[Text] In assessing the present state of international security we must recognize that it has recently been

possible to halt the growth in military confrontation between the two world military-political groups which took place in the first half of the 1980s. In a number of areas—nuclear arms limitation, the settlement of regional conflicts, and so on—it has been possible to achieve definite progress and to create favorable prerequisites for future political decisions. One might say that for the first time in recent years mankind has perceived a prospect for escaping from the oppressive atmosphere of fear and hopelessness. That is the great historical service performed by all forces that have acted to prevent mankind from sliding toward the nuclear abyss.

In order to maintain a realistic standpoint, one cannot avoid also noting that U.S. and NATO ruling circles have not renounced the continuation of the arms race and the policy of military force. The threat of mankind's nuclear self-destruction remains real; immense stocks of weapons continue to exist; moreover, both nuclear and conventional weapon systems and military technology are being qualitatively modernized and improved, and quantitatively increased. Therefore, along with the positive changes which we have mentioned, all this provided grounds for the conference of the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee, held in the Polish capital on 15-16 July, to conclude that "there has been no fundamental change for the better. The situation in the world remains complex and contradictory." That is why the key question is now that of consolidating the positive trends which have taken shape, comprehensively developing them, making them irreversible, and removing real and artificial obstacles from their path.

The consolidation of international security also has a domestic political angle for restructuring in the USSR and other socialist countries. The relationship between the dialectical essence of the development of all mankind and social development within the USSR is similar to that between national and international security: The restructuring process in our country requires the creation of a security system consistent with our society's humanist essence, the socioeconomic tasks of renewing it, and the security interests of all mankind. The analysis made by the CPSU Central Committee after the April plenum showed that the military-political sphere, generally, and security issues, in particular, are not at all to be excluded from the areas of social life which require a fundamental renewal. It was openly stated at the 19th All-Union CPSU Conference that these areas as well have been marked by dogmatism and the subjective approach. This was the root of errors and miscalculations, the most important of which was, in our view, the oversimplified, straightforward military-technological approach to solving problems of national and international security. The choice of military-technological measures to the detriment of political ones had a negative effect on socioeconomic programs for our society's development, and did not contribute to consolidating national security to the extent that would have been possible by political means.

In our view, it is precisely these two fundamental circumstances—the need to consolidate any trends that

promote international security, on the one hand, and the shift of emphasis to political means of ensuring national security, on the other—which made it not merely possible but obligatory to raise the issue of comparing the two opposing military alliances' doctrines and discussing them, in order to make them exclusively defensive in substance. The public seems not to have fully grasped the scale of this task. This is understandable; by their very nature, such conceptual shifts take time to be assimilated.

Matters are objectively complicated by the fact that what is essentially involved is a subject on which all information has been considered top-secret, and its disclosure rightly regarded as a threat to the national interest. Now, however, the objective requirements of the new stage in society's development are being reflected in the process of discussing military doctrines on the political and military levels, involving the wide-scale participation of scientists and the mass information media. It is difficult to overestimate the significance of this debate, as it opens up fundamentally new areas for international cooperation, unthinkable until recently.

It is common knowledge that at the session of the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee, held in Berlin (May 1987), the allied socialist states addressed a proposal to NATO to conduct joint consultations to compare the military doctrines of both military-political alliances, with the ultimate aim of ensuring that they are defensively oriented. The participants in the Warsaw conference have now reaffirmed their proposal for a comparison between the two alliances' military doctrines with regard to their military-technological aspects, in order to make the military doctrines and concepts of the two alliances and their participants purely defensive in nature.

Objectively speaking, the time has come to engage in such an open dialogue because today more than ever there is a particular urgency to revise military thinking and elaborate new standards and principles for the military organizational development and structure of armed forces; new standards of information in the military area to develop contacts between military commanders, and so on. In this context it would be wrong to suppose that the socialist countries' publication of a document on their military doctrine at the Political Consultative Committee session in Berlin is in itself capable of eliminating all problems and brightening the prospects for changes in these doctrines; this was not even the target. This step was merely the beginning of a process of open international discussion of the most sensitive military questions of security. Now that the initial results, however modest, have been achieved, we can say that this process has a great future and that, if it were to be supported by the West, it would bring cooperation between countries to a qualitatively new level and would open up fundamentally new areas for consolidating international security.

There is another important point. The shaping of new views of international security, which was given a powerful impetus by the CPSU Central Committee's April Plenum and the 27th CPSU Congress, is continuing, just as the reassessment and in-depth consideration of the role of military-political factors which influence the development of military doctrines are continuing, as the 19th All-Union CPSU Conference reminded us. This is a natural, if very complicated, process which has emerged as a result of the search for fundamentally new approaches and solutions to national and common human problems. In this process one cannot take one's time or behave sluggishly, on the one hand, or display haste or recklessness in one's judgments and conclusions, on the other.

In our view, one cannot avoid noting that the peace offensive launched by the USSR and its allies in recent years has been so dynamic and on such a scale that foreign policy and military thinking in the Soviet Union as well as in the West has only been able to note what is happening without being able to subject it to an in-depth analysis, thus falling behind political practice. This precise situation seems to have grown up around the initiative proposed by the Warsaw Pact in May last year, when this major action was not appropriately developed or supported by the mass information media and the scientific public. The discussions held last year in scientific and public circles in the USSR demonstrated the inadequate training of political scientists in questions of military doctrine, an inclination to draw rash conclusions at times, and a lack of the professionalism which is so necessary in the analysis of military-political problems. Let us repeat that this can be explained partly as a result of poor specialized training, and partly by the fact that some of the people drawn into the discussion—current affairs commentators, academics in related professions (economists, geographers, and even linguists), journalists, and writers—had only a very vague notion of the subject under discussion.

Whatever the case, life convincingly confirms the fundamental importance of the assessment made by the Political Consultative Committee session in Berlin in connection with the reassessment of the nature of a modern war: "...A world war, especially a nuclear one, would have catastrophic consequences not only for the countries immediately involved in the conflict, but also for all life on earth." In this way, for the first time in the history of civilization a document which describes military doctrine mentions the senselessness of war as a political instrument, and the danger it represents to mankind itself. It was thus made perfectly clear that the main goal of military doctrine must be the prevention of war altogether rather than preparations for unleashing it. This fundamental conclusion is of immense significance for all other tenets of military doctrine, including views on the ways and means of achieving the main objective—the prevention of war.

A most important set of military-technological issues related to states' military doctrines is derived from an

analysis of the specific features of the contemporary stage of the scientific and technological revolution. What are primarily involved are the extremely dangerous trends in the development of the material basis of weapons and combat equipment, and consequently of the concepts for their use, as well as changes in military strategy and tactics and in all areas of martial art. It has now become a requirement for such issues to be discussed.

Let us cite a single example to illustrate the particular relevance of this task. The authors of the report "Selective Deterrence," which was drafted in the United States at the beginning of the year, call for an immediate definition of "which programs must be given top priority." In their opinion, the formulation of these programs for the development of new weapon types and systems should permit the U.S. Armed Forces to "use military power flexibly and with control, increasing the range of its possible use by future presidents." Describing the consequences of developing new areas of military-technological rivalry, they stress that "it seems obvious that over the next 20 years there will be radical changes in military technology.... These changes may call for a serious review of military doctrines and armed forces' structures."

The interconnection between new weapons and ways of using them, which was discovered by the Marxist-Leninist classics, is now being displayed with striking new emphasis. The application of the latest achievements of the scientific and technological revolution in the military area has led to revolutionary changes in the material base of warfare. The consequences of using the latest achievements of microelectronics and computers are having a particular effect. The rise in combat efficiency of weapons gained powerful impetus as far back as the second half of the 1970s. In a single decade the combat efficiency of nuclear systems has increased 10-15 times, and that of conventional weapons even more. New weapon systems—reconnaissance and strike complexes, which combine air and ground-based reconnaissance and delivery systems, and various other weapons—will be even more effective. We are essentially at the beginning of a new stage in the military-technological revolution, which could result in the combat efficiency of weapons increasing dozens of times over in a short space of time.

In addition to the creation of ever more perfect weapon systems and means of combat control, dangerous changes are also taking place in the concepts relating to the use of military force; the aggressive orientation and potentially offensive functions of these concepts are increasing. Although the United States and NATO formally retain their doctrine of "flexible response," in reality it has now been supplemented with concepts which have essentially changed its character. Thus, in the early 1980s concepts were effectively adopted that were primarily distinguished by their reliance on massive first strike (including with nuclear weapons), and their goal of conducting offensive operations in order to "end the war

in an advantageous position." For this reason, the question of the nature of the war which the USSR and its allies would wage to rebuff aggression needs to be carefully worked out, both in theory and in practice. Such an analysis must be approached without obsolete ideas or dogmatism: The price of a mistake in defining the probable nature of aggression is unusually high in our time.

We are currently witnessing the convergence of the trend toward increased combat efficiency of weapons and creation of qualitatively new battle control systems, with the development of new concepts for their use. This increases the risk of war many times over for all of mankind, and rules out the possibility of "peaceful" observation of the changes taking place in military matters. These changes may be described as a qualitatively new state, primarily characterized by a swift increase in the threat of war; they cannot be regarded "simply" as the next phase of military preparations. Old situations are not repeated in their previous form. Repetition is only possible for certain features, but it takes place at a higher phase of development. The attempts made by a number of Western politicians to simply extrapolate a previous level of military confrontation, the nuclear confrontation of the 1950s and 1960s for instance and apply it to the future, are groundless: The situation has now qualitatively changed: these are different weapons, different concepts and different conditions.

For this reason, the only way out of the developing position is a decisive turn from military-technological to political means of ensuring national and international security, and a radical change in the existing military doctrine as a practical implementation of the approaches taken by governments to ensuring security. "We have countered the militarist doctrine on which the policy of force is based with the concept of a 'balance of interests' and mutual equal security," M.S. Gorbachev stressed at the February (1988) CPSU Central Committee Plenum.

It is clear that this is a complex and extremely important task. It calls for extraordinary courage and effectiveness in developing and making very important military-political decisions, on the one hand, and extraordinary caution, balance, scrupulousness and foresight, on the other. Caution and foresight must not, however, hamper effectiveness in carrying out this task. Moreover, there is an increasingly insistent demand that the process of making military-political decisions have greater forecasting functions and involve greater coordination and discussion, involving representatives of the other side if possible, for mutual dependence is more apparent in the military-political area than anywhere else. Practice shows that it is much easier to prevent the aggravation of a military-political situation or the appearance of problems than it is to spend a long and difficult time sorting them out later. How much simpler it would have been, for example, to agree not to deploy intermediate-range cruise missiles than it is to solve the new set of problems arising

from this today: the limitation and control of the variously launched cruise missiles equipped with different types of warheads and sited in various parts of the world. Here is an example of an even larger scale: It is not difficult to predict that it would be much simpler to reach agreement on banning the deployment of offensive weapons in outer space than to negotiate later—and inevitably—on limiting or reducing them.

One is thus forced to conclude that, in the conditions of an accelerating process of the scientific and technological revolution, it is becoming increasingly clear how necessary it is for mankind to assume strict and effective control over the possible military application of the results of scientific and technological progress. Furthermore, it will be impossible to implement this requirement without extending this control to the military-technological sphere of military doctrines (although naturally not to every area at once), on a mutual and equal basis, of course.

The traditional definition of the concept of the "military doctrine of the state" is well known (but in our view it needs to be defined more precisely); it is the system of official views which a given state has adopted on the aims and nature of a possible war, on preparing the country and armed forces for it, and on ways of waging it. Let us recall that the shaping of military doctrine is directly influenced by such material factors as a state's military-economic and scientific-technological potential, the appearance of new types and systems of weapons and military technology, and the resulting changes in the organizational structure and combat training of troops, the ways of using them, and much else. It is important to stress, however, that the decisive influence on the formation of military doctrine is exerted by policy, which determines the main issue—to what end, in what direction, and on what scale the armed forces are to develop. In other words, military doctrine contains the answers to fundamental questions about the aims and nature of a possible war; second, how to prepare the country and its armed forces for this war; and third, the methods and weapons used to conduct military operations. In practice these questions cover the broadest range of political, military, technological, legal, and other problems, which transform such theoretical into specific tasks relevant to the conditions of domestic political and international life.

Clearly, political aims exert a longer-term, fundamental influence on the shaping of a military doctrine. A change in a particular military tenet has a fundamental effect on the military-technological aspect of military doctrine. That is why one cannot overestimate the significance which the changes in the socialist states' policy in recent years has for the military doctrine of the USSR and Warsaw Pact. In short, the essence of what is going on is that the main political aspects of military doctrine have now completely changed in substance—it is not a question of how to achieve set goals by means of force, but rather how to make the use of such violent means

impossible; it is not what goals a war pursues, but what goals war and the use of military force cannot achieve; it is not how to prepare countries and armed forces for war, but how to make preparations to prevent such a war; finally, it is not what methods and weapons to develop for the successful conduct of military operations, but what weapons to try to reduce or eliminate from the countries' arsenals. In other words, there has been a revolutionary change in the actual concept of military doctrine, its aim now being a self-negating one, as it were—not military means of achieving political goals, but political means of ensuring the single, common human goal of mankind's survival. The significance of this event has as yet to be fully realized, for truly major, historic change governmental policy can be seen in perspective only when they begin to assume a specific aspect in real international life.

However, the aim of preventing war, which has been formulated as our policy's top priority, has already become an entirely new and fundamental element of Soviet military doctrine, with definite practical consequences. All the tenets of our military doctrine are embodied in a real way in military practice and in the specific development and training programs of the USSR Armed Forces. It is already an accepted rule that there should be exactly as many, but no more, forces and weapons as are necessary for defense. In this way the political aim of military doctrine forms its military-technological aspect; the defensive orientation of socialism's military doctrine is put into practice in the specific strategic decisions and development plans of the USSR and Warsaw Pact Armed Forces, in their Organizational development, technical equipment, and operational and combat training.

For perfectly obvious reasons, neither the revision of basic tenets of military doctrine nor specific steps in the military-technological field can rest on the desire and readiness to act of only one side—in this case the Warsaw Pact members. It also requires the political will and practical actions on the part of the NATO countries. There must be no illusions about this: The potential for such unilateral action is fairly limited. Changes in the military doctrine of states, and especially coalitions of states, cannot take place on a purely unilateral basis, without careful consideration of the relevant changes in the potential adversary's military doctrine. There must be joint, coordinated actions which directly influence the evolution of both alliances' military doctrines in the necessary direction. Only if this condition is satisfied can the process of changes in military doctrine become truly dynamic and oriented toward genuine consolidation of international security. Even if the socialist states already had a purely defensive doctrine and armed forces structure, and only possessed defensive weapon types and systems (which it is hardly possible to clearly delineate, incidentally), it would still be impossible to guarantee that there would not be a war. It is important for the other side—the United States and NATO—to take similar steps.



Today, however, it would be hard to convince an unbiased observer that the U.S. and NATO military doctrines are of a defensive nature. An objective analysis of their fundamental military-political aims and the trends in their military organizational development would indicate that the military doctrine of Washington and its allies remains of an offensive nature, is designed for wide-scale use of military power as a decisive foreign policy instrument, and openly envisages the possibility, indeed the necessity, of first use of nuclear weapons.

The Warsaw Pact members thus have serious grounds to doubt the West's assertions that U.S. and NATO military doctrine is defensive. As is clear from statements by military men from the NATO countries, the West also has its doubts about the nature of the Soviet and Warsaw Pact military doctrine. That is why the Political Consultative Committee proposed in Berlin in May of last year that qualified experts from both alliances should meet, with the aim of starting an objective and dispassionate debate on the substance and specific orientation of the NATO and Warsaw Pact military doctrines. Such a debate could ultimately lead to accords between the sides on the elimination of the military-technological potential to attack one another.

It has indeed been possible to take the first steps in this direction. During the meetings between the defense ministers of the USSR and United States, the chiefs of staff were able to begin discussions on the nature and orientation of military doctrines. Reciprocal concerns and doubts were expressed. The positive nature of such discussions is obvious. It is equally obvious that they must be held more often, preferable on a permanent basis. Too much distrust and doubt has accumulated in recent years, and too much depends on the reciprocal understanding that can be achieved in the course of such discussions and meetings between the top military leaders of the USSR and United States.

In addition, glasnost in the military area appears to have become an indispensable feature in contemporary international relations and of the reality which is insistently knocking at the door. The specific manifestations of glasnost—the invitation of specialists to military installations, the unprecedented expansion of verification measures for the observance of disarmament agreements, the invitation of inspectors to areas where troops are conducting exercises, and so on—have become a reality of our time. This reality is now being reflected in the establishment of direct contacts between the leading representatives of USSR and U.S. military circles.

While taking measures to lower the level of military confrontation, the socialist states are forced to continue taking the existing military threat into account, to take appropriate steps to preserve the military balance, and to maintain their armed forces at a strength and level which allow them to rebuff any attack. At the present stage they regard the preservation of parity a necessary condition

for ensuring security—general and international security, let us add, rather than just that of Warsaw Pact members. "The military strategic parity which exists at present," the Berlin document on military doctrine stresses, "continues to be a decisive factor for the prevention of war."

Nonetheless, a proviso of considerable importance must be made. The aspiration to preserve parity is not an end in itself for socialism. Especially when maintained at higher levels, parity per se cannot provide guarantees against armed attacks or war. History provides numerous examples of wars starting under conditions of approximate military parity. We thoroughly understand that in a process where the scientific and technological revolution is accelerating, the simple maintenance of parity at ever higher levels—which we have witnessed in recent decades—will not automatically strengthen security.

It is for this reason that socialist military doctrine has clearly formulated the task of maintaining parity at ever lower levels, down to the limits of sufficiency necessary for exclusively defense purposes. This should be understood as the quantity and quality of weapons and armed forces which do not exceed the limits absolutely necessary for defensive purposes but are clearly insufficient for any aggressive purposes, including offensive combat operations. The Soviet Union rigorously matches its military organizational development in the strategic arms sphere to its purely defensive tasks. At the same time, the limits of defense sufficiency are dictated not only by the aims of the USSR's military doctrine, but also by the level and nature of the external threat.

Today the most important issue related to the practical implementation of USSR military doctrine is that of improving military organizational development and military science in accordance with the principles of balance and defense sufficiency. The new directives of the 19th Party Conference on directing the organizational development of defense and military science toward qualitative parameters is a fundamental importance in this connection. These issues call for in-depth theoretical analysis, wide-scale discussion, and the development of alternatives for practical implementation in military-technological measures.

Defense sufficiency—a most important element in the military doctrine of socialism—is the basis of the entire military organizational development and, in turn, presupposes the renunciation of first use of military operations; preservation of the military strategic balance at as low a level as possible; mutual reduction of weapons to a level where neither side would have the physical potential to carry out an attack; bringing the structure, equipment level, and disposition of armed forces into line with defense tasks; and rigorous verification of reductions in armed forces and weapons, as well as of military activity.

Measures to strengthen mutual confidence between states, particularly in the area of defining concepts of the nature of military doctrine, and basing them—both concepts and plans for the operational use of armed forces—on strictly defensive principles are of considerable importance. That is why the Warsaw Pact participants have openly invited the NATO members to start a discussion, a public debate on the military activity of the two military alliances.

During the discussion, and in the process of comparing and analyzing the military doctrines of the Warsaw Pact and NATO, the USSR and the United States, as well as the nature of military organizational development, it would be possible to discuss such issues as the volume and areas for reductions in elements of armed forces and weapons, ways of eliminating existing asymmetries and imbalances, as well as which weapons, and how many, could or could not be left for defense purposes, in order to strengthen international security. For example, there are already the urgent issues of non-nuclear weapons such as ballistic missiles, reconnaissance and strike complexes, multiple-launch systems, and other types of offensive weapons; tank, amphibious, and assault units; and sabotage groups. The reduction and elimination of these would make it substantially more difficult to carry out dangerous plans or provocative sallies. The discussions could also cover other steps to reduce the threat of sudden attack.

The task of reducing the non-nuclear potentials of NATO and the Warsaw Pact in Europe is today one of the tasks with the highest priority on which the military-political climate on earth will depend. It is essentially a concentration of the whole range of issues relating to the NATO and Warsaw Pact military doctrines. For this reason, a debate on this issue within the framework of the discussion on military doctrines would undoubtedly help to solve this most important problem. In fact, apart from its immediately beneficial effect, a reduction of non-nuclear weapons from the Atlantic to the Urals would create a favorable political and psychological climate for a further positive development of relations between West and East, would open progress in other disarmament areas, and would strengthen cooperation in Europe and the rest of the world. From a military-strategic point of view, the radical reduction of weapons and armed forces in Europe would create a unique situation on the continent where neither military alliance would have the forces or weapons to conduct offensive operations, and their military machines would be reorganized in a purely defensive basis. From an economic point of view, the radical reduction of armed forces would mean the huge funds would be released for the needs of socioeconomic development: After all, something of the order of 80-90 percent of the nuclear powers' defense budgets, and 100 percent of those of non-nuclear states, goes toward improving conventional armed forces. Finally, from a military-technological point of view, such a reduction would help to curb the extremely

dangerous trends in the non-nuclear arms race and would prevent the appearance of new weapon types and systems.

Taking these and other considerations into account, at their Warsaw conference the Warsaw Pact states put forward a specific plan for the step-by-step radical reduction of NATO and Warsaw Pact conventional weapons and armed forces from the Atlantic to the Urals. Such reductions in the two alliances' military potentials, with the result that the only forces which NATO and the Warsaw Pact would still have on the continent would be those absolutely necessary for defense but insufficient for carrying out a sudden attack or offensive operations. It is worth noting that the plan for radical reductions which was submitted to the Political Consultative Committee includes everything positive that has been developed in recent years on the continent, including in the West. This specifically involves the elimination of asymmetries and imbalances in individual weapon types and armed forces of the two alliances in Europe; the achievement of equal and lower levels for the NATO and Warsaw Pact military potentials; measures to avert the threat of sudden attack, including the withdrawal or reduction of dangerous and destabilizing types of conventional weapon; and close verification measures, including on-site inspections, the establishment of a special international verification commission, and so on. It is no coincidence that as they put forward this wide-scale plan, the Warsaw Pact members affirmed their proposal about comparing the NATO and Warsaw Pact military doctrines with regard to their military-technological aspects, with the aim of making the doctrines and concepts of both military alliances and their participants purely defensive in nature.

It may be boldly asserted that never in the history of mankind has any country or military alliance formulated, as a fundamental thesis of military doctrine, such a broad program of immediate measures to reduce military confrontation as that proposed by the Warsaw Pact members. Never in the history of mankind have the armed forces been assigned the prevention of war and its elimination from society as their main task. Never before has a military doctrine proposed a transition from military to political means of ensuring security, and never has national security been regarded in such indissoluble connection with international, general security.

Military doctrine is not dogma, and its further development will largely be shaped by domestic political processes in the countries of the socialist community and by the development of military doctrines and the nature of military organizational development in the United States and NATO. For this reason, many tenets of the allied socialist countries' doctrine will be made more precise and specific and improved as applied to the processes taking place in the world. This dynamism, which is characteristic of the USSR's contemporary policies as a whole, reflects the rapidly changing world and the state of current problems. The process could, of

course, take place much more rapidly if the United States and its NATO allies were to become fully involved in it. Such cooperation in the military area has today become an objective requirement which reflects the interests of all countries and peoples.

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**German Social Democratic Party Expert on Soviet Foreign Policy**

18020001o Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 13, Sep 88 (signed to press 25 Aug 88) pp 120-121

[Article by Karsten Voigt, member of the board of the German Social Democratic Party]

[Text] Karsten Voigt, member of the board of the German Social Democratic Party and expert on problems of foreign policy of the GSDP faction of the FRG Bundestag on problems of foreign policy, submitted to our journal, during his visit to the editors, theses entitled "FRG Interest in Soviet Policy of Reforms," in which he assesses contemporary Soviet policy and, above all, its European trend. Following is a brief presentation of the main ideas included in the foreign policy section of this document which was drafted by the author for discussion by the GSDP.

A successful Soviet policy of reforms and conversion of new thinking to new action are consistent with the basic interests of the FRG. The time has come for the federal government, on its own initiative, finally, to make systematic use of the opportunity to lay the beginning of the second phase of the policy of detente which, thanks to Soviet aspirations is opening in the area of reforms. Within the framework of such a policy foundations may be laid for a Europe which would no longer be torn by contradictions between the social systems in the West and the East but, conversely, would define its common interests in securing peace and solving ecological, economic and human rights problems. Such precisely would be the nature of a European peace order.

If East and West show an equal courage to abandon traditional prejudices and mental stereotypes and, in the second phase of the policy of detente, jointly initiate progress toward restructuring East-West relations, the result would have clear positive consequences for Europe as a whole, as follows:

The threat of military conflict would diminish;

The "crisis stability" in Central Europe would increase;

Grounds for drawing the "picture of the enemy" on both sides would be eliminated;

The dynamics of stockpiling weapons in Europe would be halted;

Defense expenditures could be reduced;

The military component of the Western European integration process would lose its significance;

The assertion of Western European interests in problems of the policy of security within the framework of allied relations between Western Europe and the United States would be facilitated;

Chances of greater governmental legality and in the development of human and civil rights would increase in the Soviet Union and the other Eastern European countries;

Environmental protection could be organized on the basis of a general European cooperation;

The division of Europe would be eliminated thanks to cooperation.

Interest in the Soviet policy of reforms under General Secretary Gorbachev, calls for taking into consideration the following principles in the policies of the Federal Republic:

First, our policy should support, through cooperation and political indications, as extensively as possible, those forces in the Soviet Union which favor the reform.

Second, such a policy should be oriented toward long-term developments and emphasize this clearly and steadily. Unquestionably, the reform processes in the USSR and the other socialist countries of Eastern Europe will take decades.

Third, our policy must take into consideration probable fluctuations between reforms and stagnation and even temporary retreats.

A potential military rivalry and division of Europe will remain a reality in the short- and medium-term future. The step-by-step demilitarization of East-West relations and surmounting the division of Europe remain a political objective. In order to obtain it, the present antagonism between East and West must be replaced by a qualitatively new European pluralism. Therefore, in the daily statements and acts of the Federal Government we can no longer ignore the possibility of eliminating hostility, demilitarization and expanding cooperation.

According to Voigt, the FRG interest in the new foreign policy orientation of relations in the East is determined by the following circumstances:

Central Europe, the FRG and the GDR in particular, are the most militarized area in the world. In the case of war there could only be losers here, for not only a nuclear war but even extensive military activities involving conventional armaments would destroy in Central Europe the

very foundations of human existence. The risk of annihilation is too high for the concept of fear as an instrument for the prevention of the threat of war in the long run to remain an acceptable base for West German security policy. The FRG has, therefore, all the necessary reasons to be oriented in such a policy toward the new objectives and the use of new means. It is a question, above all, of replacing the concept of fear with a search for a stable peaceful European order based on the development of relations of mutually profitable cooperation and of reduced threat of war.

K. Voigt notes that for a long time the new concepts for securing peace were hardly accessible to Soviet policy of security. The concentration of foreign policy priorities on relations with the United States was boundless. Achieving parity with the United States gave the USSR the status of an equal military superpower.

Under Gorbachev, nonetheless, the Soviet Union proclaims as its objective the "two-sided structural inability to attack." This is a manifestation of an initiated new orientation in the Soviet policy of security, the internal political moving force of which contains the tasks of radically renovating Soviet society. With a view to modernizing its economy, the USSR is interested in directing a significant portion of its military expenditures into investments and the development of close cooperation with the technologically advanced Western countries. Naturally, this does not mean that the Soviet Union is ready to abandon its great-power role. However, on the basis of the new Soviet policy, for the first time for the FRG and NATO, ever since NATO and the Warsaw Pact were created, an opportunity appears, after many years of arms race, to achieve a reduction in the very "essence" of the threat of war on the European continent. A development in this direction could also create premises for a future peaceful order in Europe.

In further characterizing the main features of the new orientation of Soviet foreign policy, Voigt singles out at least four major areas of change, which could significantly facilitate intensified cooperation with the West as a whole and, particularly, the Western European countries.

First, broadening the content of the Soviet concept of the policy of security, manifested in the clear intention to give second priority to the military factor and first priority to political and economic factors.

Second, the USSR emphasizes the correlation between national and mutual security within the framework of the new concept of interdependence, acknowledging the growing interconnection between East and West. Peaceful coexistence between the socialist community and countries with a different social order has been considered so far in Marxist-Leninist theory as a historically limited stage on the way to the victory of socialism on a universal scale. Peaceful coexistence was interpreted as a specific form of the class struggle. Today this view has

been surmounted. Coexistence and joint security are considered without any time limitations. This is the logical consequence of the fact that both sides reciprocally acknowledge the right of the other side to exist.

Third, the renovation affects the third world and its place in contemporary Soviet policy. To the USSR today this is an area where East and West, by cooperating, could make a joint contribution to the development of that area threatened by hunger and overpopulation. The withdrawal of its troops from Afghanistan proves that the Soviet Union clearly understands that military support of a national liberation struggle could turn into an involvement in conflicts, which are not only military but also political and economic. Today the USSR sets as an objective—through East and West disarmament—to release funds for the development of the third world. This, however, presumes that East and West, to a much greater extent than in the past, should make a joint contribution in the peaceful solution of conflicts in the Middle East, South Africa, Southeast Asia and Central America, and in other areas.

Fourth, there is an enhancement of Soviet foreign policy within the United Nations, accompanied by new political initiatives toward other international organizations. In Europe, such a course of events could, this very year, lead to official contacts between the USSR Supreme Soviet and the European Parliament, as well as the Assembly of the Western European Union, the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe and other organizations.

Along with a growing criticism of the major components of the foreign policy pursued under Stalin and Brezhnev, K. Voigt notes, said four areas prove that we are facing not a tactical step but a broad beginning of a new orientation in Soviet policy.

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#### **Main Topics of American History**

18020001p Moscow *KOMMUNIST* in Russian No 13, Sep 88 (signed to press 25 Aug 88) pp 122-126

[Review by V. Tishkov, doctor of historical sciences, of the book "Istoriya SShA" [History of the United States]. In four volumes. Editors: G.N. Sevostyanov (editor-in-chief), V.A. Arbatov, N.N. Bolkhovitinov, G.M. Korniyenko, G.P. Kuropyatnik, V.L. Malkov, N.V. Mostovets, N.V. Sivachev, and G.A. Agafonova. Nauka, Moscow, 1983-1987]

[Text] For quite some time social processes developing in the United States have drawn the close attention of Soviet scientists. The efforts of Americanists have been aimed at interpreting on the basis of scientific, Marxist-Leninist positions, the fundamental problems of the historical development of the United States. Justifiably, one of the profound and comprehensive studies is the



collective work on U.S. history, prepared by the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of General History, the authors of which are affiliated with many scientific institutions in our country.

The main purpose of this publication, as the authors describe it, "is to provide, on the basis of Marxist-Leninist positions, a scientific interpretation of the history of the American people and the development of their material and spiritual culture and to indicate the real circumstances in which they have waged and are waging a struggle in defense of democratic freedoms, against all types of oppressions and for social progress" (vol 1, p 6). It must be acknowledged that this work by Soviet scientists is distinguished by a broad approach to U.S. history, above all within the context of the common laws governing the universal-historical process. At the same time, its specific features and national characteristics are studied with the necessary attention and depth. Let us take as an example the problem of the nature of social customs which were established in the British North American colonies with the start of colonization in the 17th century. As the authors of this work convincingly prove, the specific feature of that country was that as a system feudalism never existed on American territory. The settling of colonists in North America itself, and the development of the British colonies, as F. Engels himself noted, occurred "with a view to establishing a purely bourgeois society" (K. Marx and F. Engels, *"Soch."* [Works], vol 39, p 128). In this connection, however, the question arises of the nature of the American 18th century revolution which, according to Marx, "sounded like the alarm bell for the European bourgeoisie" (op. cit., vol 23, p 9).

In terms of time, this period almost coincided with the revolutionary upheavals on the European continent, above all with the French Revolution and we obviously have reasons to explain the origin of these two revolutions on the basis of a number of similar historical grounds. Nonetheless, unlike France, where social stratification and the aggravation of socioclass contradictions were of a clearly expressed nature, class conflicts in America were weaker. This circumstance is related to the greater social homogeneity of the society and the "flexibility" of classes and social groups in the early stages of colonization of the North American continent. Above all, however, the American Revolution was distinguished by its anti-colonial nature and took the form of a war of independence.

Soviet historians highly rate the significance of the American Revolution, which inaugurated a new stage in U.S. historical development and marked the beginning of the establishment of the American nation. The Declaration of Independence, followed by the U.S. Constitution, despite their sociohistorical limitations, proclaimed a republican system in America, which was progressive for its time. These programmatic documents influenced the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen, as well as the Constitution of the French

Republic; also important was the specific experience in revolutionary action. The victory of the revolution in America contributed to the enhancement of the liberation movements in many countries; it was also echoed in Russia, where voices of greetings to the American people were heard.

What was the path subsequently chosen by the American republic? What was the fate of the ideals codified in its declaration such as, for example, the fact that from the time of their birth all people "have the inalienable right to life, liberty and aspiration to freedom?" The appearance of an independent country in the place of the former colonies became a prerequisite for the rapid development and total victory of capitalist relations in the country. The origin of U.S. capitalism was not an isolated phenomenon but part of an overall global process.

The history of black slavery is one of the most complex and acute problems of the American past. As we know, the practice of importing in the continent black slaves from Africa was introduced during the colonial period. And whereas an industrial revolution was taking place in the north, in the first half of the 19th century, while agriculture successfully developed in the way of farms (Lenin described it as "American"), slave-owning plantation farming blossomed in the south. On the surface, such a situation in a country in which capitalist relations were being quickly established and the then most advanced labor methods used, could seem paradoxical. However, the point was that under specific circumstances (the tremendous demand for cotton, the fiercest possible exploitation of the blacks, the cotton monopoly of slave-owning states and the availability of a great deal of land) plantation farming brought the slave owners economic profits. In this connection, the Soviet historians sensibly note that "behind the splendor of the rich plantations and high profits earned by the slave owners one cannot fail to see the social aspects of the problem: the most cruel exploitation of millions of blacks, the lagging of the south in industrial development, squalid technology, blossoming of racism, etc." (vol 1, p 231).

Therefore, although in principle slavery was essentially the antithesis of capitalism, under the specific conditions which prevailed in America at that time, it was one of its main sources of development. It is no accident that Marx wrote that "without slavery North America, a country of the fastest possible progress, would have turned into a patriarchal country" (op. cit., vol 4, p 135). At this point, the question arises: Is the tendency to engage in the superexploitation of a different race and of emigrant population one of the historical features of American capitalism? Whereas, let us say, British capitalism multiplied its potential by accumulating wealth plundered from the colonial peoples, American capitalism stood up and strengthened above all as a result of the slave labor of the blacks and discrimination in the hiring of each

new wave of emigrants reaching the country. This question is entirely legitimate, if we take into consideration the entire subsequent development of the United States, to this day.

The process of development of capitalism and consolidation of the American bourgeois nation was determined by yet another U.S. historical feature. By asserting, with every turn of the spinning machine, their own independence from British manufacturing, shaping their own national character and feelings of patriotism, the Americans, the ruling elite above all, increasingly addressed their political practices to preaching national exclusivity, chauvinism and expansionism. Before being able truly to stand on its two feet, the young American republic began energetically to expand its territory and show an aspiration to settle everyone's problems on the continent. The supporters of expansion turned their eyes to neighboring colonial possessions of France (Louisiana) and England (Canada). Eventually, Louisiana was "bought" from Napoleon Bonaparte, while the effort to take over Canada in the 1812-1815 war with England failed.

Above all, however, the United States expanded its territory at the expense of land belonging to the Indians, who were pushed back through deception or simply eliminated by the force of arms. At this point, a remark is required: usually, the overall description of the national history of a given country by our historiography presumes the interpretation and history of all nations or population groups living on its territory at different times, including most ancient ones. Is it accurate, on the basis of this premise, to consider the year 1607 as a starting point of U.S. history, i.e., the beginning of European colonization? In that case, how to treat the long and independent development of the native Indian population which had created a unique culture on the territory of the future United States long before the arrival of the colonists and which is, to this day, part of American society?

The tragedy of the Indians was that in their collision with the antihumane capitalist civilization, they were subject to violence, genocide and discrimination. They were unable to find a suitable place in American society and, subsequently, their contribution to American history was not properly interpreted. It is only in most recent decades, as a result of the enhancement of the struggle waged by the Indians for equality and recognition of their contribution to the development of the American nation, that the Indian topic has begun to be covered more extensively in history works. Thanks to the efforts of progressive historians, truthful works were published on the true rather than romanticized history of the "conquest" of the American West, which was accompanied by cruel military campaigns mounted by the authorities against the original owners of the conquered lands and the most stubborn resistance of the Indians themselves. The so-called "Indian migration" of the 19th century, in the course of which a significant percentage of the native population was physically destroyed, while

the remnants of hundreds of tribes were pushed into reservations, is described in the four-volume work in no more than a couple of pages. Obviously, this is the result of the inertia of the old historiographic tradition for which the time has long come to be surmounted by Soviet Americanists.

In order to give a legitimate aspect to the policy of foreign expansionism, in the 1820s the United States proclaimed the Monroe Doctrine. In evaluating it, as a rule American historians proceed essentially from relations between the United States and the European countries. In that case, priority is given to positive, to progressive aspects. It is obviously correct to pit the ideas of nonintervention and banning the further colonizing by European countries of the new world against the reactionary principles of legitimism and the "right" to intervene with a view to restoring the power of the "legitimate monarch," shared by the leaders of the Holy Alliance. However, as the authors indicate, this is merely one aspect of the matter. The essence of the Monroe Doctrine and its "double bottom" were manifested later, less in relations between the United States and the system of European countries than in Washington's policy within the Western Hemisphere. New England merchants and industrialists opposed the colonial monopoly of the European countries, supporting their interests of strengthening and expanding their own positions and influence in that area. As a result, the "principle of noncolonization," became, subsequently, a tool for the creation of a colonial sphere by the United States itself.

The unquestionable nature of this conclusion is confirmed by the entire subsequent behavior of the United States toward other countries on the American continent. The aggressive principle included in the doctrine was confirmed by the seizure of Texas, California, New Mexico and other territories in the middle of the 19th century, and the U.S. penetration into areas of Central America, the West Indies and the Pacific Basin in the second half of the 19th century, when it took over Hawaii and the Philippines. It is important to note that the Monroe Doctrine principles, expanded with the thesis of the "manifest destiny," did not disappear in the 20th century: continuous interference in the affairs of Latin American countries and the Caribbean, attempts to impose upon them a political order suitable to Washington, and armed intervention against a number of countries, including the 1983 attack on Grenada, are all quite convincing confirmations of this fact.

One of the biggest events in U.S. history was the 1861-1865 War Between the States. The authors of the book interpret this Civil War as a characteristic form of a bourgeois-democratic revolution, for the elimination of slavery and the overthrow of the power of slave owners were done in a revolutionary way and the Negroes, the small farmers and the working class played a decisive role in ensuring the victory in the Civil War. As to the international aspect of this event, Lenin noted the

"greatest, universal-historical, progressive and revolutionary significance of the 1863-1865 American Civil War!" ("Poln. *Sobr. Soch.*" [Complete Collected Works], vol 37, p 58). Nonetheless, this second American Revolution as well remained unfinished: the poor whites in the south were not given land while black Americans did not gain economic and political rights; the landed estates were not entirely eliminated. The consequences of slavery left their mark on the subsequent development of the United States and are felt to this day. Discrimination based on race remains one of the gravest problems in contemporary American society.

The history of the United States proves the familiar Marxist conclusion to the effect that the revolution is the locomotive engine of history. The subsequent period was a time when the United States became a country of progressive capitalism, considerably outstripping all countries in terms of the level of industrial output.

Developing initially at a fast pace and having assumed, after World War I, a leading position among the capitalist countries, U.S. capitalism maintained it by becoming the center of financial exploitation of the rest of the capitalist world and the dependent countries. World War II not only allowed the United States to surmount the consequences of the destructive "great depression" of the 1930s but also placed it in the position of a country unequal in terms of the economic potential of its competitors in the world capitalist economy. In the 1970s the U.S. hegemony in the capitalist world was questioned. This, however, did not indicate the loss of American economic ability to grow and, in some periods of time, quite significantly to increase its pace of growth. In recent decades American capitalism has mastered the achievements of scientific and technical progress on a broad scale, used new forms of international division of labor and accelerated radical structural changes in production.

Unfortunately, such an extensive study failed to allocate adequate space to depict with the necessary objectivity the way the powerful economic base influenced the material living conditions of the overwhelming majority of the United States population. It is impossible to deny the fact that the living standard of the Americans is one of the highest in the world. In turn, this shapes the social concepts and political and cultural-moral values of society and the world perception of the citizens. However, it nonetheless remains difficult for the reader to gain a sufficiently complete idea of the "American way of life" from the text of the book, and even less so from the illustrations which consist almost exclusively of a gallery of portraits and photographs of slums, camps for the unemployed, strikes and demonstrations, and lines for free lunch (although all of this does exist!)

What is not shown, however, is the "sated" America. We are not only sinning against historical truth but also simplifying the complexity and responsibility of this task, of this challenge which history itself has set to the

more progressive social system—socialism. This remark does not question in the least the assessment contained in the four-volume work of American capitalism, according to which "the determining factor in its general historical dynamics is advancing through the aggravation of profound contradictions (above all the antagonism between labor and capital and between the monopolies and society) toward a decline" (vol 4, p 706).

Here as well we must mention one of the most consistent laws in the development of human society in the stage of the capitalist socioeconomic system, the clear manifestation of which in U.S. history debunks all kinds of ideas on the exclusive nature of that country's past. A fierce class struggle is the main essence of the social development of the United States, as it is of any other capitalist state.

The class struggle of the proletariat and the actions of farmers, "progressives" and other mass social movements against monopoly rule, which occurred by the turn of the 20th century, were developed in the age of most recent history. Under the influence of the October Socialist Revolution, a communist movement appeared in the country and the U.S. Communist Party waged and is continuing to wage a struggle for the interests of the working people under most difficult circumstances. An anti-war and anti-fascist front developed in the 1930s. In the postwar decades America was shaken up by the Black and student actions of the 1960s and 1970s and the struggle by progressive forces against the Vietnam adventure and for American civil rights. Described in all of its details in this work, the history of the class struggle in the United States destroys the illusion of the unlimited ability of American capitalism to eliminate barriers among classes and to maintain the entire hierarchical system of the "social order" in a stable condition. Even computerization and other impressive accomplishments of scientific and technical progress have not transformed American capitalism into some kind of ideal condition or eliminated the very grounds for clashes and conflicts within the system of class relations.

The topic of the popular masses is one of the central topics in this work, and it is unquestionable that the authors have recreated the fullest possible and integral picture of the main motive force of social development and main source of changes in social forms: state-legal, party-political and ideological. It may appear that herein lies the unquestionable advantage of the integral Marxist-Leninist historical analysis compared with the artificial division of national history into "subhistories": fragments which are typical of many works of non-Marxist authors. However, we believe that some elements of the schematism which has been established in Soviet historiography in the interpretation of the history of popular masses may be seen in this work as well. Such an important topic has been traditionally reduced to the presentation, almost exclusively, of the organized forms of struggle by the working people (trade unions, political and social associations, and so on).



In recent years, however, and mainly through the efforts of supporters of the trend of so-called "new social history," a real breakthrough has been accomplished in world historiography in the area of the study of the popular lower classes and in the opening of new topics and approaches. As to the history of the United States, here qualitatively new knowledge has been obtained on problems such as the history of rural and urban municipalities, social strata, professional and age groups, families, the status of women, education and religion, the people's state of health and demographic processes. The inclusion of such data in a general historical context would, unquestionably, enrich our vision and understanding of the past, above all as the history of a nation, for even the most detailed description of the activities of the AFL-CIO or other similar topics does not rescue us from the "top," the elitist interpretation of even such a topic of priority to Marxist historians as the history of the people's masses. Obviously, the time has come to take a more comprehensive view of this topic which demands of Soviet students of American history to introduce new sources and new topics, as well as new methods for the study of mass historical data.

Soviet Americanists have acquired their greatest experience in the study of the domestic and foreign policy of the U.S. ruling circles. The work discusses in detail the political programs and real actions of the various presidential administrations and basic bourgeois parties—the democratic and the republican—and the changing deployment of political forces in the country at different historical stages. They have especially concentrated on foreign policy problems in interpreting postwar events, for never before have international relations played such an important role in the destinies of mankind as in the nuclear age, and never before has U.S. foreign policy assumed such a global nature. The reader will find a great deal of fresh and profound views and lively descriptions of specific historical events and personalities.

Nonetheless, this four-volume work bears the mark of the time during which it was written. In this connection, let us express one critical remark or, rather, amazement on the extent to which the mentality of reinsuring self-censorship has firmly entered our intellectual pores and the slowness with which we are abandoning our acquired ability, based on the sad experience of previous works, occasionally to write semi-anonymous histories. How else can we explain that in the history of tempestuous and saturated Soviet-American relations of recent decades it has become possible to mention in addition, naturally, to U.S. Presidents, virtually all leaders of the great powers, while actually failing to mention N.S. Khrushchev and L.I. Brezhnev? For the sake of this feat it even became necessary to fail to mention the first visit by a Soviet head of state to the United States in 1959, the results of which, incidentally, were by no means simple and have long demanded an objective scientific assessment.

This is the first time that historical-cultural topics have been properly included and organically made part of a general historical treatment. Each volume includes rich

data on American culture (graphic art and architecture, literature, theater, motion pictures and music), which enables us to judge not only of the cost of the ideologically aimed bourgeois "mass" culture but also the great accomplishments of the people of the United States, who enriched the world's cultural heritage. In shaping integral concepts of the image of the Americans, such data provides positive information which contributes to mutual international understanding. The fact that thanks to the efforts of a large collective of scientists, henceforth Soviet public and home libraries will include a work of 2,700 pages on the history of the United States does not simply open an additional "window to America" but also characterizes our society—its openness and desire to know and understand—and, therefore, to respect not only its own history but the history of other nations with whom we are destined peacefully to coexist in such difficult and worrisome times.

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#### Short Book Reviews

18020001q Moscow *KOMMUNIST* in Russian No 13, Sep 88 (signed to press 25 Aug 88) pp 126-128

[Text] G.L. Smirnov. "Revolyutsionnaya Sut Perestroiki" [The Revolutionary Nature of Perestroika]. Sociophilosophical Essay. Politizdat, Moscow, 1987, 223 pp. Reviewed by A. Dmitriyev, doctor of philosophical sciences.

Today any book on the problems of perestroika, particularly on the theoretical level, would naturally draw the attention of the readers. So far, unfortunately, we are noticing an acute shortage of such publications.

In our view, Academician G.L. Smirnov has made a fruitful attempt to consider some crucial aspects paralleling the revolutionary processes of the renovation of socialism. Most interesting among them is the sociophilosophical interpretation of the place of perestroika in the development of socialism and its historical perspectives. The party has formulated an integral concept and strategy for our advance. However, "The process of interpretation of the new problems and tasks," the author justifiably emphasizes, "has not ended. It is paralleling practical efforts, intertwining and interacting with them. The closer such interaction is the more fruitful the common results become (p 5).

It is no accident that the author has assigned a separate chapter to a critical review of the state of affairs in the social sciences, above all in the philosophy and theory of scientific communism, the serious lagging of which in recent decades was one of the essential elements of the obstruction mechanism, adversely affecting many areas of social life. Has the situation in the social sciences in the post-April period changed radically? Unfortunately, as in the past, comments and descriptive works predominate in sociophilosophical studies; there is virtually no



profound analysis of the lessons of the past and the interpretation of the new phenomena in the development of socialist society and its leading contradictions, including the contradictions which arise in the course of perestroika. However, the author does not provide a detailed analysis of the reasons for this worrisome situation prevailing in a number of social sciences, although the readers had the right to expect it.

The book contains interesting theoretical concepts on the future progress of socialism in our country and, in particular, on achieving a qualitatively new status of society. The strategy of acceleration of the socioeconomic development and perestroika in all areas of social life, formulated by the party, is based on innovative assessments in the interpretation of the present stage. In this connection, the theoretical interpretation of the long-term objectives of developing socialism becomes a topical task in the social sciences.

The comprehensive development of the individual could be described as one such main objective. As we know, there is a debate among social scientists on this matter. As to the author of this book, he believes that the requirements of the present stage in perestroika calls for a comprehensive development of the worker as a direct practical task of social priority.

This concept has been expanded quite well in the book: individual chapters deal with the correlation between objective laws and the creative activeness of the people, social awareness, interaction between masses and individuals in the historical process, and freedom as a requirement of the personality and of society. In short, the problem of the spiritual and moral development of man and society is at the center of this work.

Among the problems discussed in this book, let us also single out that of pluralism under socialism. This concept has only begun to be included in the range of problems studied by Soviet social scientists. Nonetheless, for quite some time it has been extensively used in bourgeois philosophy, political studies, and mass information media, which claim that in the capitalist countries there are unlimited personal rights and political freedoms, expressed in ideological and political pluralism. Such a claim is invariably accompanied by yet another stereotype: "totalitarianism" dominates in the USSR and the other socialist countries, the consequence of which is the absence or violation of democratic human rights.

What is actually happening? Why is it that the very concept of "pluralism" could be applied to socialism which is essentially a system different from capitalism? Obviously, such problems demand a serious scientific analysis on the part of philosophers, sociologists and law experts in order to provide an expanded answer to this topical problem.

The book under review is merely an initial attempt to bring to light the content of socialist pluralism. The

author substantiatedly opposes any effort to standardize social life under socialism, reducing it to monochromatic monotony; he justifiably believes that multiplicity of interests, positions, views and outlooks under socialism is an entirely legitimate phenomenon and that the very concept of "pluralism" has in a socialist society an entirely different content compared to the one invested in it by bourgeois ideologues (see pp 203-206).

The book is distinguished by its polemical approach to other topics. The author does not avoid sharp assessments and original formulations of problems. Naturally, it would be difficult in a brief review to evaluate the entire range of problems considered by G.L. Smirnov. Let us note, however, that the parts dealing with the "personal" aspect of the problems of building socialism would have benefited had the author expanded his viewpoint on the problem of alienation under socialism and its connection with the underdeveloped forms of socialist ownership in Soviet society and ways of surmounting alienation. It is hardly necessary to prove the importance of this question in terms of the intensification and codification of revolutionary changes in social awareness.

As a whole, many of the theoretical concepts expressed by the author raise interesting questions for fruitful thoughts and debates on the topical aspects of perestroika, taking into consideration the significant step which has been taken in their interpretation at the 19th Party Conference.

Yu.M. Osipov. "*Khozyaystvennyy Mekhanizm Gosudarstvenno-Monopolisticheskogo Kapitalizma*" [The Economic Mechanism of State-Monopoly Capitalism]. Moscow University Press, Moscow, 1987, 400 pp. Reviewed by V. Kuznetsov, doctor of economic sciences, and R. Yanovskiy, USSR Academy of Sciences corresponding member.

The development of the contemporary capitalist economy faces researchers with new complex problems. This applies, above all, to the study of the way the economic mechanism functions in practice, the trends of its evolution and the way it is adapting to changes in interrelationships and ratios of economic management. In our view, the book under review makes a noticeable contribution to the theoretical and practical development of such most important problems. The approach adopted in this book is rarely found today: it is based on the intersecting area among political-economic, philosophical, systems-analytical and specific economic aspects.

Yu. Osipov proceeds from the competitive-market nature of the mechanism of capitalist economic management. To the entrepreneur economic management means competition: organizing the production process, he must compete and, while competing, he must organize the production process (see p 78). Competition means complex rivalry between one capital and another and, at the same time, in a way, a competition of capitals against itself. This is one of the most important incentives for technical and economic development under capitalism.

The author provides an original study of the market. The market is considered, above all, as a society of entrepreneurs and only then as a social combination of capital with commodities. In other words, the market is not impersonal. Capital and commodities interact not by themselves but through the activities of the subjects, the entrepreneurs. The market is not only organized by the entrepreneurs but organizes them as well. This applies to the economic and the management systems.

The author systematically considers the historical forms of the capitalist economic mechanism and identifies the laws governing their development and replacement. Initially, the mechanism of free competition and market was consistent with capitalism. In the final quarter of the 19th century, it found itself in a state of profound crisis out of which it emerged as a result of its qualitative transformation. The result was that the free competitive-market mechanism became a monopolistically controlled competitive-market mechanism.

This brought to light the need for the development not only of private but also public regulation of the reproduction of capital. The bourgeois state became its leading character. However, statification could not be achieved with the same degree of intensiveness as monopolization. Initially, the bourgeoisie tried to solve the problem of regulating on a private basis, i.e., on the basis of a private monopoly. It was only in the course of a new and protracted production crisis in the 1930s that the statification of the mechanism proved entirely inevitable. As the result and manifestation of the socialization of the capitalism mechanism, monopolization and statification do not lose their ties with the private economic foundation of capitalism which they transform but do not eliminate.

In analyzing the problem of the development of the capitalist system in connection with its adaptation to the new conditions—increasing technological changes and internationalization of production—the author concludes that the further development of the economic mechanism will take place within the framework of the internationalized state-monopoly form. In his view, this is consistent with the overall trend of conversion of state-monopoly capitalism to international state-monopoly capitalism (see p 365).

At the same time, the author notes the historical limitations of capitalism. Production internationalization, even adopting a global form, in his definition, cannot solve the problem of a conversion "to the creation of a unified and regulated global economy based on a common plan, as an entity..." (V.I. Lenin, *"Poln. Soch."* [Completed Collected Works], vol 41, p 164).

We believe, however, that the problem of singling out the economic mechanisms within the social systems deserves further discussion: the author's view on the need for such singling out in a few developed systems only does not seem absolutely acceptable. We must comprehensively study the phenomenon of competition, above all in the aspect of the

possibility of its existence under the conditions of its functioning in noncapitalist economic systems. A more thorough study is needed of the idea of the processes of internationalization of contemporary capitalism. In short, many of the views expressed in that book provide extensive opportunities for a discussion.

The work under review provides numerous examples of the philosophical interpretation of processes of capitalist economic management. The author skillfully leads the reader into the dialectical world of contradictions inherent in bourgeois enterprise. In moving in this complex labyrinth, and in observing the most complex transitions of opposites, the spiral development of economic processes, the gradual accumulation of their number, and their subsequent conversion into a new quality, the reader can clearly feel the "effect" of dialectics. Unquestionably, this is confirmation of the high philosophical standard of Yu. Osipov's work.

Finally, as to the style. It is no secret that the sins of many social science studies are their stereotypes and "memorized" style and cliches. For that reason even new ideas frequently remain unnoticed and the reader fails to detect valuable scientific findings. This book deals with a rather "dry" and unemotional topic. However, it has been written in a very meaningful, precise and, we would say, intellectual style in which words provide broad scope for the work of the mind.

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